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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to break with the habit of much
criticism of Wyndham Lewis, which has been to rely on the various
classes of Lewis' non-fictional discourse in the interpretation of
his fiction and satire.
To this end, Chapter 1 undertakes a short survey of the bulk
of major Lewis criticism, and indicates the several limitations
attendant thereupon, in the form of too restricted models of intei—
pretation. This chapter ends with a brief account of the method that
I myself will adopt. In essence, this will be to go 'outside' the
confinement of Lewisian discourse, as it were, in order to bring
external bodies of knowledge to the examination of his work.
In Chapter 2 (which occupies nine sections) I attempt to show
how the ant i-Christian heresies embraced by the term 'Gnosticism',
and the conceptual structure of Persian dualism, informed Lewis' work
both theoretically and imaginatively, and adduce evidence of his
interest in these systems. Lewis' attitude to nature, his conception
of good and evil, his aestheticized theology and the theory of satire
(or satiric philosophy) expressed in Hen Without Art can, in my view,
be called Gnostic. That term might also be applied to the attitude
of certain of his protagonists, to the allusive and imaginative syn¬
cretism of parts of The Apes of God, to an eschato 1ogica1 structure
discernible in that novel, to a creation myth expounded in Ma 1 ign
Fiesta, and to other elements of that novel (though in a less positive
sense than in Lewis' previous work).
In Chapter 3 (in six sections) I introduce a new way of looking
at Lewis' satire. In his capacity as a satirist, I relate Lewis to
the earliest manifestations of that genre (in Ancient Greece), when
it was believed that the satirist had the potency to kill through the
word. Such a belief has persisted to the present, undergoing a trans¬
formation from a literal to a symbolic significance. Its presence,
and the urges and intentions associated with it, I trace in Lewis'
theory, polemics, verse and satiric fiction. In addition, I examine
his affiliation with the figures of the railer and the Cynic, who,
on account of the virulence of their utterance, have in some ways
been associated with the proto-satirists. In a discussion of The
Apes of God, I present Lewis as a 'revenge-satirist', motivated by an
impulse to satirize to death the objects of his hate. Finally, I
return to Ma 1ign Fiesta as the point at which, a Christian theology
beginning to emerge in Lewis, attended by quilt over the character of
his career as a satirist, a twin departure is signalled in his work,
from the traditions expounded in Chapters 2 and 3.
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A Short Survey of some of the Major Criticism
of Wyndham Lewis
1.
In this introductory chapter, I want to indicate what seem to me
to be the types of limitation by which some of the major specimens of
Lewis criticism are affected, by means of a short chronological sur¬
vey. In doing so, I hope to adumbrate in some degree the approach I
myself will take in subsequent chapters; but this I will give clearer
notice of in my concluding remarks.
Hugh Gordon Porteus1 Wyndham Lewis: A Discursive Exposition (1932)
was written so close to the influence of Porteus1 master (Lewis) that
commenting upon it is an uncertain business. Porteus (an artist by
training) produced elsewhere an amusing account of intimate sessions
with Lewis;(l) and Lewis' biographer remarks that, '(Lewis and Porteus)
had the earliest of many quarrels when Porteus refused to let Lewis
write the book for him.'(2) But the evidence for Lewis' having inter¬
fered with the preparation of the book is considerable; for, quite
aside from Porteus' very evident partisanship, his fluency in Lewis'
unmistakable idiolect is so pronounced as to make one suspicious of
Lewis' oral, if not literary, involvement; and that Porteus was
Lewis' oracle, or his amanuensis, is suggested by almost every page.
The diction of the following passage, for example, (where the sent¬
ence beginning with a conjunction is something of a Lewisian give¬
away) seems to anticipate the central chapters (on satire and the 'ex¬
ternal' method) of Men Without Art (193^),
Mr Lewis runs the rich raw stuff, the molten material, piping
hot, into a carefully chiselled mould kept well below zero.
The finished figures are lifted from their matrices and
presented cool, clear-cut and firm. Or they crystallize
with a frosty stellar click. (3)
as does the sentiment of this: 'And Satire is the fine hair-line that
divides Humour from Tragedy.'(4)
The pervading of the text by this curious double voice is, in
fact, forcefully precursive of one of the dominant strains of much
2.
Lewis criticism to follow, namely, the excessive influencing of the
critic by Wyndham Lewis' own ideas or precepts - Lewis is used to
read Lewis. Here, however, there is an elaboration on this pattern,
produced by the intimacy of the critic with his subject, namely
Lewis' using Porteus to offer an interpretation of Lewis. Yet as an
heuristic process, we need not of necessity set too much store by
this. For how much the theoretical or critical Lewis reveals about
the creative Lewis, it is not simple to assess - though much criti¬
cism seems to assume a simple relationship between his philosophical
criticism, polemics, and so on, and his fiction (a matter to which I
must return in this chapter)-; and Porteus is manifestly propagandiz¬
ing throughout his study, on behalf of his subject, and his subject's
dogmas.
What we get, once the matter of Porteus' small critical indepen¬
dence has been remarked, is a reduction of Lewis' satire to a supreme
(in Porteus' view) techn i ca 1 performance, with scarcely any external,
historical reference or psychological analysis of the satirist (except
that Porteus does not believe Lewis capable of spleen (5)). Thus,
having asserted that 'All Mr Lewis's creative works are satires of
some kind,'(6) Porteus establishes the two poles of Lewis' satire:
'The Painter's Eye, I have called the "positive instrument" of Mr
his
Lewis's satire. The "negative instrument" is of courseAMsense of
humour".'(7) Humour, however, where Porteus is concerned, derives
from the way Lewis gets us to look at the world he portrays, namely
with unsentimental detachment,(8) and his means of delivering this
vision is what Porteus terms 'The Painter's Eye'. This instrument,
therefore, is, it could be argued, for Porteus the controlling
principle of Lewis' satire. Its modus operandi he summarizes thus:
3.
(Lewis') eye sees a coloured shape, matches it from stock
(i.e.}memory) with a different object having an approxi¬
mately identical colour or shape, and hands it back. The
reader, unless he is a painter and 'on duty,' will regard
the resulting image with a human eye, alive to the func¬
tions and associations of the paired objects. In relating
the two parts of the image, he will be forced to rea1ize
the essential shape and colour which the painter's eye
sees; but he wi11 also be shocked (agreeably or uncomfort¬
ably, according to his liabilities) by the inconqruity.
T, . , , . , , . . tl.e, form of / . . \ , .
This shock will issue in a Iauqhte r lor disgust] - but its
effect will be to convey a very vivid impression of the
object i tself. (9)
Such a conflation of the Formalist concept of 'defami1iarization'
with that of the metaphysical 'conceit' supposes that the reader (who
is not a painter) will be surprised by the Lewisian method into see¬
ing as a painter sees. It may well have been the case with Porteus
(who was a painter); but as an account of how, in general, Lewis'
descriptions work, it is probably too decisive, since a 'very vivid
impression of the object itself' is, as Hugh Kenner later argued,
just what we do not get from Lewis' prose-method;(10) rather, we
receive an astonishing hail of disparate visual detail.
Beyond this, in arguing that Lewis is the visual writer nonpareil
(which one may be disposed to agree with, without having to accept the
doctrine of 'The Painter's Eye'),
Blake was a visue 1 . But Mr Lewis brings the technique of
the visue 1 to its logical extreme; there is no more vivid
visua 1 writing in the whole of literature, it is safe to
say, than that which is to be found in The Enemy of the
Stars , The Apes of God, The Chi1dermass" (11)
Porteus is classing Lewis' satire as sui generis, as a 'phenomenon',
that is to say, and cutting off all contact with any tradition of
satiric expression, having, as pointed out above, reduced the body of
satire in question to a matter for formal consideration, without re¬
gard to the ideas, energies or beliefs that may have motivated it.
The model which he uses to account for Lewis' satire is too limited
h.
and specific by far to reveal more than a fraction of the nature of
that satire.
Hugh Kenner's short study of Lewis, Wyndham Lewis (195M>has
acquired an aura of defin i tiveness that seems to have left the
Lewisian critic struggling to say something new. Paul Edwards summed
up the state of affairs when (writing as recently as 1986) he referred
to 'the prospect of Wyndham Lewis criticism continuing to be not much
more than a series of footnotes to Hugh Kenner.'(l2) Why this should
be might be ascribed to the eclat with which Kenner generally ex¬
presses himself, particularly as this manifests itself in his way of
synthesizing or co-ordinating widely separated tracts of Lewis' work
in a single statement, as:
It is in Blast that the Wyndham Lewis who appeared in
silence on Ford's stairway finds an appropriate tongue.
It is explosive in principle as well as'^strategy. . . I t
is, vastly elaborated, the style of its showpiece, the
1928 Chi1dermass, and its mechanisms underlie the
wonderfully expressive prose of Lewis's masterpiece, the
1937 Revenge for Love. (13)
Confined to the question of style, such broad assertions are
relatively safe, and may be very illuminating (Kenner backs up the
example given some pages on - 'vastly elaborated' is not the grand
and idle opinion it might at first seem). (]'k) But we are again in
the presence of the habit - initiated in Porteus, evident less im¬
pressively elsewhere in Kenner's book, and to harden among later
critics - of using Wyndham Lewis as a self-expository principle;
either within the same mode of discourse, or across different
classes, Lewis is brought to bear upon Lewis. The limitations atten¬
dant upon such a method, I shall indicate in proceeding through the
list of Lewis' critics. Here, Kenner has justified his treatment
through the premise - not dissimilar to that evident in Porteus'
study - that Lewis is sui generis: 'In 191^ he (Lewis) seems resolved
5.
never again to write a phrase that will betray a hint of literary ante¬
cedents .1 (15)
Yet when Kenner considers Lewis' fictional characters, we find
that he adopts an analogous method. That is to say, he declares a
prototype, here biographica1 - 1iterary and emanating apocryphally
from Lewis himself, and schematizes its subsequent appearances in
Lewis' novels as reversions to type. Yet the dash of Kenner's formu¬
lations is effected at the expense of noticing what the novels actually
say. Thus, from the legendary appearance of Lewis at the residence of
Ford Hadox Ford bearing the manuscript of "The Pole", Kenner produces
a Lewisian emanation which he calls the 'Man from Nowhere':
This mystery man without a past had before him in 1909 a
lively future. He is the Wyndham Lewis protagonist who
arrives from nowhere onto the pages of the book: succes¬
sively Kreisler in Tarr, Ker-Orr in The Wild Body, Zagreus
in The Apes of God, Kell-lmrie in Snooty Baronet, Hard-
caster in The Revenge for Love, and Vincent Penhale in The
Vulgar Streak .
and
(Tarr)... is essentially the Lewisian Man from Nowhere
and
(Kreisler) has made the Lewis entrance fromnowhere, a
total stranger and the only man present not in evening
d ress. (16)
But what, or how much, exactly, is this telling us? It seems
significant - that, to put it perhaps too cynically, is Kenner's
trick - but, on closer inspection, will be seen to be registering,
merely, a superficial impression, and a rather vague one at that:
many of Lewis' protagonists make dramatic entrances? they appear in
mid-career, as it were, unlike the heroes of nineteenth century
novels, whom we know from birth? they are not gradually and carefully
introduced to us? But if that is all that Kenner's impression con¬
sists of - though he seems to be intimating more - he has a portentous
6.
way of putting it. Yet if he does mean more than that, he is, simply,
wrong. For to suggest that the Lewisian protagonist is as cut off
from any semblance of a fictional past as Lewis, swathed in black on
Ford's staircase, pretended to be from his past, is to supplant care¬
ful reading of the texts in question with a rather obsessive a
priorism - as I have intimated above.
For although Zagreus does arrive with a sweep in the passage
quoted by Kenner (17), it is quite wrong to characterize him as a
'mystery man without a past'. On the contrary, he is a veteran presence
in the world of the Apes. Lionel Kein tells Dan Boleyn that he and
Zagreus have been friends for 'longer than you've been alive', and
'"Hallo Zagreus! Where have you been all this time?"' isn't the
salutation you would normally offer to a 'man from nowhere'.(18) In
fact, of all the characters in that novel, Zagreus alone is provided
with the status of someone who, far from appearing from nowhere, has
always been around, to which effect, the narrative furnishes much
circumstantial detail: he has been a surveyor; he had a post in the
Civil Service; his tricks are conversation pieces; he did this
thirty-odd years ago, he did that two weeks ago, etc., etc...(19)
As with Kreisler. Only by ignoring what the novel tells us can
Kenner decree that Kreisler's outrages at Fraulein Lipmann's house
party and the Bonnington Club should be perpetrated by 'a total
stranger1. The text (I am referring here to the 1918 edition of Tarr,
which Kenner uses) reveals that before the events of this night,
'Kreisler came a few weeks running to the Lipmann soiree,' and that,
'On the preceding evening, he had paid one of his unaccountable calls
on Fraulein Lipmann, the first for some time'. (20) Indeed, Kreisler
has become sufficiently familiar with Lipmann and her ladyfriends to
have been marked down by her as persona non grata, because he has
stopped attending her evenings. (21)
7.
To seek to deflate Kenner in this way may seem prosaic, or cap¬
tious, or too 1itera1-minded; but we ought not to have to ac¬
cept as definitive assertions of the order of,
The liaison between the puppet-fiction and the polemics is
easy to discern. These people incarnate the ideas the
polemics are directed against. The unfinished Ch i 1dermass
(1928) is simply The Art of Being Ruled dramatized. (22)
It is not 'simply' the polemic 'dramatized', a magisterially lazy
reduction of the sort that echoes, rather more solemnly, through much
writing on Lewis (for example, 'Difficult to read and to describe...
the novel dramatized many of the political ideas of The Art of Being
Ru1ed'.(23)) One knows, in a sense, that Kenner did not mean just
that (though it sets a bad example), but he is himself tendentious
here, since he does not want to applaud more than necessary a novel
which disappoints his own humanist predilections: '...the marvelous
verbal inventiveness of The Chi1dermass doesn't compensate for a
certain tedium consequent upon the replacement of persons by dia¬
lectical puppets.'(24) Yet even there, his qualified tribute is only
to the conversations at the court of the Bailiff. What of the imagi¬
native feats of the novel, such as the creation of the peons, the
mobile landscape, the 'Time-trek' through an eighteenth century
English Lilliput? (25) Even here, I suppose, Kenner might have
referred Lewis' imagination back to Lewis himself by stating that
such sequences 'simply' fictionalize certain ideas explored in Time
and Western Man (as if imagination can 'simply' be referred to theory
for its exposition). But nothing in Kenner's scheme can account for
the visionary conception that is the Bailiff's first entrance, which
'fictionalizes' or 'dramatizes' nothing to be found in Lewis' philo¬
sophical criticism, but, as Fredric Jameson later well expressed it,
ignites a flash of recognition in the collective unconscious; it is
8.
ve.ry
grotesque, terrible, universal: 1 The*appearanee of the Bailiff...
(is) as archetypal as all great character creation, yet as familiar
as the household bogeyman...We seem to remember such a figure, which
surely did not need to wait for Lewis to invent it.1 (26)
It is not very far from that last statement of Kenner's (about
the 'liaison between the puppet-fiction and the polemics') to the
entire premise of Geoffrey Wagner's Wyndham Lewis: A Portrait of the
Artist as the Enemy (1957); Wagner merely inverts the relationship
of Lewis' theoretical and satiric productions:
if it is true, then, that (Lewis') critical grew out of
his creative work, it must make any consideration of his
criticism especially interesting as illuminating his en¬
tire artistic genius. For it follows that if we resume
Lewis' criticism, we resume the purpose of his satire.
And as we inspect this criticism what we find is as repre-r co" tar« por<t-ry _
sentative a statement ofaneoc1 assicism as can be found in
any English writer. (27)
Ergo - Lewis' satire is in essence neo-classical? But 'grew' is a
shaky verb in Wagner's protasis, yet leads to the emphatic 'must' in
the dependent clause. How did the one body of work 'grow' from the
other, and in such a way, moreover, as Wagner implies, for Lewis'
criticism to account exhaustively for his satire? A brief inspection
of the dates of publication of certain works (in making which, how¬
ever, one should bear in mind that Lewis was working on several books
at once during the 1920's, which were to have composed the projected
Man of the World opus) seems to invalidate Wagner's premise, even if
he meant only that the need to be a critic developed somehow from the
being an artist: The Tyro 1921 - 1922; The Art of Being Ruled 1926;
The Lion and the Fox 1927 (but completed about 1925); The Enemy 1927;
Time and Western Man 1927; The Chi1dermass 1928; Pa 1eface 1929; The
Apes of God 1930. (Satire and Fiction and Men Without Art conform
with Wagner's proposition, at least insofar as they were published
9.
after The Apes of God: but how much the dissertation in Men Without
Art reveals about The Apes of God - its vision, intention and animus,
that is to say, not its formal qualities - is problematic, if dealt
with more than superficially, as I will show in Chapter 3, section
(v)). Furthermore, Lewis states that his criticism and polemics,
rather than 'growing' from his satires in some way, in fact prepared
a space in the public mind for those satires' accommodation:
No Ch i 1 dermass (Part 1.) would ever havebeen written if I
had not cleared the ground first. The Apes of God could
not have been done at all if I had not, beforehand, para¬
lysed all the most troublesome 'Apes' in my neighbourhood. (28)
Yet even if Wagner's initial proposition were sound, in what way
does 'resuming' Lewis' criticism 'resume the purpose of his satire'?
Undeniably, some of the debates and analyses of Lewis' philosophical
criticism and polemics are carried over into his satire: the
"Encyclical" in The Apes of God, for example, echoes some of the con¬
tent of the chapter "Super-Freedom of the Revolutionary Rich" in The
Art of Being Ruled (29); and the exposure of the cults of inversion
and of the child in The Art of Being Ruled is one concern of The Apes
of God, as is the monopoly of taste arrogated by the vulgar rich, an
idea which Lewis used Benda's Be 1phegor to illustrate in the former.
(30) But to point out as much is merely to acknowledge that among
the totality of Lewis' interests as a writer was one set of isomeric
concerns, which may find expression in different literary states; and
it is to concede that sometimes in Lewis, the narrative voice falls
away into the phi1osophica1-didactic, which led to Pound's observa¬
tion (upon The Apes): 'The orthodox Flaubertian groans when Mr
Lewis springs an "encyclical" several pages of dogma or argument
quite likely to be Mr Lewis' own;' (31) it is not to 'illuminate
Lewis' entire artistic genius' - a phrase which suggests that in Lewis,
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criticism and creation, or rhetoric and vision, run in the same cir¬
cuit, differing only in degree, and separated merely by a few volts of
imagination. Indeed, if Lewis' satire could be as readily accounted
for by his criticism as Wagner supposes, then the former would be a
very superficial business indeed, giving the lie to the following
statement of Lewis' compositional habits:
At the time (Lewis is referring to around 1927) I had a sort
of rule, to the effect that one page of fiction should take
anything from five to ten times as long as a page of non-
fiction ...Mere 1y re-writing 'Tarr', I recall, took longer
than it did to write a book named 'The Diabolical Principle'. (32)
Then what of the assertion in Wagner's third sentence, namely,
that Lewis' criticism epitomizes neo-c1 assicism in English letters?
His criticism, as well as his satire, is essentia 11y of a neo¬
classical disposition? But, arguably, all that is essential about
Lewis' philosophica1-criticaI position is its pessimism. And, more¬
over, as much in his critical as his creative work does the (plati¬
tudinous, I am afraid) image of the iceberg apply. That is to say,
Lewis' significant theoretical debts are often unannounced or con¬
cealed (a process which he sometimes went about by attacking his
creditors - Nietzsche, for example, who could not be cited as one of
Lewis' neo-classical influences) i ri a manner somewhat analogous to
that in which the sources of his fiction, his imaginative influences,
are not necessarily dogmatically manifested in his aesthetic pro¬
grammes or dissertations. The earlier of these two points, in fact,
has been made in a doctoral thesis, by Alan Munton: '(Lewis')
variety of impartiality is partly based on the refusal to adopt any
position that might allow him to be identified with any faction or
political group. On other occasions, Lewis deliberately obscures his
position. It is difficult to believe, reading the chapter in The Art
of Being Ruled entitled "Nietzsche as Vu1garizer", that Nietzsche was
11.
also a major influence upon Tarr and other works...Such indirectness
is the consequence of a general unwillingness, on Lewis's part, to
identify the positive sources of his work. Again, further difficul¬
ties of interpretation follow from what may have been genuine doubts
as to his position.1 (33)
Accordingly, the classification of Lewis' satire and Lewis'
criticism categorically as neo-classical, though here and there it
may be apt, is bound to seem to be offering only a fraction of the
truth when the basis upon which that classification is made is re¬
versed or contradicted by Lewis. And Lewis' habitual (in Hunton's
terms, intentional) contradictoriness is a constant stumbling block
for the critic who brings to bear upon his work a too narrow and
decisive model of interpretation.
Thus, Wagner cites "The Code of a Herdsman" in evidence of the
idea that 'Lewis has been typically neoclassical in hiding behind
some fictional mask',
The Herdsman is advised to adopt six different personalities
to keep h imse 1 f pure of the herd.
It is necessary to stress this because, by adopting at
least six such personalities himself, Lewis makes it hard
to take much of his criticism directly.
and lists some of the personalities or alter egos (or does he mean
personae?) adopted by Lewis in order to dramatize his criticism:
Cantleman, Bland Burn, the Enemy, Rene Harding, and so on. (3^0
But if Lewis was 'typically neoclassical' in adopting different
'personalities', in projecting fictional or dramatic selves, he re¬
commended an opposite practice of self in the essay "Physics of the
Not-SeIf":
We have one, life, and we have one indvidua1ity. It is a
ration, as it were. It is an 'ob1igation'...to devote all
our energies to that^self, and not to poach. We were not
born twenty men, but one. (35)
12.
As he did in that volume which Wagner regards as the core of his neo¬
classical criticism (The Art of Being Ruled):
The more highly developed an individual is, or the more
civilized a race, this discontinuity (Lewis means, for
example, between the various stages of a person's life)
tends to disappear. The 'personality' is born. Con¬
tinuity, in the individual as in the race, is the diag¬
nostic of a civilized condition. If you can break this
personal continuity in an individual, you can break him.
For Jne is that continuity. It is against these joints
and sutures of the personality that an able attack will
always be directed. You can divide a person against
himself, unless he is very well organized.... You can with
luck cut men up so thoroughly that they become almost
'six-months men,'...rather than men of one continuous
personal life - than 'life men.' It is only necessary
to mention the central subject of the very effective and
fashionable plays of Pirandello to show how...this segre¬
gation of the 'selves' of which the personality is
composed can affect the public mind. (36)
Here, it is maintained that singularity or continuity is the condition
of selfhood that marks the artist or intellectual, as it is the con¬
dition of order among groups or classes of men; the tendency to split
or divide is a symptom of decadence or romantic disorder; any habit
of the self that dissolves its own permanence in the interests of
plurality is not an instrument of neo-classical detachment, but, con¬
versely, a psychic flaw that makes the individual vulnerable (to
satiric attack, for example). The psychological novelty of the
multiple self is exploited in modern drama; and the reference to
Pirandello is much elaborated in The Apes of God, in the passages where
Zagreus explains that the common desire of the Apes is to acquire a
second self, by being transformed into characters in one another's
novels;(37) while the idea that when people pretend to more than one
self they are particularly prone to satiric attack is also evident in
the story "A Soldier of Humour", which I discuss in my third chapter.
Again, when Wagner comes to the question of style, he falls into
the error of interpreting a position as definitive, as all there is to
13.
Lewis . Thus, in Chapter 17, "The External Approach", he summarizes
Lewis' "Philosophy of the Eye". This 'philosophy' Wagner associates
with neo-c1 assicism via Benda's Be 1phegor, and considers it an anti-
Bergsonian attack on the faculty of intuition:
It was in Time and Western Man that Lewis first adumbrated
at length his "philosophy of the eye." It alone gave
reality, unaffected by the "darkness" of the aural and
tactile world. Untroubled by the lower senses, the optic
sense placed the world of common-sense reality as directly
as possible before the intellect. In fact, the eye _i_s the
intellect, "private organ" of the senses, the "person" in
the human organism.
'Like Joyce's Shaun,' Wagner protests, '(Lewis) is an eyeman. How
many times has he told us this?' (38)
Yet he does not pause to consider why Lewis is always telling us
this, or asserting too insistently his bias, as:
Dogmatically, then, I am for the Great Without, for the
method of externa 1 approach - for the wisdom of the eye,
rather than that of the ear. (39)
May it not be the case that the very reiteration of the concern with
externality, with the outside, and of the predilection for the eye,
is, in itself, a sort of psychological mask (as well as, or even more
than, in Wagner's terms, a phi1osophica1-aesthetic obsession)?
Nietzsche's comments upon the choice of the superficies as the de¬
marcation of the interests of a certain type of intellectual or
artist, it may not be without point to cite here:
He who has seen deeply into the world knows what wisdom
there is in the fact that men are superficial. It is
their instinct for preservation which teaches them to be
fickle, light and false. Here and there, among philoso¬
phers as well as artists, one finds a passionate and
exaggerated worship of 'pure forms': let no one doubt
that he who needs the cult of surfaces (my italics) to
that extent has at some timeA°macie a calamitous attempt
to get beneath them. (40)
And the following observation from a most interesting essay by Martin
14.
Seymour-Smith seems pertinent: 'Lewis worked consistently hard to
keep his imagination under restraint, and transform it into polemical
energy. He tried to ignore the non-cerebral elements in creativity.
Perhaps he was afraid of his imagination in rather the same way as
Swift (justifiably) was of his. Certainly the fierce hardness of
outline that characterizes his painting and most of his prose may be
seen as gaining its firmness from a need to curb and control a violent
and wild passionateness of nature.1 (4l)
But Lewis, in a passage which I do not recall having seen dis¬
cussed by any of his critics, and which was written before the
"Philosophy of the Eye" was announced, seems to be offering the fuller
conception of artistic expression which, it is here being supposed,
the later dogma was intended to suppress. The passage occurs in the
second number of The Tyro (it will be necessary to quote at length):
It is more difficult to exercise our imagination when the eye
is operating. (The ear, being blind, is in that respect
better off.) The practical and very necessary belittlement
accomplished for us by the eye at the same time invalidates
its claim to priority as the king organ (my italics) where
imaginative expression is concerned, although in every other
sense it is so supreme. ... In dreams, however, the eye is
in every way supreme. Our dreams are so muffled (or are such
dreams only a painter's?) that they are nearly as silent as
the Kinema. There the mind, by arranging things as it re¬
quires them for its own delight or horror, can get the full
emotional shock, the purely visionary quality. . . .In what
does this 'emotional' quality, the stripping of things and
people by the eye of their more significant and complete
emotional vesture,consist? Simply in an incessant analysis
of the objects presented to us for the practical purposes of
our lives. We are given by the eye too much: a surfeit of
information and 'hard fact', that does not, taken literally,
tally with our completer values for the objects in question.
To make up, from the picture presented to us by the eye, a
synthesis of a person orithing, we must modify the order for
which the eye is responsible, and eliminate much of the
physical chaos that only serves to separate us from the
imaginative truth we are seeking. . . . The eye, in itself,
is a stupid organ, or shall we say a stolid one. It is
robust to a fault, where the ear is, if anything, hyper¬
sensitive. Everything received through the eye from the
outside world has to be 'treated' before it can be presented
to the imagination with a chance of moving it. (42)
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It is unusual and fascinating to witness Lewis in this way estimate
the ear over the eye, indeed, deprecate the latter organ. His doing
so seems to suggest that, as Seymour-Smith thought, and as the pas¬
sage from Nietzsche - if we may in some sense apply it to Lewis -
explained, the constant attending to the shells and carapaces of
things that is the salient trait of Lewis' satiric style was, in it¬
self, a carapace of sorts. That is to say, though Lewis repeated that
satire must remain upon the surface - where, alone, the eye can con¬
duct its 'necessary be 1itt1ement' - as an artist, he did not want, in
a sense, to take his position exclusively on the outside. Or, the
external, objective, scientific truth of satire was not, for Lewis,
essential; 'to set up the Shell as your shield, against the Dark
Within' (43) was a rhetorical necessity, but, ultimately for Lewis, a
false creed. We may state this if we allow an imaginative, as well
as a hard, objective, component to Lewis' satires - and in The Apes
of God and The Chi1dermass, for example, the former is quite evident;
(and even if Lewis gives back to the eye its dominance in the dream,
that visionary faculty of the eye is categorically distinct from the
common-sense function of the eye which Wagner designated a neo¬
classical, ant i - i ntu i t i ve instrument). The Apes of God, I shall con¬
centrate on particularly in subsequent chapters within symbolic frames
of interpretation, even as I comment upon the satire. Here, a short
comment by L.P. Hartley may suffice, as evidence of his impression
that the 'surfeit' of 'hard fact' dispensed by the eye was, in the
composition of that novel, at least in some degree 'treated', to
confer a strange, grotesque aspect:
(Lewis') superb prose s ty 1 e .. .(i s) somehow divorced from
reality. He creates a world which has the same relation
to our own as a. landscape in the moon might have for a
terrestrial landscape. It is terrifying and impressive
and alien. (44)
And these comments might be concluded with the observation that the
most mysterious passage in The Apes (which I shall discuss in
Chapter 2, section (viii)) indeed shows something like an irruption
of "imaginative truth" past Lewis' externalist ordinance, the displac
ing of the "Philosophy of the Eye" or 'cult of surfaces' (in
Nietzsche's phrase) by an impulse towards a deeper expressiveness.
Finally, to move from the theoretic to the personal level, there
is no mistaking in Wagner a less than favourable spirit towards Lewis
Often, this manifests itself in swipes at Hugh Kenner, 'who verges on
the uncritical in some of his opinions on Lewis,' and is Lewis'
'Catholic apologist.' Approving criticism of Lewis 'must remain
op i nionative,' while hostile critics are men of proven excellence:
'Irving Howe, author of some brilliant criticism in the contemporary
field, writes: "When a charlatan like Wyndham Lewis is revived and
praised for his wisdom, it is done, predictably, by a Hugh Kenner
(Wagner killing two birds with one quote) in the Hudson Review".' (45)
In 1955, in a letter to Ruthven Todd, Lewis, who had seen parts
of Wagner's book while it was in preparation, wrote: '...in certain
writing of Wagner I remarked errors regarding my works which seem to
me deliberate. He is, you know, a nephew of Fanny Wadsworth. He is
a nice fellow but he may inherit family feuds.' (46)
The cause of these feuds is documented by Lewis' biographer.
Edward and Fanny Wadsworth set up a relief fund for Lewis in 1923,
the depending upon which made him resentful, causing him to behave
with disgraceful ingratitude.(47) Probably on account of this
affair, Lewis put them in The Apes of God, where they are treated
very roughly indeed.(48) The dedication of Wagner's book might,
therefore, be read as a rather oblique statement of the 'first
principles' that Lewis thought the critic should be obliged to
announce, so that 'we should all know where we stood' (49) - the
dedication reading: 'To the memory of my uncle, EDWARD WADSWORTH,
who first introduced me to the work of Wyndham Lewis.'
To have mentioned this is more than a matter of incidental in¬
terest, since it indicates the as if radioactive quality that satire
may possess, to contaminate with its own animosity criticism that
has fallen within its field of force, even at some degree of remote¬
ness, or indirectly. This point is not without bearing upon my dis¬
cussion of satire as a symbolic form of vengeance, and Lewis as a
'revenge-satirist1, in Chapter 3.
I will not dwell on William Pritchard's study Wyndham Lewis
(1968), except to state that it is, in my view, the most attentive
and observant work on Lewis to date. It is an antidote to all forms
of reductive or a priorist Lewis criticism, to the selecting, or
compelling, of data from Lewis' art to meet formulae, or conform to
narrow models, derived by the critic on insufficient grounds, to the
too confident acceptance of Lewis' dogmas as decisive, to excessive
deference to Lewis' philosophical criticism as an informing influence
over his novels. Rather than attempting to produce an essential
Lewis, it recognizes and registers variety and discontinuity in the
fiction, or where Lewis seems to be uncertain, or to be going against
his own grain. It may suffice here to acknowledge, as exemplary, two
instances in which Pritchard's attention delivers up passages of
critical importance to our understanding of the nature and develop¬
ment of Lewis' satiric aesthetic.
The first is what Pritchard calls 'one of the strangest sequences
in (Tarr) ' . It is also one of the most revealing and awkward in all
Lewis' writing, and occurs when Tarr is threatened by Kreisler (whom
he has been pursuing for his own amusement) with a dogwhip. Tarr
realizes that the satirist's attitude is always a matter of arroga-
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tion, rather than of right, and that contempt for others mus t, in the
end, corrupt the satirist himself.(50) Pritchard writes:
The extraordinary thing about this passage from Tarr is the
way in which that whole habit of mind is turned on, not in
rejection, but in fuller understanding - with the recogni¬
tion that the practice of such "humour", such satire,
carries with it its own curse, and that it is faced in no
trivial way by "life". (51)
'That whole habit of mind1 (the satiric attitude) was for a long time
Lewis' dominant humour, in all he wrote. Pritchard is correct to
state that it is not rejected here, but a doubt is raised about it;
there is the flickering of a moral misgiving, and the overbearing
confidence of Lewis the satirist is briefly lifted away, to reveal
something beneath. No critic apart from Pritchard seems to have
dealt with this, the tendency being to deny those elements of Lewis'
conflicting positions vis-a-vis satire which happen, themselves, to
conflict with the critic's notion of what satire is. Pritchard does
not go as far as to say that the doubt here expressed is ever
erected into a refutation of satire in Lewis. It is, however, my
view that it is, in the last book of The Human Age. That, and the
passages in question from Ta rr, I shall treat in Chapter 3, in,
respectively, sections (iv) and (vi).
Then, Pritchard provides a fine analysis of that series of pas¬
sages in The Apes of God (to my knowledge unnoticed by any other
critic) which I alluded to in my comments on Wagner (and will deal
with in Chapter 2, (viii)), where Lewis, through Horace Zagreus, makes
extended and haunting use of the interior monologue. This occurs in
Part IX, "Chez Lionel Kein, Esq.", (52) which, states Pritchard,
'stands out from the rest of the book by its serious dependence on
some promptings from "The Great Within" and by the cumulative way that
it hints of the strangeness and terror lying just behind social
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re 1 ationships.1(53) The valuable point raised by Pritchard in his
analysis, which is too long here to cite in full, is that Lewis'
writing is at its 'strangest1, or most fascinating, where it subverts,
or acts against, Lewis' own conventions or terms of reference (princi¬
pally, the non-moralist and externalist definitions of satire). So,
of the passages in question, Pritchard continues:
In fact, the analogy between character and creator is a
very strong one: as Horace's objective analysis of the
apes is qualified by his personal involvement with them -
... - so Lewis the "external" satirist seems to be
imagining the great obstacle to such an art - an author's
sympathetic identification with his characters....(The
Apes of God) fascinates by the way it puts questions to
the satirist that are not put by theoretical talk about
"external" or "non-moral" satire such as is found in
Men Without Art. (5^)
Robert Chapman's study, Wyndham Lewis: Fictions and Satires (1973)
'concentrates upon the dialectics of Lewis's imaginative writing.'
(55) '(Lewis') fiction of ideas,' considers Chapman, 'demands ex¬
plication of a different order' (from what one would bring to a novel
of Henry James or Virginia Woolf, for example), and 'to evaluate his
fiction by means of a preconceived poetics of the novel does Lewis
no just i ce.' (56)
Chapman's 'deliberate concentration upon (Lewis') fiction as
philosophy' is a good counter to the customary complaints about lack
of narrative interest in Lewis or the psychological shallowness of
his characters, of the order of Kenner's remark about the 'tedium
consequent on the replacement of persons by dialectical puppets';
or Timothy Materer's 'his characters cannot interest the reader for
more than a few pages;' (57) or his biographer's '...the characters
(in The Apes) lack both feeling and intelligence, and forfeit the
attention and sympathy of the reader. Lewis was uanbleto surmount
the handicap of a self-defeating theory and a rigidly restrictive
technique which drastically diminished the effect of his satire.'(58)
In addition, Chapman undertakes a chapter on Lewis' relations with
Bloomsbury, "The Malefic Cabal", which is very welcome as a demonstra¬
tion of how a certain sort of local history, of external facts, bears
upon satire alone among literary genres, and of how the satirist
depends upon a kind of reactive or negative intimacy with the people
or institutions of his time.
One limitation - or, rather, inevitable effect - of a treatment
of Lewis' art as a 'fiction of ideas' is the constant recourse to the
philosophical criticism, particularly here The Art of Being Ruled,
for exegesis of the novels (two of Chapman's favourite verbs, it will
come as no surprise, are 'fictionalize' and 'dramatize'). That work,
for example, is cited on page 100, twice on page 105, and twice on
page 17^5 and when Chapman writes of Pierpoint's detachment, 'Again,
Of- frhe.
like so many^deas in The Apes of God, this could almost be a fic¬
tional i zat i on of one of the central concepts of The Art of Being Ruled'
(59) , one is either irritated - particularly by 'almost', glib and in¬
decisive adverb, and by the implicit echoes of Kenner ('The Chi1dermass
is simply The Art of Being Ruled dramatized') and Wagner ('if we resume
Lewis' criticism, we resume the purpose of his satire') - or challenged
what element, or elements,can we perceive in the presentation of Pier-
point that make him more than the mere 'fictiona1ization of a concept'?
Chapman's modus operand i , of necessity, precludes such investi¬
gation, establishing the criticism on a plateau of lofty generality,
so that the particular suffers. For instance, he states that: 'Both
Tarr and Kreisler are, on one level, ideas in action....Pierpoint's
status in the novel, and the relationship with Zagreus, his mouth¬
piece, also dramatize an important Platonic concept. Just as Tarr/
Kreisler dramatize the Cartesian dichotomy of intellect/emotion, so
Pierpoint/Zagreus represent the dualism between the perfection of the
word and the limitation of the deed.'(60) While such classifica¬
tions are schematically useful, they seem, at the same time, to
sterilize the novels in question; the critic avoids dirtying his hands
as it were.
Why, for example, does Lewis name characters 'Zagreus' and 'Pier-
point1? Why does Tarr enjoy, at some points, such strange and violent
powers of expression? Why are Tarr and Kreisler associated, here and
there, with ancient figures of satire? Why does Kreisler have to
die (beyond the explanation offered in Tarr's superficial dialectics
(61)), and why does he give himself precisely thirty days to live?
Why is it intimated that Zagreus is the possessor of mysterious wisdom
and capable of magic; and why is he subject to peculiar mental wander¬
ings? Such questions (which I will address in subsequent chapters)
cannot be answered by concentrating merely on the intellectual pattern
ing Lewis employed in his creation, or on his balancing, and
demonstration, of (Cartesian or Platonic) ideas. For to do so cannot
account for the very detritus upon which imagination depends: such a
critical method cannot register the traditions, models, themes,
topoi - literary, religious, historical, psychological, mythic - by
which Lewis' mind was fed in creation, or to which it referred; nor
can it demonstrate the symbols, motifs, allusions through which his
various fascinact ions , compulsions or interests manifested themselves.
Moreover, Chapman's explanation of certain passages, even within
the remit of a philosophical analysis of Lewis, may be too narrow or
specific. When, for example, he writes of the astonishing descrip¬
tion of Lady Fredigonde Follet's ascent from her chair and passage
across a room (she is 93 years old) that 'Lewis, like a true Car¬
tesian, is^faughing at the ugliness of the body in decline,' and
refers to 'Lewis's abhorrence of the exaltation of purely physical
life,' (62) he is neglecting the fact that there are dualisms older
than the Cartesian, by which Lewis may equally have been influenced,
that are defined by their aversion to physical life - that of the
ant i-Chr i stian heresies, for example, or the Socratic kind. But to
these questions I will come in my second chapter.
Furthermore, Chapman's approach compels him to depreciate the
sense in which The Apes of God is a roman a clef, and exalt its
ideal and timeless validity:
The Finnian-Shaws/Sitwe11s are not important per se, but are
part of a metaphorical statement, valid even if one is ig¬
norant of those satirized. If The Apes of God is to be more
than a historical curiosity, then the satiric fiction must
be able to stand independent of its "social interest," and
it does - Lewis has painted the portrait of a society in
decay, and as such The Apes of God transcends the merely
contemporary and personal interest of who's who. (63)
Yet in stating this, Chapman denies The Apes of God one of the tra¬
ditional features of satire. The iambic poets (that is, satirists),
Aristotle tells us, 'write about actual people' (as opposed to
imaginary).(6A) Histories of satire still record the names of the
victims (and the offence they caused the satirist) of Archilochus
and Hipponax, who composed lethal iambs over two and a half millennia
ago. The most recent editions of The Dunciad or of MacFlecknoe
divulge still the actual identities of those against whom Pope or
Dryden inveighed, and why they did so. Chapman himself has produced
a chapter on Lewis' fights with a certain set of people, some of whom
are portrayed in The Apes; and Paul Edwards' "Afterword" on the
novel identifies the actual models of many of the Apes. Chapman,
however, is concerned that The Apes of God should never appear 'dated'
a decent concern. And he is probably correct to maintain that the
novel can be read on a purely metaphorical level. But to read it that
way may be to omit something essential from the consideration of the
satire. For it is my view that people will continue to demand to
know (what Pound predicted would not be the case (65)) why certain
persons, circa 1910-1930, deserved to be torn apart and humiliated in
prose, in the way that the Apes are.
To put this another way, we may cite Chapman's observation, 'The
castigation of his (i.e. Lewis') personal antipathies is not an end
in itself.'(66) But, in a sense, punishment/venaeance may be, for
the satirist, an end in itself, his other purposes being merely
rhetorical ones (l will return to this point presently, then more
fully in my third chapter). Equally, real animosities fuel the in¬
ferno prepared in The Apes of God; and knowledge of his relations with
those who became the satirist's victims may illuminate the psychology
of the satirist, his motives, the viciousness of particular portrayals
and so on. For what is essential about the satirist throughout the
tradition of satire (if by 'satire' we mean punitive literature)
is the nature, aim and psychology of his contempt or hate and
the modes in which his desire for vengeance may express itself
(this point I will address at large in my third chapter).
This, Chapman seems to disregard, or fails to appreciate, in his
peroration:
As a satirist, Lewis is in the tradition of Pope and Swift;
he is, indeed, the only satirist of modern times who can
standVcomparison with these Augustans. Like them, Lewis
attacked individuals as well as vices, and his most
memorable satiric fictions are those - like The Chi1dermass,
The Apes of God, and The Revenge for Love - in which he sets
up satiric victims and then, with imaginative viciousness,
proceeds to destroy them.
Thus far, I concur fully with Chapman; but:
Alongside this demolition work runs a strong sense of the
satirist's duty to society....In addition to the castiga¬
tion of the especially wicked or the peculiarly foolish,
satire was for Lewis a way of looking at humanity. (67)
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But responding to these comments leads us into some complications.
To take the simpler issue first: satire was 'for Lewis a way of
looking at humanity.1 Or rather, he developed a theory of satire
along such lines (in Men Without Art), a theory which comes close to
standing as a statement of religious pessimism. But when he wrote
satire, he was not exactly enacting that theory: he was expressing
something of a more personal order (in making this observation, I
have principally in mind satire such as The Apes of God, rather than
that contained in The Wild Body stories). These issues I must take up
in chapters 2 and 3 (in sections (vi) and (v) respectively).
Then, there is Chapman's claim that through Lewis' work 'runs a
strong sense of the satirist's duty to society'. Yet how are we to
take such a statement in the light of Lewis' proposal (in Men Without
Art) 'to consider the character, and function of, non-ethical satire;
and if possible to provide it with a standing, alongside the other
aTtOfc"
arts and sciences, as a recognized philosophic and,vhuman activity'?
(68) How can 'non-moral' satire, the idea of which Lewis devoted him¬
self to considerably (though not always) in his dissertations on
satire, include a 'strong sense of duty to society'? To support his
argument, Chapman introduces the well-known aassage from Rude Assign¬
ment (which I shall return to several times in my third chapter) where
Lewis portrays himself as an extempore hangman, with a duty to lynch
wrongdoers (Apes, in this case) on the spot.(69) But such images are
topoi in the tradition of satire; and they express less a sense of
public duty than the satirist's advertising of his own punitive or
destructive potency. 1 do not wish here to digress too far, or to
anticipate the material of the later chapters; so it will perhaps
suffice to state that the case Lewis makes for non-moral satire is
not the same as his practice as a satirist, which is non-moral also
25.
(again, these issues will be explored in Chapters 2 and 3); but in
neither case is a duty to society his motivation. That it has seldom
been so for the satirist, apart from as a pretext, it is possible to
maintain - on the side of the argument that the satirist is answer¬
ing to darker, or negative, urges within himself. Chapman's associa¬
tion of Lewis with Swift is just, but only insofar as it recognizes
in each an urge to destroy particular, or many, individuals (the
intention to protect or reform certain conditions or institutions
being a secondary question).
But it seems that scarcely any of Lewis' major critics has got
properly to grips with such questions (Fredric Jameson I would exempt
from that observation; and Pritchard is perceptive when he writes
about Lewis and satire, though it is not his major interest).
Timothy Materer's study, Wyndham Lewis the Nove1ist (1976),
devotes a chapter to Lewis and satire, "Satire and Self-Defense". It
begins with much point by suggesting that, because he could discover
no moral sanction for the satirist in modern society, Lewis
adopts the satiric persona of the malcontent.
In his use of the malcontent, Lewis is closer to Renais¬
sance rather than Augustan attitudes toward satire...
Although the Renaissance malcontent may penetrate the
hypocrisy that gentler characters cannot, his savage hatred
for it usually corrupts him. (70)
and that Tarr is a 'Timon-like protagonist'. These are most interest¬
ing observations, seeming, as they do, to find a place for Lewis
within that tradition of satire expounded by Robert Elliott in his
important book The Power of Satire (which I shall refer to in Chapter
3). Their value, however, crumbles away when it becomes clear that
Materer has only a superficial understanding, in general, of the
nature of satire; and that he intends to resort continually to an
Augustan conception of that literary mode - even though he thinks that
it is more apt to refer Lewis to a Renaissance model!
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Thus, Materer explains:
Satire traditionally ridicules fools or knaves for depart¬
ing from society's norms of good sense or morality. In
Jonathan Swift's words, satirists feel a sense of public
duty, "prompting men of genius and virtue to mend the world
as far as they are able.' Lewis tended to reject such
traditional conceptions of satire and the satirist. Since
he doubted that his own society offered any moral norms, he
saw no sure way to call the fools and knaves to account. (71)
Yet Pope's complaint in "Epilogue to the Satires", "Dialogue 1",
is no different from that which, according to Materer, Lewis makes,
namely that the satirist occupies a moral void:
All, all look up, with reverential awe,
On crimes that scape, or triumph o'er the law:
While truth, worth, wisdom, daily they decry -
'Nothing is sacred now but villainy.' (1 1. 167 - 170) (72)
That may be purely rhetorical; but so, equally, may be Lewis when
issues that sort of sentiment - except that one cannot recall his
putting the case as absolutely as Pope, which rather stands against
Materer's argument. Then, Swift may have written that the satirist's
duty was to 'mend the world'; but he also wrote in private (in a
letter to Pope), inconveniently for Materer, that 'the chief end I
propose to myself in all my labors is to vex the world'. (My italics)
(73) That remark gives at least some grounds for the proposition
that antagonism is the ruling desire in the satirist, rather than
concern to correct, reform, and so on.
But that satire has long been affected by a tension between real
intent (punishment/vengeance) and professed (reform, healing, etc.)
it does not suit Materer to canvass - if he realized as much - since
he wants to claim that it is Lewis' inability morally to justify it
that 'helps to explain the failure of The Apes of God.' (74) For
Materer believes, along with Geoffrey Wagner and Robert Elliott, that
Lewis was impelled by a powerful moral sense:
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(Robert) Elliott concludes that Lewis is "utterly incapable
of disguising the intense moral urgency underlying his
whole literary enterprise," and concurs with Geoffrey Wagner
that Lewis goes to "self-contradictory lengths to avoid
seeming 'edifying.'"
Wagner's speculation only partly explains Lewis's motives.
Why should he wish to "disguise" his moral urgency? I
believe the real problem was that he could not justify this
urgency to himself. He thought seriously about his work,
and could not practise successfully an art which he could
not defend theoretically. (75)
The first part of that passage from Wagner is worth quoting here:
Yet of course he is a moralist, in the sense that the urge
to change the status quo, which avowedly prompts his satire,
has a moral intention. One presumes that Lewis is exposing
the evils in our society by means of satire in an effort to
correct them. (76)
But what grounds are there for 'presuming' that Lewis is 'exposing
evils' in order to 'correct them'? Is there a record of a satirist's
ever having 'corrected' anything? Is not the exposing or punishing
of evils what, in truth, fascinates the satirist? Pope may have
wr itten,
Hence Satire rose, that just the medium hit,
And heals with morals what it hurts with wit. (77)
but Robert Elliott is probably right to object that no one who has
been damaged by satire has ever, subsequently, felt 'healed' by the
lesson he has received at the lands of the satirist.(78) And -
to answer Materer - if you are of a sufficiently pessimistic cast of
mind, then, it might be argued, 'moral urgency' is not something that
you are going to be affected by, let alone feel the need to 'justify'.
This takes us to Materer's next point. Writing satire against a
background of Christian belief in the fallen nature of man saved
Swift and Pope, for example, from despair, Materer suggests, and
c i tes Lou i s Landa :
Without underestimating Swift's despair, he proposes that
Swift's traditional, Christian view of man as fallen and
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in need of redemption supported his satire: "The satirist
and the divine tend to merge, or at the very least to come
together in striking compatibility as they envisage man."
Lewis believed that the satirist needed such support to
avoid falling into incoherent despair or rage, and the
works of classic satirists like Swift and Pope support his
content ion ... Pope ... can contemplate the severest evils
without losing his balanced view of the status quo... (79)
Does this mean that unless a satirist be a Christian, he must end up
subsiding into dementia? But this condition need hardly be applied
to Lewis anyway; since, although Materer knows it not, something
like an heterodox religious sense informs a broad range of Lewis'
conceptualizations of satire, and of the nature of good and evil - I
call that sense Gnostic, and it forms part of the subject of my next
chapter. So, Lewis does possess a sort of (aestheticized and in¬
tellectual i zed) theological support for his despair. But beyond
this - though not unattached to it - lies the point of view that as
long as the satirist has a creed of sufficient value to refer to,
then he will not collapse into nihilism. In Lewis, this is his
estimation of art (for a long time, in a sense, his god); and it is
manifested in The Apes of God (as I shall show in Chapter 2, (viii))
by recourse to mythic structure and allusion, and by installing a
sort of divine agent in the midst of the satire. (That the satirist
himself becomes a kind of god in the act of taking revenge, I will
attempt to show in Chapter 3, (v).)
Here, however, it may be stated that Materer, as well as having
only a thin and unquestioning understanding of satire, reverses him¬
self on any point that will allow him to issue a fresh refutation of
Wyndham Lewis. Above, for example, Pope could keep his balance of
mind in contemplation of the worst manifestations of human nature.
When, however, Materer comes to Lewis' theory of the 'scientific ob¬
jectivity' of satiric truth, he offers us - Pope as Mr Hyde!
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Lewis's theory does not fit satiric practice. Whether ex¬
pressing Dryden's amused contempt for Zimri or Pope's
furious disgust (my italics) with Sporus, satire is
scarcely objective. Lewis's theory is as contradictory as
his claim that the satirist need not pass judgement on the
person he attacks. (80)
Lewis' theory does not necessarily fit his own satiric practice either.
This raises several points.
The contradictoriness of Lewis' discourses on satire, which
Materer is correct in seeing as beset by 'doubts', and demonstrating
'uncomfortable sincerity', a 'strained definition' (of satire), 'un¬
successful juggling', 'an ambivalence that goes deep', and 'diffi¬
culties', and which raise questions that Lewis 'never satisfactorily
answers', (8l)he is, I think, wrong to criticize. He takes exception
to them because they are not re 1iable, because they can frequently
be refuted - by mutual reference, by reference to the tradition of
satire, or by reference to Lewis' own satiric fiction.
But if we allow that there may be harboured by the satirist guilt
about his profession (which is to attack others), then equally we
might allow that - over his career - that guilt (or traces of mis¬
giving intermittently experienced, if 'guilt' is too strong a word)
might issue in uncertainty, manifested by apparently irresolvable
differences of position (at one time, or at different times). Also,
to attempt to define a genre from within (as_ a satirist, that is to
.say) is, perhaps, impossible, not least "because changes in
society over time call for adaptations of that genre (which is a
living or continuous one in a way that epic or tragedy, say, are
not - satire is always "being created somewhere).
Thus, in The Lion and the Fox, 'satire is essentially ethical,
or it is difficult for it not to be',(82) while in Satire and Fiction,
'It could perhaps be asserted, even, that the greatest .Satire cannot
be moralistic at all.'(83) And in Men Without Art, 'by stretching a
point, no more, we can without exaggeration write satire for art...1
(84), while in Rude Assignment: "'The Apes of God" is the only one
of my books which can be described as pure Satire (unless we wish to
speak of verse): there is much farce, comedy, and other things in
there too, but as a satire it must generally be classed.' (85)
Yet the other major attempt to define comprehensively and at
length satire (I can think of no example apart from Dryden's) in
English letters suffers from a comparable unevenness. In the Dis¬
course Concerning the Original and Progress of Satire, Dryden is un¬
able to get ideals, tastes and practice in harmony:
Folly was the proper Quarry of Horace, and not Vice: And,
as there are but few Notoriously Wicked Men, in comparison
with a Shoal of Fools, and Fops; so 'tis a harder thing to
make a Man Wise, than to make him Honest: For the Will is
only to be reclaim'd in the one; but the Understanding is
to be inform'd in the other. There are Blind sides and
Follies, even in the Professors of Moral Philosophy; and
there is not any one Sect of them that Horace has not ex-
pos'd: WhichAwas not the Design of Juvena1. who was wholly
employ'd in lashing Vices; some of them the most enormous
that can be imagin'd; so perhaps it was not so much his
Ta1ent. . . .
How easie it is to call Rogue and Villain, and that wittily!
But how hare to make a Man appear a Fool, a Blockhead, or a
Knave, without using any of these opprobrious terms! (86)
The thinking in this passage, it will be noticed, Lewis adapted in
Satire and Fiction: (1) satire is more ruinously effective when it
is aimed at stupidity rather than vice; (2) there is more art to such
satire.(87) And Dryden's artistic preference is for the deadly re¬
finement of Horace; but his approbation goes to Juvenal, for totality
of effect and moral severity:
Horace means to make his Reader laugh; but he is not sure
of his Experiment. J uvena1 always intends to move your
Indignation; and he always brings about his purpose. (88)
To account for this incompatibility of taste and ideal, Dryden enlists
the distinction between the comic and tragic modes of satire, Horace
practising the former, Juvenal the latter. Dryden's own satire, in
judgement upon which Lewis cites George Saintsbury,(89) conflates
Horace's urbanity and Juvenal's severity in a disabling coolness of
style. It may be remarked also that Lewis approximated satire to
tragedy, to account for the bitterness of comic spirit that prevails
in the former. (90)
Had Materer taken notice of this irresolution of Dryden's (and
he knows Dryden's essay), or Dryden's wanting to have the best of
both worlds, as it were, he might better have understood Lewis'
various position regarding satire. Instead of holding against Lewis
the fact that his 'critical statements about satire reveal the same
doubts about its spirit as do his novels', (91) he might have recog¬
nized such doubts as a source of intellectual vitality - a doubtful
satirist is more admirable than a complacent one! In addition, he
might have discerned that the moment of critical uncertainty in Tarr
career (mentioned in my comments on Pritchard (92)) over the satiric
attitude is an awkward interruption of misgiving on Lewis' part (and
of necessity, to be hurriedly suppressed), rather than complaining
about Lewis' inability to keep to a coherent narrative point of view
'This passage, at first,severe 1y criticizes Tarr....Yet even on a
single page Lewis cannot keep a consistent attitude toward Tarr.' ('
It is apparent, however, that in considering Lewis' satire,
Materer's intention is to deprecate him in every department as a
second-rate descendant of Augustan forbears. Thus, he maintains:
...the prose style of The Apes communicates so overpowering
and sometimes so oppressive a sense of Lewis' personality
that one cannot believe in his objectivity. Even in the
portrait of Dick Whittingdon, his anger tends to turn
satire into mere denunciation. (94)
But (1) Materer has already told us that satire cannot be objective
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(Pope's 'furious disgust', etc.), so he should not take exception to
the absence of this quality in Lewis; (2) persona 1 animus and its
expression have played a central part in satire, ab initio; (3) it
is wrong to give the impression that the satirist's only weapon is
refined, cutting irony (even Pope's couplets can descend to very
effective obscenity (95)), as Materer does here and elsewhere (96);
accordingly, Materer's is a meaningless imputation - denunciation is
not less satiric than neater forms of literary attack - and merely
serves to refer Lewis to a tradition of savage satire; (4) but how
crudely denunciatory is The Apes anyway? Is not the portrayal of
Dick (97) so elaborate in its expression and funny in its effect that
it could only be regarded as 'denunciation' by one without either a
sense of humour, or the sense to realize that to be persistently
satiric in prose requires considerably more in the way of verbal and
imaginative resources than does the Augustan couplet?
I will conclude this survey with very brief reference to three
other works of Lewis criticism.
Against Fredric Jameson's Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis,
the Modernist as Fascist (1979), I will make no criticism, since that
seems to have been well accomplished by Alan Hunton in a strict essay.
(98) Three areas of Jameson's study, however, with which this thesis
concurs are: (1) his understanding of Lewis' visionary potentiality
and its mode of expression (99); (2) his accurate - in my view -
opinion that satire was a compulsion for Lewis, rather than a genre
chosen as most congenial from among several possibilities; and that,
erected into a universal view - 'absolutized' - in Lewis, it 'recovers
something of its primitive power and its most archaic vocation'; (100)
his recognition, on the strength of that insight, that the practice of
satire is, in essence, 'non-moral' (101) - in a more fundamental sense,
in fact, as I will show, than any Lewis offered in his theoretical
definitions of his art, or dissertations on satire.
Other contributions of Jameson to this thesis, I shall acknowledge
as necessary.
Thomas Kush's Wyndham Lewis's Pictorial Integer (1981) conflates
the approaches taken by Porteus and Chapman. Lewis' literary art, he
considers, should be read as the product of a painter and philosopher-
critic; in addition, he regards the influence of Bergson on Lewis,
especially of Creative Evolution, as paramount. To this end, chapters
two and three are devoted, respectively, to Lewis' own criticism and
Bergson, and to Lewis' painting. The project sounds comprehensive:
'An account of Lewis's career should emphasize the multiplicity of
his creative and critical endeavours. . . . I t is, in fact, essential to
understand Lewis's place in modern painting if we are properly to
understand his fiction.' (102) Kush's display of the word 'multi¬
plicity', however, gives the wrong impression of what he is about,
namely, a rather limited and selective exercise in confirming a
thesis. The only criticism he studies in depth (though exceedingly
well) is Time and Western Man (alongside Bergson); and he concen¬
trates on only four creative works: The Enemy of the Stars; Tarr;
The Chi1dermass; The Apes of God. It will be noticed that of Lewis'
oeuvre, these texts alone meet the requirements of analysis in terms
of painting.
From this narrow position, Kush produces some of the best Lewis
criticism to date; and his improvement on Porteus is to use both art
history and Lewis' paintings themselves in his commentary. The very
persuasiveness and clarity of his arguments, however, awaken the
reader to the exclusion from his critical scheme of the consideration
of 1 i terariness. His bias, which is a productive one, prompts one to
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took for, or register, an alternative that is based neither on the
pictorial nor the Bergsonian model.
Of the "Prologue" to The Apes of God, for example, he states:
It is especially significant that the layers of metaphor,
description and epithet used to characterize Lady Freddy
are, for all their diversity, gathered in support of a
single pictorial image. The scene is in fact a genre
painting, entitled "The Toilette of a Veteran Gossip-Star".
This careful travesty features the conventional elements of
a toi1ette - a woman of fashion, the boudoir, a servant, a
simple act of van i tas, (later) a mirror. (103)
The urge to compensate for the pictorial bias here induces one to
discover a 'single literary source', and Swift's "On a Beautiful
Young Nymph Going to Bed" comes to mind: a woman at her toilette,
and vanity contending with a painful spectacle of physical decay.
Kush is the first critic to present a constructive and really
considered interpretation of Horace Zagreus (in The Apes). In him,
he sees synthesized the painterly and Bergsonian aspects of Lewis'
vision: 'Zagreus's costumes take up Lewis's Bergsonian equation of
body with psyche...The novel's central passage, a long piece of
Vorticist prose, describes Zagreus fully arrayed as the most heroic
of Lewis's Abstract Figures.' (104) Kush is correct, I think, to
regard the section "Mr Zagreus and the Split-man" as the symbolic
core of The Apes of God. (105) Again, however, his models of inter¬
pretation exclude from scrutiny the total variety of significances
in the thesaurus of religious and mythic allusions poured out by
Lewis in the pages in question (if such a totality could be compassed
by a single reading of the novel - and an entire thesis could use¬
fully be devoted to analysis of this strange interlude in the
novel). To reduce the passages in "Mr Zagreus and the Split-Man"
to a sort of abstract anthropo1ogica1-Bergsonian-painter1y scheme,
as here:
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Like many of Lewis's Abstract Figures and Creation Myths,
then, Zagreus's totemic costume features the full scale
of evolution, with animal and vegetative forms built up
into a human icon, surmounted by the hard clear form of
a "beak or horn", as a "symbol of undying creative
energy" . (106)
denies, perhaps, or evades, the historical import of these pages.
Why, albeit fragmented1y, are certain definite references to
various antiguities retrieved and presented, connoting older, more
varied and more powerful influences over Lewis than can be compre¬
hended in a conceptual application of Bergson to his imagination?
Nor does Kush register the mysteriousness of this section: why is
Ratner, seemingly on the verge of instruction in something awsome,
teased, and knowledge ultimately suppressed? That may be an issue
of the satiric pessimism - Ratner is not capable, by nature, of know¬
ing certain secrets - which the vitalism of Rush's interpretation
cannot accommodate. Such ideas I will later examine (in Chapter 2,
(vi i i)) .
Kush, however, should be applauded for essaying a positive con¬
struction of the figure of Horace Zagreus (my own view of that
character is principally a positive one), and a definite interpreta¬
tion of difficult writing. It may well be a dialectical strength of
his sort of study, consistently bringing to bear bodies of outside
knowledge (Bergson and art history) upon the texts, that it repels
the reader towards other pa rt i cu1 a r frames of reference, rather than
involving him in the inertia of generality.
Concerning Reed Way Dasenbrock's part-study of Lewis, The Literary
Vorticism of Ezra Pound and Wyndham Lewis: Towards the Condition of
Painting (1985), I have not much to add to the criticisms levelled
by Paul Edwards in an article on the book.(107) It seems to me,
however, that Dasenbrock's premise marks not much of an advance on
that of Porteus (writing 50 years previously) or those of Kenner and
of Wagner (30 years), insofar as it expects to reveal Lewis by means
of Lewis - as his own model of interpretation, that is to say.
Kenner, furthermore, was considerably more illuminating on the Vorti
cist component of Lewis' style than Dasenbrock ever manages to be.
One example of the inevitable, a priorist limitation of Dasen-
brock's procedure may suffice. He states that:
The circularity of Lewis' novels is the circularity of
the vortex itse1f...What conclusively demonstrates that
Lewis' formal model is the vortex is that these novels
speed up as they approach their end, as if they were
approaching the centre of the maelstrom; they do not
slow down, as if they were simply approaching death. (108)
But since so much literary art 'speeds up as it approaches its end'
in its climax, or in its denouement - it is hard to see the value
of this observation; it is merely forcing facts to meet a formula.
Of far more interest is Dasenbrock's opinion - not so self-evident
as to have been grasped by a great many of Lewis' critics, it is
surprising to say - that the creative Lewis is by no means a mere
dogmatic echo of the theoretical or critical Lewis:
His own practice as a novelist was much more flexible than
the polemical rigidity of Time and Western Man or Men
Without Art would indicate or seem to allow. (109)
CONCLUSION
I think that what may have emerged from this short survey is,
first, that Lewis criticism has rested too much on the relation of
Lewis' theoretical, polemic or philosophic writing to his fiction.
To a degree, such criticism was necessary (it would be stupid and
ungracious to suggest otherwise), as Martin Seymour-Smith
acknowledged over twenty years ago:
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Lewis'sfew admirers have until now...concentrated , and
rightly, on the exposition of his ideas, and have in¬
terpreted his fiction largely with the aid of those
ideas. Thus, his prose has hardly been looked at except
in the terms of his ideas. (110)
Still, however, Lewis criticism seems inclined to follow the tendency
described by Seymour-Smith; and it is not desirable that this should
seem to be the only way of delivering Lewis' meaning, as if the
literary critic who is not continually resorting to Lewis' non-
fictional discourses is somehow omitting something. Then, it has
sometimes been decreed that Lewis the pictorial artist is the key to
Lewis the imaginative writer. Either of these ways of reading Lewis,
if not casting his imaginative productions as somehow epiphenomena 1,
at least makes them seem too dependent upon other aspects of Lewis.
Yet when efforts have been made to examine Lewis in the light of
tradition (of satire), then his own theoretical dissertations on
satire have been allowed to interfere with the project - and producing
statements about satire is different intellectually and psycho¬
logically from writingsatire, it is my view, even when the same man
does both; or, the nature of satire has been allowed by the critic
to be dictated by Pope- or Swift-centred conventions (if such could
be held to exist in a clear sense anyway).
Now, in the chapters to follow, I will examine both Lewis'
fiction (and verse and drama) and non-fiction, but more independently
of each other, I think, than has hitherto been the custom. Where,
however, particular issues or motifs, especially of a nature that
seem to trouble Lewis, or to compel or obsess him, or to cause him
anxiety or uncertainty, are common to both the classes of his writing,
they will be noted. Yet this is no more, perhaps, than to say that I
should hesitate to talk too readily of the novels' practising the
theory, or of 'dramatizing' or 'fictionalizing' this or that - if
only because enough comments of that sort have been made already in
Lewis criticism to be going on with.
But the condition of my adopting this guardedness is that I
intend to present two traditions, one really a religious-philosophic
current of thought, the other one of artistic practice and belief,
to which, 1 think, the Lewisian corpus can substantially, though not
conclusively, be referred. Where certain common or analogous areas
in these traditions seem evident, I will indicate as much, without
ever trying factitiously to unify the two readings of Lewis I am
offering. Thus, to an extent not common in criticism of Lewis, I
will be adopting an historical method, and in fact bringing to bear
upon his work certain ideas of antique provenance. For it is my
view that it is worth looking below the level of apparent dogma in
Lewis (below, that is to say, the surface of reiterated and insisted
upon predilections and antipathies), or below the body of statements
that have seemed (superficially and reflexively) to explain his
creation. And if there should be discovered certain cults, interests
concerns, motifs, patterns, certain shaping influences on his imagina
tion, that is to say - which may or may not be oblique in their
presence, but will be less forcibly advertised than certain of his
opinions, or certain elements of his style - it will be necessary to
account, somehow, for their presence and their affectivity. But I
think that all this has been expressed more crisply by John Russell,
in Style in Modern British Fiction, when he cites the critic Seymour
Chatman:
Chatman, while assured that "the analyst should limit him¬
self to what is immanent in the work of art", is forced to
the empirical conclusion that, after all, "our chief
pleasure in reading modern fiction ... depends radically, it
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CHAPTER 2
The Conceptual and Creative Influence of
Gnosticism and Related Religious Systems
on Lewis' Fiction and Theory
42.
(i)
His theoretical writings and fiction yield up much evidence of
Lewis' interest in the religious movements of late antiquity, of a
non- or anti-Christian nature, which are embraced by the term
'Gnosticism'. I want in this chapter to examine the ways in which this
interest is manifested in his work, and to show where it is attended,or
underpinned, by a body of mythic reference.
To define Gnosticism is a difficult task, for several reasons.
Doctrinally, it was manifold and syncretic. It was practised in scat¬
tered communities and little survives it in the way of scripture
or documentation. The testament of contemporary Christian authorities
and early Churchmen is biased and usually distorted. There is dispute
about the relative importance of its Hellenistic, Judaic and Eastern
components. The Hermetica (a collection of Greek and Latin religious
and philosophic texts) give evidence of a pagan form of Gnosticism,
separate from its manifestation as a Christian heresy. There are
marked similarities between Gnosticism and certain forms of Persian
religious thought, for example Mazdaism and Zoroastrianism (in which
Lewis also showed considerable interest).
For the sake of simplicity, I am using principally in the account
that follows Robert Haardt's Gnosis: Character and Testimony, which
provides a fair, technical introduction to the Gnostic movement. Else¬
where in this chapter, I shall cite contemporary authorities and
modern research when necessary for the development of my argument.
Gnosticism is considered to be roughly coeval with Christianity,
and to have flourished in similar areas: Samaria, Palestine, Syria,
Anatolia, Asia Minor, Egypt, Rome. Its crisis came in the second
century AD, when it began to be broken by the Church, whereafter its
sects were driven underground. In the third century, however, the
Persian Mani established Gnostic thought upon a cogent and fully
developed cosmological basis. His system, Manichaeism, lasted until
the sixth century in the West, but well into the second millennium in
Eastern Iran and Southern China.
The Supreme Being or true God of Gnosticism is absolutely remote
from the world and inhabits the Realm of Light or Pleroma. The Crea¬
tion is the work of a Demiurge, subordinate to the Godhead, who
wrought the world and mankind out of evil, malignity, recklessness or
ignorance (the Demiurge is characterized differently according to the
Gnostic system in question, and may be incorrigibly wicked and anti-
divine, or redeemable). The issue of the Creation is to trap the
divine spark of man's spirit-self in matter and exclude him from the
Pleroma, in which, as a being of light, he had originally dwelt.
The various Gnostic sects are united by the concept of 'Gnosis'
(in Greek, 'knowledge'), which is the means by which man may again
know the Realm of Light and how it may be re-attained:
Gnosis, as distinct from the rational type of knowledge, means
knowledge which per se brings healing and salvation. The Gnostic
may acquire it by an act of divine revelation, chiefly through
the mediation of a Saviour or Messenger. Such Gnosis is know¬
ledge of the benign acosmic Godhead; his emanations (Aeons); the
Realm of Light (Pleroma) and simultaneous knowledge of the
private, divine spirit-self of man, which has been imprisoned
by the world of demons and the creator thereof. (l)
In their structure, all the Gnostic systems repose upon the dua¬
lism between (l) 'the acosmic, spiritual Godhead and its Aeons on the
one hand, and the Creator of the World (the Demiurge) and his Archons,
the Cosmos, matter and the human world on the other'; (2) 'the
divine Spirit-Self of man on the one hand, and the Creator of the
World,on the other, with his Archons and their Creations (cosmos,
matter, Fate, time).' (2)
The concept of soteriology in Gnosticism is divided between those
sects which believe all men to be in possession of the divine spark,
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and therefore capable of salvation, and those which ascribe this
divine particle to only an elect number, the rest of mankind being
doomed to annihilation after death.
The conduct of the Gnostic sects took diametrically opposed forms.
Some pursued 'extremes of radical asceticism1 in diet, habitation and
sexual abstinence; others engaged in 'extremes of antinomist liber¬
tinism', which took the form of systematic lawlessness ana sexual
promiscuity. These courses were thought to be of 'equal validity1 as
means of attaining Gnosis: 'Both attitudes agree in renouncing the
Creator of the World, as well as the World itself, together with his
Commandments, issued for the purpose of enslaving the light; and both
practise the freedom of the Gnostic as being superior to the World.'
But the attainment of Gnosis is personal, not communal or congrega¬
tional: 'Emphasis is laid within Gnostic eschatology on the individual
aspect...' (3)
Thus, the common antipathy of the Gnostic systems is towards
matter. They believed that evil was created simultaneously with the
material world, and their philosophy is one of determinism, over
against that of the early Church, which taught that evil was the issue
of man's sin, freely chosen. This being the case, the primary focus
of Gnosticism is not on admission of sinfulness and the offer of re¬
demption in Christ, but on the possibility of release from the imposed
evil of physical incarceration: '...but whereas Gnosis delivers its
possessor from this evil world of matter, to Paul the evil consists
in sin, from which Christ by His death has set men free....The
Gnostics laid more stress than earlier thinkers on the evil of matter,
which made it impossible for them to accept a real incarnation of
Jesus.1 {k) The Gnostics' secret knowledge, 'born out of their own
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meditations orAthe secret teachings which they claim to have had from
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Jesus or from mythical ancestors, leads them to see the whole of
material creation as the product of a god who is the enemy of man.' (5)
(ii)
A few critics have indicated connections between Lewis and
Gnosticism; but deeper investigation, which this chapter will show to
be fruitful in the study of Lewis, is notably absent. Thus, Hugh
Kenner, C.H. Sisson, and Robert Chapman have characterized Lewis'
theory of politics as in essence Manichaean. (6) Philip Head writes
'Whether the gnostic element in Lewis was as powerful as the romantic
or whether either contributed enduringly as much as Stirner's egotist
assault on the bases of authority, is something that deserves closer
deliberation.' (7) Martin Seymour-Smith states of Lewis' prose:
'Its complex dialectic is undoubtedly Gnostic in spirit.' (8) Kenner
stands on the brink of an interesting revelation, but is held back by
erroneous terminology, when he accounts thus for Lewis' vision of
aesthetic creation: 'But invention out of nothing is not for men,
and a Manichaean bias deep in Lewis's psyche inclined him to doubt
if it were even for God. To invent is to play the Demiurge, to shape
chaos, a chaos with which one is intimate.' (9) Kenner is mistaken
in conceiving the Creation, according to the system of Mani, as reck¬
less or irresponsible. In most other Gnostic systems, the Demiurge
is motivated by such qualities: but in Manichaeism, the Creation is,
on the contrary, critically purposive: '...the Demiurge of the
Manichaean system is a Light Divinity who creates the Cosmos on the
instructions of the benign Godhead, for the purpose of delivering
the Light swallowed up by darkness.' (10) Beyond that, what, exactly
is a 'Manichaean bias '? I want now to explicate, as far as is
possible, the nature of the affinity, or affinities, in Lewis with
the religious thought of antiquity.
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(iii)
A parallel at once suggests itself with regard to the exclusion to
which Gnosticism and Lewis have been subjected by their respective
cultures. Gnosticism, suppressed, was driven to the underground
transmission of doctrine and secret practice of ritual. Lewis, en-
duringly heterodox, is represented in most literary histories as a
minor novelist, an addendum of Modernism, whose (i.e. Modernism's)
standard is carried by Conrad, Joyce, Pound, Lawrence, Woolf, Eliot,
etc., with whom he can be compared neither stylistically nor in taste.
His stock remains low in most of the universities. The student of his
work becomes accustomed to the ignorance or disapproval of literary
people. As the early Churchmen reviled the rites of Gnosticism, so
the authorities are often impelled to extremes of reaction in their
judgement of Lewis - John Wain on the reprint of One Way Song: '...I
am repelled by it, as I am by all Lewis's writings... it reads like
a lot of hollow noise... like that of a man growling curses as he
gropes along in a sewer.' (11) Fredric Jameson describes the con¬
tinuing resistance of Lewis' work, a subcultural phenomenon, to
academic canonization, writes of 'excellent and objective reasons for
(his) neglect,' yet asserts that his texts merit 'unapo1ogetic re¬
discovery'. They are an 'archaic survival' locked in a 'time capsule'
in which their 'freshness and virulence ' are preserved. (12)
The force of such rediscovery, in Jameson's terms, might be re¬
corded on the same heuristic scale as that of the unearthing of the
Gnostic scrolls at Nag Hammadi in 1947, buried in a cliff for close
to two millennia. Or at least, there is a sense, in either case, of
the sudden revelation of the forbidden, an access of thought that
threatens the subversion of the established order of things.
The possibility of such a continuity or network of heretical
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opinion, of a subterranean and illicit wisdom that runs beneath the
main currents of the intellect and received thought, Alan Munton cap¬
tures, though within a relatively limited chronology: 'Lewis's prose
and thought refer back to what can be called the illegitimate tradi¬
tion in nineteenth-century European writing: to Fourier, Saint-Simon,
Max Stirner, Proudhon, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. They all understand
excess and their writing shows it....P1acing him into relation with
these illegitimate groupings makes it possible to grasp the trans-
gressive and pleasurable nature of Lewis's work.' (13) Just before
this passage, Muntonhas called Jameson 'tense and reserved' in the
face of Lewis' exhilarating non-conformism and unrestraint, qualities
which, were the 'illegitimate tradition' to be extended backwards,
might be compared to the 'extremes of antinomist libertinism' and
denial of the Commandments which were an element of Gnostic conduct.
Martin Seymour-Smith takes precisely this longer view when, in an
essay already cited, he advances the thesis that Gnosticism actually
adumbrates the concerns of Modernism. He thinks that all art that
presents an ordered vision of the universe, that settles with con¬
ventional notions of what reality is, is either in bad faith or com¬
placent. The test of the validity of the art of any era, he argues,
is whether or not it registers phenomeno1ogica11y the fission by
which life is affected on every plane: 'There are four great early
witnesses: Rabelais, Montaigne, Cervantes, Shakespeare. However
much we may now reject the body-mind split in philosophical terms, we
have to admit that it originates in a phenomeno1ogica1 truth: our
minds seem, too often, to be split from our bodies. The 'good' seems
too often to co-exist with the 'bad'. We even will this to be so.
Reality is not that of the conventional English philosophers, who,
pitifully, can never agree about what it is; it is what we experience.'(14)
With such irreducible and perplexing divisions, Gnosticism is
equipped to deal. It is so because its doctrines are founded on the
dualistic vision that Christianity resisted in the approaches of
Greek philosophy, Neo-P 1 aton i sm and Gnosticism itse.lf, and dispensed
with by means of the credo that Christ was a real man, as testified
by His Passion and Resurrection. Such a refutation of dualism, how¬
ever, issued in an optimism which, at its most excessively superfi¬
cial, induced the Church to avoid the question of evil. So Caird
writes: 'An optimism established without any difficulty becomes
worse than any pessimism: an idealism that has not entered into all
the differences and antagonisms of the real is futile. Even
Christianity has tended to become an ignoring rather than a healing
of the evils of life when it has not been based in the deepest con¬
sciousness of those evils.1 (15)
For Seymour-Smith, Gnostic pessimism is unceasingly conscious of
the 'differences and antagonisms of the real': 'But gnosticism,
though persecuted and driven underground, provides a clearer picture
(than does Christianity) of the true predicament of man; officially
suppressed - it survives ir the teaching of Manes, and then in the
persistent Cabbala.... gnosticism, though unrecognized as such, has
permeated our lives. Perhaps, untidy and open-ended and fantastic and
never organized into a single dogma to be perpetrated upon mankind,
it always - at a secret level - did.' (16) And he considers
Modernism a sign of this permeation, for Western culture at the end
of the last century and beginning of this is certain of nothing but
uncertainty. Existence is apparently purposeless, there is no basis
for any system of morality, the earth is a wilderness and place of
entrapment. Modernism thus discovers itself in recusancy from the
'authorized' view of how things are: the Newtonian universe; photo¬
graphic realism; mimetic fiction; time as measured by the hands on
the clock. The first stirrings of this refusal are the reversion of
interest to diabolism and the occult, with the sensational prospect
of authenticity: 'Decadence has no set programme, as the Expres¬
sionists tried to have. What is most interesting about it, perhaps,
is the way in which - by however crude and even vulgar means - it
tried to revive that gnosticism which, though pagan in origin, had
represented what might fairly be described as the rebellious 'modernism'
of early Christian times....the object behind 'Black Magic' (Seymour-
Smith is referring to Huysman's La Bas) , however hidden from the
frequently stupid people who indulge in it, is to explore the gnostic
belief that men are under the rule of the Devil, and that God is in¬
finitely remote, perhaps so much so that he is inaccessible.... The
ancient notion, formulated in numerous ways, of the guardian angels
(an import from the original Zoroastrianism - not present in its
tamed, modern Parsee version) being cheats and tricksters who try to
turn back the 'ascending soul', has a startling relevance to modern
life, in all its over-sophisticated complexity.' (17) And, as has
been noted, Seymour-Smith regards Lewis' prose as 'gnostic in spirit'.
The converse of Seymour-Smith's exaltation of Gnosticism is pro¬
vided by Kenneth Cox's essay "Dualism And Les Autres", which is the
only consideration of any length known to me of the relation of Lewis
to Gnosticism. Cox thinks almost the entire Lewisian oeuvre char¬
acterized by the 'dualism of a complex mind', and identifies the four
fields in which this dualism operates: the sense that the self is
divided, which shaped Lewis' presentation of people, from The Wild
Body onwards; the dialectic of Lewis' polemics, criticism and
theoretical writing; 'the value he attached to politeness. To the
extent that they are derived by emanation from the split self, opposed
characters of his creation treat each other with punctilio'; Lewis'
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snobbery, and the arrogance of his fictional principals, such as Tarr,
Kreisler, the Bailiff, Hyperides.
Cox refers to evidence in Lewis' fiction and criticism of the
latter's knowledge of the heresiarchs and cosmology of Gnosticism
and Persian religious thought, and bases on this the induction of a
larger parallel between Gnosticism and the practice of Modernism:
'The whole movement of gnosticism of which dualism is part may however
have a bearing here broader than has so far been apparent.' (l8)
His thesis is that Modernism pursued a sacramental course, whereby its
practitioners acquired enlightenment outside the academies and univer¬
sities (whose orthodoxy is guaranteed by the establishment), through
diligent focus of the mind on doctrine handed down in privacy or
seclusion. Furthermore, the ability to receive such wisdom reposed
on a quantum leap of consciousness, a readjustment of vision or, in
fine, an incidence of gnosis: 'The modern or modernist movement in
art, which arose in France about the middle of the nineteenth century
and is now in its last throes, may be seen as a recrudescence of
gnosticism. A succession of serious and talented men, in passive
opposition to the established order, dedicate themselves from youth
onwards to the attainment of insight and fulfilment, each following
at first a teacher. The teaching, esoteric and obscure, demands not
only devoted application to study and practice but some initial ex¬
perience of a kind making the apparently difficult easy to accept:
great sacrifices are made, some lives are lost. There are two main
grades; the stage or group of passive receptivity - readers, spec¬
tators and listeners (auditores) and the elite of practising artists
(electi). The latter are further divided, according to the degree of
gnosis attained, into followers, critics, innovators and masters.' (19)
The BLAST manifestoes, it could be argued here, are a codex of
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such teaching. Lewis' rubric is THE EXPLOITATION OF VULGARITY:
Today the Artist's attention would be drawn...to anything
particularly hideous or banal, as a thing not to be missed.
Stupidity has always been exquisite and ugliness fine.
But the condition of our enjoyment of vulgarity, discord,
cheapness or noise is an unimpaired and keen disgust with
i t.
A man could make just as fine an art in discords, and with
nothing but "ugly" trivial and terrible materials, as any
classic artist did with only "beautiful" and pleasant
means. (20)
This defies exuberantly Keats' axiom that the commutabi1ity of truth
and beauty 'is all/ Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know', and
beyond that, Plato's strictures about the 'ugly fiction' and 'foul
stories' that will have no place in his ideal State (unless told to
a 'select few under oath of secrecy'), where 'Evil is to be kept out
of sight, and, so far as may be, treated as an impossibility,' and
'Poetry is to tell its "noble untruth".' (21) It is an insight
passed on to Lewis from Flaubert, whom he acknowledges as 'almost in
a class by himself - perhaps the first member of a new class. For
him human life in its entirety is composed of folly and crime in one
degree and another.' (22) While the BLAST theorems are resumed by
Yeats, almost a quarter of a century later, in "The Circus Animals'
Desertion":
Those masterful images because complete
Grew in pure mind but out of what began?
A mound of refuse or the sweepings of a street,
Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can... (23)
Art which relishes or transmutes stupidity, discord, terrible
materials or refuse Cox doubtless has in mind, when he writes: 'The
doctrine of modernism, that an artist can as well make work out of
what he abhors as of what he prizes, and not merely in the way of
satire or for thepleasure of excretion, but organizing them in pat¬
terns to take stress or complicating the play between them for pure
devilment, this is 'secret' doctrine. It does not commend itself to
the masses, which say they like plain speaking, and it cannot be
translated into action, which may be good or evil or neither, but
cannot be both. Study of the one movement may deepen our understanding
of the other. We know more about modern art and so have more to
learn about gnosticism. Had this too a scandalous history?' {2k)
Yes, insofar as its conduct was based in antinomianism and
secret ritual; and it is over this that Seymour-Smith and Cox are
diametrically opposed. For the former, the strength of Gnosticism
seems to lie in its denial of moral law and gospels which could
neither accommodate the conception of the positive presence of evil,
nor man's bewilderment over the disjunction of mind and body; for
Cox, this denial of obligation to any canon (and one should recall
here Haardt's comment that 'emphasis is laid within Gnostic eschato-
logy on the individual aspect'), which issues in a creed of personal
revelation, of the sufficiency of knowledge alone, is the source of
Gnosticism's decadence: 'One thing about gnosticism we do know
better, we know more about its end. The weakness of a movement devoted
to a search for knowledge, as of some associated Buddhist systems, is
that it does not provide for the salvation of mankind. Various asser¬
tions are made: that, nothing being so important as fulfilment, the
deprivation of the masses does not matter and may be ignored; that
the fulfilment of one personality helps others to attain fulfilment
or at least consoles them in the meantime; that those who attain
enlightenment are able to advise or instruct the others. But these
are spurious answers, not truths drawn from the heart of man or the
nature of things but webs spun by ingenious reason to cover a
hole.' (25)
What Cox writes here has consequences of the first magnitude for
his conclusions about Modernism. His criticism of Gnosticism on the
grounds of selfishness is, in point of fact, reductive. Its grava¬
men is placed too squarely on the notion of individual revelation
and salvation, which is to confuse the conduct of the Gnostic with
the teleology of Gnosticism. The latter envisages ultimately as
general a salvation as the terms of a particular Gnostic system
allow, in the form of an apocatastasis of the divine spirit-selves
of men to the realm of the Supreme Being. In Haardt's words: '...
attainment of personal salvation of course is inseparable from the
hope of a return of Light to the Pleroma, which shall be as all-
encompassing as possible.' (26) The justness of Cox's criticism
consists in the fact, mentioned in the preliminary section of this
chapter, that the divine light-spark was attributed by some Gnostic
systems to an elect only, the rest of men being barred from salvation
but it is only such systems that are careless of the 'salvation of
mankind'. Furthermore, can it be stated with certainty that it was
its secession from the world, its lack of engagement, that brought
about the decline of Gnosticism (assuming, that is, that it ever did
come to an end, for Seymour-Smith suggested its continuance to the
present)? It could be proposed with as much reason that Gnosticism
was destroyed through persecution, as by any innate flaw.
This proposal is not considered, however, since Cox wants to
parallel the error of Gnosticism and the error of Modernism: 'In
the same way the chief weakness of modernism has been its lack of
social and political theory. This is not an unfortunate omission
due to the men or the times but a necessary consequence of the
artist's concentration on his art: unconcern for les autres. Theo¬
ries of 'order' or of 'revolution' were entertained if compatible
and adopted if conceivable extensions of his work, but his attention
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was elsewhere. Hard as it is to take, both the structure of ideas
and the history of individuals show an undeniable line linking Mal-
larme's Tuesdays rue de Rome with Belsen and Auschwitz.1 (27)
To recapitulate, Cox bases his moral criticism of Modernism on
the 'recrudescence' therein of the Gnostic error which he formulates
'unconcern for 1es autres', a catastrophic lack of sympathy which
has a causal relation to the ethos of Nazism, and which was, tem¬
porarily, apparent in Lewis' work: 'We harm ourselves if we ignore
what is fascist in Lewis though he grew away from it.* Cant 1 eman' s
Spring Mate (1917) is far more fascist than The Revenge for Love
(1937).' (28)
My first objection to Cox's criticism is that in representing
Lewis as lacking 'social and political theory', he neglects the
existence of The Art of Being Ruled, a work of profound, though
elusive, engagement, and one in which the weight of analysis falls
on Socialist, not Fascist, thought. (29) Nor, regardless of Lewis'
confidence that dictatorships, Leninist or Fascist, would not
practise physical coercion (30)(which confidence later events showed
to be stupid), can The Art of Being Ruled be viewed as displaying
'unconcern for 1es aut res'. Its pessimism, as was briefly noted in
section (ii), has, according to Sisson, Kenner and Chapman, a Mani-
chaean cast (and I shall show, in section (iv), how Lewis employs
directly as a criterion matter from Iranian religious thought), but
this pessimism does not tend towards indifference to the lot of men
in general. A comment such as the following confirms this:
The European poor become poorer every day: whatever the
reason may be for this, you cannot, unless you are a
heartless fool, do nothing. And there is an immense
instrument to your hand (in socialism), especially or¬
ganized for the correcting of this terrible situation...
today you are compelled to be a socialist, at all events
in anglo-saxon countries. In Italy fascismo provides you
with a creditable alternative. (31)
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The aim of The Art of Being Ruled is to reveal to the represen¬
tative of the masses, the 'small man', how he is deceived and exploited
by the obscure management of power in modern democracy; and to give
notice of the disdain, even hatred, which those at the head of the
democratic system - politicians and newspaper owners, for example -
harbour towards their 'millions of "little charges'", whom they be¬
wilder with assurances of the freedoms (increasingly silly or vacuous)
which they enjoy, thereby consolidating their own power. (32) And it
is with these duped millions that Lewis allies himself, as a fellow
'Inmate of the Power House':
Now I am not one of the staff, I have never had anything to
do with Management, have no taste for bossing. I have al¬
most ostentatiously been a governee. I have had an active
preference for the governed in contrast to the governing. (33)
This acknowledgement of shared interest, together with the didactic
provision which closes The Art of Being Ruled, (from Parmenides):
'"I wish to communicate this view of the world to you exactly as it
manifests itself: and so no human opinion will ever be able to get
the better of you'", I would employ in refutation of Cox's charge of
"unconcern" and of the artist's 'attention being elsewhere'.
My second objection is to Cox's impression (unsupported by quota¬
tion) that 'Cantleman's Spring Mate' is 'fascist'. The theme of the
story is Cantleman's antagonism to Nature, which arises from his re¬
flections on the courtship of animals:
The only jarring noteF in this vast mutual admiration society
was the fact thatAits members showed their fondness for
their neighbour in an embarrassing way: that is they
killed and ate them. But the weaker were so used to dying
violent deaths and being eaten that they worried very little
about it. (3*0
Cantleman's irony is a means of detaching himself from this spectacle
of what Lewis called elsewhere 'the darwinian nightmare of the
struggle for existence1 - sex may be a symbolic, or, in some insect
and parasitic species, literal annihilation:
'I could eat you!1 one lover says to another at the paroxysm
of their lubricity. And indeed, if one were considerably
smaller than the other, as in the case of the male of the
epira, that no doubt would happen very often. (35)
Jacques Lacarriere, in his lyrical account of the Gnostics, sup-
lements their rudimentary vision with biological horrors that have
more recently come to light, in order to show their possession of a
knowledge that anticipates Darwin, Lewis and Cantleman: 'What Dar¬
winians were later to call natural selection and the survival of the
fittest had already been observed by Gnostics and was in their eyes
a flagrant proof of the fundamental depravity of the universe... For,
in the last analysis, if this world were the work of a good and just
God - and not that of an incompetent and profoundly malevolent demi¬
urge - one would have to impute to that God the most infamous thoughts
and imaginings, the most ruthless acts of repress ion...What warped
mind could have invented the procreative act of the praying mantis,
in which the female decapitates and then devours the male? What
immeasurably sadistic being could have thought up the paralysing
sting of the ammophilous wasp, which it sticks into the flesh of
caterpillars, that they may be devoured alive by the larvae of the
winged insect?1 (36)
Perceiving the savagery of Nature, Cantleman makes it his project
to outwit it, by matching its indifference - when he is copulating
and, later, killing a German. Robert Chapman has shown that Cantle¬
man fails in this project because he himself descends into the
natural cycle of sex, birth and death - 'To be in life is to be
tainted by life' - and that Lewis uses this failure to deflate the
Nietzschean concept of the Superman (an ant i -Naz i procedure, surely?) (37)
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The moral of the story, however, is not that abstraction of the self
from Nature is impossible, but that Cantleman chose the wrong alter¬
native: action, over against an ascetic withdrawal from life earlier
contemp1ated.
•This does not invalidate Cantleman's philosophising:
The miraculous camouflage of Nature did not deceive this
observer. He saw everywhere the gun-pits and the 'nests
of death1. Each puff of green leaves he knew was in some
way as harmful as the burst of a shell. Decay and ruins,
it is true, were soon covered up, but there was yet that
parallel, and the sight of things smashed and corrupted.
In the factory town ten miles away to the right, whose
smoke could be seen, life was just as dangerous for the
poor, and as uncomfortable, as for the soldier in his
trench. The hypocrisy of Nature and the hypocrisy of War
were the same. (38)
The pessimism of this insight could also be considered to have a
Gnostic cast: Nature is substituted for the Demiurge as an
actively evil creative force, operating behind a mask, here, of fair-
seeming rural beauty. Its profusion conceals the decay which is the
consequence of the processes it initiates, hence its 'hypocrisy1.
It creates in order to destroy, or at the expense of forms of life
already existing. Man, Nature's mimic, desires only respites from
savagery and disorder. The 'factory town' (where a few men prosper
at the expense of the poor, for whom, evidently, Cantleman's feeling
is not of 'unconcern') provides the machinery of war, which, on the
Western Front, is already obliterating such towns, the human species
recoiling upon itself.
Nature - in Blast, a 'sterile Tyrant' (39) - as viewed by Lewis
through the persona of Cantleman, is neither vital nor indifferent;
or rather, to characterize Nature as indifferent is merely to use
the sentiment of science in a vain attempt to neutralize a force of
cosmic malevolence. What is demanded by this story, therefore, is
the alienation of man from the organic; Lewis sets about instituting
a programmatic distrust of Nature, which Jameson has called an 'anti¬
cipation of the poststructura1ist assault on the Romantic valoriza¬
tion of organic form1. (40)
Interpreted thus, "Cantleman's Spring Mate" - to resume the
objection with which I opened this particular discussion - is anti¬
thetical to the philosophy of National Socialism. This abused Darwin
to give licence to brutality, Nietzsche to legitimize conquest,
apotheosized Nature over the moral traditions of two millennia, and
embraced the 'Romantic dream of the one-ness of all things'. Thus,
J.P. Stern: '...even today we are not clear enough to what extent
the language, the thinking and the practice of fascist movements
generally and of National Socialism in particular were determined by
the 'Nature' vocabulary that has its roots in early nineteenth-cen¬
tury Romanticism . . .the Romantic exaltation of the natural being of
man and of his Nature-given condition is the intellectual background
against which, in the circumstances of lawlessness and anomie pre¬
vailing in the 'twenties and early 'thirties, a social praxis arises
in which men are judged, condemned and eventually done to death, not
for what they have done but simply for what they are.' (41)
The argument against Cox, presented above, constitutes a
digression from the purpose stated at the outset of this section,
namely, to discover, if possible, the nature of the affinity or
affinities between Lewis and Gnosticism. It was necessary to conduct
this argument, however, in order to deal with Cox's thesis that the
parallel between Lewis and Gnosticism is a 'scandalous' or catastro¬
phic one; and it has yielded as a valuable by-product an affinity in
the attitude to Nature. Yet it is clear that the original purpose
has not, so far, been satisfactorily advanced: Munton posited an
'Illegitimate Tradition', which was adapted to suggest the possibility
of an unbroken, subterranean current of thought; Seymour-Smith, that
Gnosticism has 'permeated our lives', and 'always - at a secret level
did'; Cox, a 'recrudescence' of Gnosticism in Modernism. But the
question remains to be asked in each case - what principle, or
principles, control the continuance or re-appearance of Gnostic
sentiment? That is to say, what is the condition of, or how may one
qualify, the attraction of Lewis to Gnosticism - an attraction that
is sometimes manifest, sometimes latent, in his theory and fiction?
The way to deal with this difficult question, I think, is to
examine the efforts of researchers to discover the 'origin and
essence' of Gnosticism. What I mean by this is that either the
causes of Gnosticism may be identified with the causes of its re¬
appearance, or the conditions which sustained it in antiquity may be
regarded as obtaining still.
Haardt writes that when such research is conducted according to
the methods of religious history, that is, by the comparative study
of Gnostic themes with their representations in antecedent religious
systems (Iranian, Oriental, Judaic, etc.), an aporia is inevitably
announced (related, typically, to 'lost' texts) when the phenomenon
in question is found to have no definite prototype. This has led
researchers to resort to models for the origination of Gnosticism
outside the 'thematic historical method'. That is, concepts or
structures of thought are posited which allow Gnosticism to be ex¬
plained in terms of itself, and not as a derivative system. (42)
One such model is the 'existentia 1-onto 1ogica1 analysis' of
Gnosticism. This was conceived by Hans Jonas, who, according to
Haardt, derived it from the 'problem horizon of Heidegger's philo¬
sophy, which suggested the idea of relating two phenomena belonging
to different periods in spiritual history.' (43) The essence of this
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model is an 'attitude to existence1 which originates in a 'fundamental
experience1 that comes to men individually. It expresses itself,
typically, in the myth of a 'Primordial Han-Redeemer', whose function
is redemptive, and who, come to earth, reminds man of his original
state of being, in The Realm of Light. (A4) Haardt's survey here
can usefully be supplemented by Christopher Nugent's account of
Jonas' model: 'Hans Jonas...has brought out the analogies between the
old Gnosticism and the new....They can be reduced to four. The first
is the alienation between man and the world, the indifference of
nature - what Jonas calls "gnostic acosmism". The second is in the
alienation of God and man, applied to what Jonas calls the deus
absconditus - more the absent than the hidden God....This implies a
logical continuum of sorts between ancient Gnostic belief and con¬
temporary unbelief, the "death of God" and the death of man. The
third theme is in dread, which Jonas sees as a "recurrent theme" in
Gnostic literature. A fourth and final is in Nihilism, that is,
"gnostic antinomianism". The similarities between the old and the
new derive from their being common responses to culturally contem¬
poraneous periods of history.' (^5) Nugent's last sentence meets
the requirement of identifying the cause of Gnosticism with that of
its re-appearance (though 'contemporaneous' is the wrong word, and
should be replaced with, for example, 'similar' or 'comparable').
With the existentia 1-onto 1ogica1 model described above, there
are correspondences in The Enemy of the Stars, the theory of satire
contained in Men Without Art, and The Apes of God, as I shall show
in, respectively, sections (iv), (v) and (viii) The 'fundamental
experience' in which this model is based may be seen to correspond
with the ontological shock inflicted upon Lewis by the First World
War (which he also held responsible for the death of his mother).
This, Bernard Lafourcade argued, issued in Lewis' 'exaltation of the
absurd' in the essay "The Meaning of the Wild Body", which fulfilled
his search for a 'philosophy to replace the superficial vitalism of
"Our Wild Body"' (1910), and anticipated to a notable degree the
details of French existentialism: 'Lewis seems to have been the
first to use this word (i.e. 'absurd') systematically as a formal
critical concept. The Lewisian "alternative" - this intuition of
post-modernism - is closely associated with this exaltation of the
absurd, which in many ways prefigured not only existentialism...
but the formalist distortions of The Theatre of the Absurd..! (46)
The second model for the origin of Gnosticism is expressed in
terms of sociological analysis. Haardt's authority here is G. Quis-
pel: '"Astonished and fascinated, man confronted the depths within
him. His place in the universe eluded him, and was lost: the cos¬
mos became less and less divine and more and more demoniac. The
polis and the Empire were no longer organic associations: the state
became a planned bureaucracy, which took no account of the individual
and large cities made men unbearably lonely. There remained only
flight into eroticism, and into the self. The culture in other words
was dying, and doomed to extinction because it was no longer exo-
centric.'" (47) Thus, faced by the spectre of centralization, man
began to feel his individuality dwarfed, and to fear the abstraction
of whatever concrete notion of self he possessed. A critical phase
in this process, it might be speculated, was the development in Rome
under Augustus, around the last decade B.C. and the first decades
A.D. (supposedly the period of the birth of Gnosticism), of a civil
service, symbol, to those in the provinces, of lost autonomy and
dependence on a remote authority.
If we resume Nugent's/Jonas' argument that the new Gnosticism
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has re-appeared in response to cultural pressures analogous to those
which brought about the original form, we can adduce here a socio¬
logical premise for Lewis' attraction to Gnosticism. That is to say,
the threat of imperial centralization is felt again, this time in the
form of state-socialism, the realization of Marxian Communism. To
continue the parallel, Lewis' approval of Proudhon's system, which
is based on the establishing of small sovereign states, corresponds
to the longing, in late antiquity, for the self-governing city states
(po1eis) of ancient Greece, whose decline (in Quispel's account) was
one of the crises in human organization that created the conditions
for Gnosticism. From The Art of Being Ruled:
Proudhon is one of the two great socialists of the last cen¬
tury, Marx being the other. And it could be said that he
stands, philosophically, for the sma11 man - the hero of
Part II of the present essay: whereas Marx stands for the
great urban state machine, and is against the sma11 man... .
(Proudhon's) idea for the working of federalism in France
was that the country should be cut up into thirty-six small
sovereign states....He was still ardently against any form
of centralization. It was indeed really in order to avoid
the danger of centralization that he was inspired to
create his federalist theory. That is still his greatest
bugbear. Had he lived to be a thousand he would probably
only have gone on inventing escapes for humanity from this
monstrous political dragon, this withering abstraction. (48)
Something of Lewis' horror at the prospect of centralized control is
conveyed in the last sentence, which mythicizes the object of dread
(a 'dragon'), and by the notion of Proudhon's heroic, millennial
task ('Had he lived to be a thousand,' etc.).
At the core of this apprehension is the sense that Marxian Com¬
munism will invade all spheres which previously have benefited from
individual activity, eventually creating a climate - and assisted in
this by science and philosophy, operating as tools of the state - in
which mind, as much as property, is arrogated by centralizing and
communizing forces:
We live a conscious and magnificent life of the 'mind' at
the expense of this community.... But in sympathy with
the political movementsof today, the tendency of
scientific (in which is included philosophic) thought is
to hand back to this vast community of cells this stolen,
a r i s toe ra t ical monopo 1 y of personality which we call the
'mind1. 'Consciousness1, it is said, is (contrary to
what an egotistic mental aristocraticism tells us) not
at all necessary. (49)
it is from the prospect of such a condition, it might be argued here
that Lewis is repelled into a Gnostic position. If the acquiring
of gnosis was a matter for the individual, so is the Lewisian
equivalent - the satisfactions emanating from the free life of the
mind.
The third model for the origin of Gnosticism which circumvents
the aporia in proving derivation from earlier religious systems is
the psychological one, described thus by Haardt: '(It) neither ig¬
nores nor denies the production and potentiality of historical
affiliations, but does go beyond them insofar as it proceeds to
indicate thematic religious concepts, between which there is no
historical link. It bases the existence of similarity or identity
of themes on recourse to a general 'spiritual' structure in mankind,
whatever form this may take. In recent years the psychology of C.
G. Jung has achieved widespread recognition in connection with an
understanding of Gnosis...the essential factor in the origin of
Gnosis (is regarded) as being "the mythical projection of the ex¬
perience of the self."' (50)
By comparing this theory of the origin of Gnosticism with Jung'
theory of the source of visionary literature, we can, in fact, pro¬
pose the existence of a Gnostic modality among Lewis' creative
facu11ies .
There is an intimation in Jung's essay "Psychology and Litera¬
ture" that the eternal patterns of the unconscious mind which are
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revealed in gnosis - and subsequently framed in appalling and sublime
creation myths and cosmogonies - are similar to the obscure psychic
manifestations to which the visionary artist is prone. The
'mythical projection of the experience of the self' which is the
origin of Gnosticism, in the model in question, can be equated with
that 'primordial experience' which, according to Jung, engenders
visionary art: '(in) the visionary modesof artistic creation...
the experience that furnishes the material for artistic expression
is no longer fami1iar....It is a strange something that derives its
existence from the hinterland of man's mind - that suggests the abyss
of time separating us from pre-human ages, or evokes a super-human
world of contrasting light and darkness. It is a primordial
experience . . . ' (51)
From The Caliph's Pesign:
The artist goes back to the fish. The few centuries that
separate him from the savage are a mere flea-bite to the
distance his memory must stretch if it is to strike the
fundamental slime of creation. And those are the con¬
ditions - the very first gusto of creation in this scale
of life in which we are set - that he must reach,before
he, in his turn, can create! (52)
For Lewis, the act of psychic reversion described by Jung is impera¬
tive. Aesthetic creation can only occur on a new or authentic level
when it partakes of the proto-evolutionary energies that attended
the genesis of life itself. That is to say, the artistic imagination
must undergo the Jungian 'primordial experience', arrived at by a
powerful faculty of retrospective intuition, if its product is to be
anything more than mere imitation, however elaborate, of the forms of
1 i fe.
That the 'primordial experience' is close to, or synonymous
with, the 'mythical projection of the experience of the self' is
strongly suggested by the lines from The Caliph's Design. To
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stretch the memory back to a time before time itself began to be
recorded as history is a means both of recovering creative energy
and of forgetting - of forgetting, that is, the prosaic (the notation
of history and the daylight world). In effect, the artist reverts to
a point where there is nothing to remember, where he must resort to
fabulizing whatever the psyche yields up. This becomes his only
material, as it was for ancient man, who mythicized his own history
therefrom.
The psychic data upon which the 'primordial experience' draws
are, according to Jung, archetypes or patterns of such antiquity and
obscurity that, emerging in visionary art, they have all the force
of the most formidable novelty: '(This experience) arises from
timeless depths; it is foreign and cold, many-sided, demonic, and
grotesque. ' (53)
What Lewis evokes has been characterized in similar terms. Thus,
L.P. Hartley of The Apes of God: '(Lewis) creates a world uihichhas
the same relation to our own as a landscape in the moon might have
for a terrestrial landscape. It is terrifying and impressive and
alien.' (5^0 And the following portrait of the Bailiff exempli¬
fies the attributes of the Jungian 'primordial experience':
Uncle Punch amongst his jolly children! - the solemn mask is
off, the satiric on. He is all grinning vulpine teeth,
puckered eyes, formidable declination of the ant-eating
nose, rubicund cheeks, eyes of phosphor. The goatee
waggles on the glazed bulbous chin; it is the diabolics
of the most ancient mask in the world exulting in its
appropriate setting. (55)
This hybrid fiend is composed of features which pre-exist any remem¬
bered source. The association of Satan with the goat is biblical,
but earlier on, the followers of Dionysus (who are here alluded to
by 'satiric') - the god of frenzy - took half their form from the
goat. (Later on, the Bailiff masquerades as Bacchus/Dionysus, and
at one point, his assailant, Macrob, is torn apart by the Bailiff's
votaries - the fate of those who fell foul of Dionysus's priest¬
esses, the Maenads.) Nevertheless, the demonic associations of the
goat are probably even pre-Dionysian, since the goat-mask goes back
to the Bronze Age. (56) Other animal forms are present in the
figure, however, which conjure up an older demon still. This is
Setek (Set), the embodiment of evil, and unique in the animal pan¬
theon of Ancient Egypt in that he resembles no known animal, but is
himself a hybrid. Depicted with an elongated snout, cocked ears, a
greyhound's body and erect tail, he re-appears partially here in the
Bailiff's mouth of a fox and 'formidable' proboscis.
The retrieval of such archetypes, the oldest figurations of the
imagination, Jung clearly regards as a form of gnosis. It is a
knowledge of origins which the visionary artist shares with other
seekers after wisdom, and which experiences as real those mysteries
against which civilization erects structures of faith or reason:
'It is not alonethe creator of this kind of art who is in touch with
the nightside of life, but the seers, prophets, leaders, and enlight-
eners a 1 so.... However dark this nocturnal world may be, it is not
wholly unfami1iar....It is only we who have repudiated it because of
our fear of superstition and metaphysics, and because we strive to
construct a conscious world that is safe and manageab1e....Yet, even
in our midst, the poet now and then catches sight of the figures that
people the night-world - the spirits, demons and gods.... he has a
presentiment of incomprehensible happenings in the pleroma. In
short, he sees something of that psychic world that strikes terror
the , V
into the savage and Abarbarian. (57)
On the strength of the three models presented above, it could
be suggested that Lewis' Gnosticism is in part ectogenic, and in
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part inherent. To the latter should be added Cox's premise, namely,
that to be very decisively a dualist is to approach a Gnostic posi¬
tion. It should also be acknowledged that Gnosticism is apt to be
congenial to a pessimist of Lewis' cast.
Having offered these considerations - all of which will be re¬
sumed where necessary in later sections - I think that an observation
must be made. To refer to 'Lewis' Gnosticism' is to imply that he
merely acquired or inherited a certain habit of mind, as if invol¬
untarily. Such an implication, unnecessarily reductive in our case,
is the effect of citing analyses such as that of Jonas, which ex¬
presses itself in terms of 'neo-Gnosticism' and the 'new Gnosticism'.
There is, however, no aporia involved in showing that Lewis had read
up on Gnosticism and related religious systems. What, therefore, is
apparently at issue is whether Lewis researched religious history,
having recognized in himself a certain propensity, or whether his
reading reinforced in him a propensity of which he was less certainly
awa re.
This, however, is to reduce to a too simple circularity the
complex relation of psycho-spiritual affinity to the conscious
selection of historical information. What I propose to do, therefore,
in the following sections is both to demonstrate direct reference to
Gnosticism, Persian dualism, and so on, and to elicit as much as
possible from implicit, or less conscious, indications of the presence
of Gnostic themes and concepts, and related patterns of myth.
(iv)
In Lewis' diagnosis of the current decadence of Western culture,
Gnostic and ancient Persian thought provide criteria which are
exalted overthe general slippage of the European mind from logical
or exact methods of thinking.
Concomitant with Lewis' aesthetic preference for classical,
hard and clear definition, over against blurring, impressionism and
exoticism, (58) is his estimation of the intellectual clarity which
can be sustained by a firmly demarcated dualistic arrangement of
principles. Only within such a structure of thought can exist the
'permanent values and metaphysical truths' which are Lewis' concern,
and which are threatened by the 'religion of impermanence' imposed
on society in the present day. The murky processes of excitation by
which the European mind is currently affected, the sensationalist
philosophies which confuse useful change with malignant change, or
change for change's sake, would be prohibited from flourishing, were
the distinction of what is good, what bad, to recover its ancient
dualistic prominence. Against the intellectual tendency, inculcated
by modern science and philosophy, to view any manifestation of pro¬
gress as a good thing, no matter how violent its conduct, Lewis
invokes the principal spirits of late Zoroastrianism, Mazdean dualism
and Manichaeism:
The virtues that we are apt to confuse in our excessive
officially promoted pragmatism are the disruptive and the
creative ones: or rather, katabolism comes too much to
be described as life. . . .
In our society two virtues are baldly contrasted, that
of the fighter and killer (given such immense prestige
by nineteenth-century darwinian science and philosophy)
and that of the civi1izer and maker. But the ancient
and valuable Iranian principle of duality is threatened.
We confuse these two characters that we violently con¬
trast. The effort in this essay is to separate them a
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little. It is hoped that certain things that have flown
a grey and neutral flag will be forced to declare them¬
selves as Ozman or Ahriman, the dark or the light. (59)
The Lord Ormuzd/Ormazd (not 'Ozman'), who incarnated truth, righteous¬
ness and order, and Ahriman, who incarnated the lie, unrighteousness
and disorder, stood, in the systems cited, opposed in the eternal
and irreducible opposition of good and evil. (60) In the face of
this eternal and constant dualism, revolutionary amelioration of
man's condition is scarcely feasible, since the quantity of evil
cannot be diminished; and, furthermore, because the evidence suggests
thatrevolutionary activity (social, political or scientific), con¬
ducted for its own sake, performs Ahriman's work by creating a
society in which prevails a cult of disorder, an expectation of
chaos: !..a very complete and profound inundation is at hand. After
us comes the Deluge.1 (61)
Having stated (in these opening pages) as one of his premises a
pessimistic metaphysical conservatism, it is difficult for Lewis to
make any progress on the positive, as opposed to the analytic, side.
Consequently, towards the end of The Art of Being Ruled, there comes
the admission: 'No logical future has taken pictorial shape in these
pages.' Following this, there is a clear re-statement of the Mani-
chaean theme, a return to premises: prevailing over the quotidian
wickedness of man, on the one hand, and his inconsiderable attempts
at ethical conduct, on the other, is the metaphysical opposition of
evil and good - the former preponderating, since earth lies within
the realm of Darkness, by which the principle of Light is constantly
assai1ed:
But in spite of all the evidences of deliberate malefi¬
cence in the modern world, when you have reckoned all that
is deliberate, there still remains a great amount of
automatic evil. In spite, similarly, of the small evidence
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of effort to produce any good, automatica11y a surplus of
good comes into the world every year. For all the organi¬
zation designed to convert it into evil with great
despatch, there is still left over a respectable amount,
which has either escaped attention or been found intract¬
able to present methods. (62)
It might be inferred from the discussion presented above that
what draws Lewis intellectually to the ancient dualisms is the fact
that they are unequivoca1 about where man stands, namely, in the
midst of evil, with good unattainable on earth. (There is a degree
of resemblance between this and what attracted Lewis to the Leninist
and Fascist dictatorships, namely, their 'frank' acknowledgment of
the fact that 'All rule is evil'. (63)) The corollary of this is
a radical diagnosis of the metaphysical flaw in Western culture,
which has been confounded by equivocation since the Advent.
Lewis' authority in this is Marcion, author of the Antithesis,
and the only Gnostic, apart from Mani, to establish a church, the
theoretical foundation of which consisted in rejection of the Old
Testament. Lacarriere provides the following account of his system:
'...it is impossible that Jesus, who is the Son of God, should be the
son of Jehovah the exterminator, or that the latter could be the
Father whom Jesus c1 aims... Jehovah is not the true God. The latter
is the Unknown God, a stranger to this world, the true Father whose
son is Jesus Christ.... The implication of Marcion's ideas is thus
seen to be simple but revolutionary: the Bible is not and could not
be a work of revelation, nor a Holy Scripture. The opposition be¬
tween the Old Testament and the New is total and it is expressed at
all 1 eve 1s.... what the Bible describes is not the immense and
grandiose work of God, but the stultifying creation of Evil.' (64)
Invoking Marcion, Lewis claims that because Western culture has
been diverted by the character of the New Testament from a logically
consistent pessimism - all is for the worst in an evil world:
Jehovah is, in fact, the Demiurge - yet has been compelled to accept
both books of the Bible, it has developed a split personality. The
necessity of accommodating the antinomies of cruelty and mercy
associated with, respectively, the Old and New Testaments unbalances
the European psyche, causing it to project both a ferocious and a
pacific self:
The student of the early christian age will recall that
the great heretic Marcion found it impossible to recon¬
cile the god of Justice with the god of Mercy: his
gentle master, Christ, he found represented such an
opposite doctrine to that of the supreme member of the
Trinity, that he was compelled to repudiate the latter,
or at least to distinguish radically between them, a
very difficult and ticklish operation, but, for him,
essent i a 1 .
The sacred books inherited by the christian European
were in two contradictory parts. One was a very
'realistic' account of things indeed - as barbarous and
'pessimistic' as Darwinian theory - namely, the Old Testa¬
ment. The other part was the exact opposite: it was an
extremely 'idealistic' book of humane injunctions, full
of counsels of perfection - namely, the New Testament:
the existence of this mad contradiction at the heart of
his intellectual life has probably been the undoing of
the European. The habits induced by the pious necessity
of assimilating two such opposed things, the irrational
gymnastic of this peculiar feat, installed a squint, as
it were, in his central vision of the universe. (65)
One of Marcion's enormities (as reported by the Churchman
I renaeus) (66) was the 'pruning' and 'abridging' of the New Testament,
notably the contributions of the Apostles Luke and Paul, in order to
adapt it to his own system. We find also that Lewis conducts a re¬
vision of New Testament theology, in order to accommodate it to his
own pessimism.
This comes about in Lewis' approving, though strangely sarcas¬
tic, resumption of T.E. Hulme's 'discovery' of the Pauline doctrine
of Original Sin (that is, the disobedience of Adam, through inherit¬
ing which, all men are fallible). Lewis considers 'the importance of
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Original Sin, as a doctrine,... is that it puts man in his place,1
and thereby provides a useful rebuttal of the Utopianism and
exaltation of the human that Lewis finds in, for example, H.G.Wells.
What emerges, however, is that Lewis wants to remove Original Sin
from its theological, or Scholastic, context, and to propose instead
what could be considered a Gnostic redaction of the doctrine:
Rousseau... taught that Man was essentially good. Mr Wells,
Mr Shaw, and most people in fact in England, believe that.
Christian theology teaches the opposite. For it, Man is
essentially bad. But, in theology, there is a reason for
Man being bad. He is bad because he 'fell1. The doctrine
of Original Sin is the doctrine, of course, of 'the Fall'.
You may believe that Man is bad without being a theo¬
logian. And then of course you mean something different
by the term 'bad'. (67)
Robert Chapman has called this a notion of a 'secular Original Sin'
(68) which, termino 1ogica11y, is a contradiction (since temporal
misconduct is not sin) and, moreover, fails to grasp, I think,
Lewis' particular apprehension of man's 'badness'.
This can be illuminated by comparison with the Gnostics' concep¬
tion of the inherent badness of man, which accepted Original Sin, but
as a curse or imposition, and not in terms of inherited depravity.
For them, the validation of the doctrine rested upon material
evidence, rather than moral or spiritual assumptions about the trans¬
mission of fallibility: '...our world...is the domain of evil. This
term is to be understood not in the moral but in the biological
sense....In this unending circle, the simple fact of living, of
breathing, feeding, sleeping and waking implies the existence and
the growth of evil....But (the) inherent vice, which the Hebrews
and Christians saw as the stamp of original sin, and therefore wholly
the responsibility of man, appeared to the Gnostics, on the contrary,
as a statute imposed on man.... the one who is truly responsible
is the sadistic and perverse demiurge who dared to dream up such a
cruel world in all its minute detail.' (69)
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A similar pessimism, based in a conception of the 'biological'
horror of human existence, its confinement in its own materiality,
is conveyed by the following passages from, respectively, The Art
of Being Ruled and The Apes of God:
Prostration is our natural position. A worm-like movement
from a spot of sunlight to a spot of shade, and back, is
the type of movement that is natural to men. As active,
erect, and humane creatures they are in a constantly
false position, and behaving in an abnormal way. (70)
They (i.e. the Keins) were b1ottis in a furnished
paralleloped with all required by the human worm for
its needs . (71)
More specifically, these passages echo the teaching of the Gnostic
Saturninus: man was created prostrate, owing to a failure of energy,
at a critical stage, on the part of the demonic angels; the subsequent
intervention of the True God rendered him 'active, erect, and humane'.
In 1renaeus' account: 'When this creature had been formed, and was
unable to rise up owing to the Angels' lack of strength, but crawled
around like a worm, the Power Above took pity on him - it had, after
all, been created in his likeness - and emitted a spark of life,
which raised man erect, provided him with limbs and made him alive.' (72)
Lewis' account of "'Hulme of Original Sin'" concludes with an
allusion to Gnostic soteriology: '(The proponent of Original Sin)
is denying that the average man, left to himself, has a divine spark,
which will eventually enable him to become a god...' (73) Such a
sentiment recalls the teaching of Valentinus, who expounded a system
of selective salvation, and identified three classes of men: pneu¬
matics (who possessed the divine spark, and would re-ascend to the
Pleroma); psychics (capable of comparative salvation); and hylics
(material men, or, in Lewis' phrase, 'the average man', who were
condemned to perish at the conclusion of earthly life). (74)
Since Lewis' pessimism derives from the recognition of biological
exigencies, it cannot, ultimately, be moderated by practical prescrip¬
tion of a better way of life. Nature, in the form of 'our enormous
physical and intellectual handicaps... those drastic limitations - of
gestation, metabolism, hunger and thirst, courtship, reproduction,
and all the rest of it,'(75) is not susceptible to ethical improve¬
ment (asceticism being a form of protest, or a means to an end,
rather than an end in itself). Consequently, he attempts to educe
from the ancient dualisms a 'non-ethical basis for the definition of
goodness' (76). This he discovers, in the essay "Physics of the Not-
Self", in the Socratic conception of the 'highest philosophical good¬
ness' (phi1osophike arete), and distinguishes it from 'popular' or
'ethical' goodness. Such 'philosophical goodness' is a form of
transcendent, as opposed to practical, wisdom, and, once attained,
abstracts one from the demands of the body, giving 'freedom from the
obscenities of existence'. (77)
In this can be observed the nature of the Greek contribution to
Gnosticism, since the concept of philosophike arete plainly anti¬
cipates that of gnosis. It is clear, furthermore, that Lewis was
aware of this relation, since he points to Manichaeism's comparable
exaltation of spiritual enlightenment over ethical goodness, as the
means to release from the chain of being:
The fusion of the idea of goodness with that of knowledge
we see in the teaching of Mani, for that matter; with his
Persian ontology, the principles of Dark and Light, he
taught that as the mind of a person contains increasingly
more light, so it contains correspondingly more goodness.
Socrates held that it was impossible for a man to under¬
stand and to be evil. (78)
Finally, I want to mention two more explicit references to
Gnosticism, these occurring in Lewis' aesthetic, as opposed to philo¬
sophic, criticism. The first is in The Lion and the Fox, and comes
about when Lewis is describing how the Renaissance recaptured the
pagan vitality of ancient Rome:
The last great pagan goddess, descended ultimately from
Helena, the mistress of Simon Magus, a gnostic aeon,
can still be worshipped in the pictures of Leonardo or
Luini. There she is "imprisoned" in the loveliest
matter that has been discovered for a northern goddess. (79)
The second occurs in The Dithyrambic Spectator, where Lewis complains
that 'Civilization', by which he means the product of man's highest
endeavours, no longer pays its dues to those (principally artists)
on whom its condition depends:
'Civilization' having become brazen in her new role of
Whore of Babylon, she has a malignant squint for her
traditional retainers and wears her high-brow orna¬
ments with an unconcealed impatience. When she was a
Madonna and claimed her descent from Simon Magus, she
was the friend of every art. (80)
I want to avoid anticipating here material from my discussion of The
Apes of God, in section (viii), where Simon Magus again appears, as
does Helena. Now, however, it should be pointed out that Simon was
reputed to be the first Gnostic, and claimed that Helena issued from
him by autogenesis. Subsequently, she underwent reincarnation many
times on earth. (81)
The passages quoted are further evidence of Lewis' technical
knowledge of Gnosticism, which is testified by the allusion to
'"imprisonment"' in matter, and to the concept of the aeon (an emana¬
tion of the Supreme Being), as well as by the reference to Helena's
'descen t' .
Beyond this, however, one gets the impression of a peculiar
fascination on Lewis' part. This derives, I think, from the obser¬
vation that the two variations on the theme of Helena are cameos of
a notably reverent nature, rather than logical or discursive elements
of Lewis' analysis. The lyrical tone of the first quotation ('wor-
shipped1 seems to be employed with some feeling), and the elegiac air
of the second, reinforce this impression.
Evidently, Lewis is drawn to the story, put about by Simon, that
Helena was the universal feminine principle embodied, and, inspired
by the myth of her reincarnations, considers her to be apparent, by
metempsychosis, in the female subjects of Western art at the highest
point of its achievement. Technically, this commits him to blasphemy,
for to see Helena in the Madonna is to substitute a common prosti¬
tute (Helena's trade before Simon discovered and mythicized her)
for the Virgin Mary. Yet what emerges from this is that, in addition
to the congeniality of Gnosticism to Lewis in respect of its dualism
and pessimism, it possessed for him an iconic affectivity.
Now, since Simon Magus professed to be the Supreme Being (82),
and that Helena was of him, Lewis' exaltation of Helena through art
gives him, it might be ventured, an intimation of divinity - though
not that of Christian tradition. To put this in more general terms,
I shall cite the passage in Time and Western Man where Lewis ex¬
presses belief in the possibility of 'a first-hand experience of the
divine in human life', and implies that such experience is most
likely to be re 1igio-aesthetic, gnosis coming through contemplation
of man's most consummate creations:
(Aristotle) says that if all we had to make our idea of God
with were what we possess in our experience (what we could
take from the highest reaches of our own contemplative
states), then that God would be 'worthy of our admiration'.
What we are suggesting here is that that is exactly all
that we have, indeed, with which to construct our God;
and that, further than that, it is completely adequate.
To at once be perfectly concrete, we can assert that a
God that swam in such an atmosphere as is produced by the
music of a Bach fugue, or the stormy grandeur of the genii
in the Sistine Ceiling, or the scene of the Judgement of
Signorelli at Orvieto, who moved with the grace of Mozart...
such a God would be the highest we could imagine. (83)
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Those who do not possess 'intellectual and artistic faculties' of the
necessary order cannot, as it were, know God in themselves, through
contemplation. Having fixed 'the "divine" upon some plane in¬
accessible to their senses', they must be satisfied, Lewis implies,
with faith a 1 one.
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(v)
One antidote to the curse of bodily existence, presented in the
last section as a form of Original Sin, is, as Lewis was eventually
to propose, laughter.
Such a recourse is not available to Arghol, in The Enemy of the
Stars, whose attitude to existence calls to mind the existential-
ontological model of Gnosticism, and is articulated as a cry of
anguish:
'The process and condition of life, without any exception,
is a grotesque degradation, and ",/ouillure" of the
original solitude of the soul. There is no help for it,
since each gesture and word partakes of it, and the child
has already covered himself with mire.' (84)
A development on Arghol's lament is provided by Benjamin Richard
Wing, in "The Code of a Herdsman". He is, as it were, the spirit of
Arghol abstracted from the 'mire1. He observes the corruption in
human existence, but is not of it:
You will meet with this pitfall: at moments, surrounded
by the multitude of unsatisfactory replicas, you^wi11
grow confused by a similarity bringing them nearAto us.=
...That group of men talking by the fire in your club...
that party at the theatre, look good enough, you will
say. Their skins are fresh, they are well-made, their
manners are good. You must then consider what they
really are. On closer inspection you know, from un¬
pleasant experience, that they are nothing but limitations
and vulgarities of the most irritating description. The
devil Nature has painted these sepulchres pink, and
covered them with a blasphemous Bond Street distinction.
Matter that has not sufficient mind to permeate it grows,
as you know, gangrenous and rotten. (85)
This "Imaginary Letter" was composed in the same year as "Cantleman's
Spring Mate" (1917) and views Nature similarly: it is malevolent,
the devil or Demiurge responsible for man's evil condition, and,
once again, a hypocrite, one that paints 'sepulchres pink'. Wing's
dicta can be considered Gnostic, and I would cite here Christopher
Nugent's formulation: '(Gnosticism) stands for spirit alone, and
demonizes nature'.(86) Yet in its idealization of spirit lies the
rhetorical weakness of "The Code of a Herdsman".
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Its thesis depends upon the acceptance of an illusion - that of
Wing's disembodiment, as if, de facto, he had attained the Socratic
philosophike arete. He thinks that a vigilant asceticism is means
enough to dissolve the contingency of the physical, of organic life.
For him, reality is divided into monistic, discrete regions - on the
mountain, pure mind, in the valley, dead matter. This leads him to
adopt Gulliver's fallacy: by withdrawing from man, he assumes that
he expels the Yahoo from within himself. (87)
Schematically speaking, by abstracting in turn from Wing the
principle of the observer, and installing it within Arghol, the
latter can learn to 1augh at his condition, where before he could only
fee 1 its tragedy. Hence, Lewis gets Ker-Orr, the "Soldier of Humour":
This forked, strange-scented, blond-skinned gut-bag,
with its two bright rolling marbles with which it sees,
bull's eyes full of mockery and madness, is my stalking
horse. I hang somewhere in its midst operating it with
detachment.... I explain everything by 1aughter. (88)
And hence, he gets the theory of the Comic expounded in the essay
'The Meaning of the Wild Body':
First, to assume the dichotomy of mind and body is neces¬
sary here, without arguing it; for it is upon that
essential separation that the theory of laughter here
proposed is based...we... have to postulate two creatures,
one that never enters into life, but that travels about
in a vessel to whose destiny it is momentarily attached.
That is, of course, the laughing observer, and the other
is the Wild Body. (89)
That is to say, Lewis' comic axiom reposes upon that dualism that was,
for the Gnostic, both an expression of and refuge from pessimism,
insofar as it distinguished his essence from his corruption, and
supported his consciousness of his enveloping badness.
Thus, as defined above, the function of the Comic is to make of
the Gnostic/Lewisian conception of Original Sin a matter for appre¬
ciation:
The soul lives in a cadaverous activity; its dramatic
corruption thumps us like a racing engine in the body
of a car. The finest humour is the great play-shapes blown up or
given off by the tragic corpse of life underneath the
world of the camera. (90)
And it is to aestheticize pessimism, to turn the self into a spectator
of the terrible difference between the existence of the spirit and the
sensory world:
Laughter is the climax in the tragedy of seeing, hearing,
and smelling self-consciously. (91)
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(vi)
The theory of satire expounded in Men Without Art presents Lewis'
most thorough examination of the nature of man's badness, and con¬
siders again the function of laughter. Central to it is the proposal
of a new, 'non-moral' mode of satire. The feasibility of this, it was
demonstrated in Chapter 1, Lewis' critics have been unwilling to accept,
and there some attempt was made to answer them. Some of the considera¬
tions offered in those pages, and certain of Lewis' statements
regarding satire, it will be necessary here to repeat, or cite again,
in the interests of the present discussion. The purpose of this is to
show that the essence of Lewis' proposed innovation is consistent with
a Gnostic vision of man's condition, and how laughter is exalted above
the aesthetic function assigned to it in "Inferior Religions" and "The
Meaning of the Wild Body", in such a way as to be regarded, finally,
as a faculty whose quality approaches the religious.
Lewis' first requirement isapurifying of satire from its tradi¬
tional ethical purpose, so that it can be provided with 'a standing,
alongside the other arts and sciences, as a recognized philosophic
and artistic human activity, not contingent upon judgements which are
not those specifically of the artistic or philosophic mind'. The
first reason Lewis gives for this requirement is that the victim of
moralistic satire is likely to revel in the charge of wickedness.
The second is that a judgement cannot at the same time be moral and
wise, since the artistic or philosophic mind has a different end in
sight to that of the moralist: the former wants to attain truth, the
latter to bring about correction or practical improvement:
It could perhaps be asserted, even, that the greatest satire
cannot be moralistic at all: if for no other reason, be¬
cause no mind of the first order, expressing itself in art,
has ever itself been taken in, nor consented to take in
others, by the crude injunctions of any purely moral code.
This does not mean that the mind in question was wanting
in consciousness of itself as a rational subject, which is
never absent in an intellect of such an order: but that
its abstract theory, as well as its concrete practice, of
moral judgements, would differ from the common run, and
that their introduction would merely confuse the issue. (92)
Such sentiments are similar to those expressed in the essay 'Physics
of the Not-Self', where 'philosophical goodness' was exalted over
'popular goodness'. That is to say, the most abstract form of in¬
telligence is to be substituted for reference to any system of
morality, or precepts of right conduct, as the basis and criterion
of satire. There is an analogy, in turn, between this and the anti-
nomianism of Gnosticism, for which knowledge alone was goodness.
The terms of reference of satire thus defined, what, according
to this theory, is to be its subject? Not, obviously, the vices of
man, nor the deficiencies of a particular society, nor the immoral
trends of a particular time, but the condition of humanity itself:
It is with man, and not with manners, that what we have
agreed to describe as 'satire' is called upon to deal.
It is a chronic ailment (manifesting itself, it is true,
in a variety of ways) not an epidemic state, depending
upon 'period^' or upon the 'wicked' ways of the parti¬
cular smart-set of the time. (93)
This 'chronic ailment' corresponds to what Gnosticism viewed as
the general evil in which man exists, the Original Sin of bodily life
and the envelopment of the spirit in matter. The correspondence is made
clear by what Lewis has to say about the common phenomena of physical
existence, which, objectively regarded, have their own evil pathology:
It is unnecessary to enumerate the tragic handicaps that
our human conditions involve - the glaring mechanical
imperfections, the nervous tics, the prodigality of
objectless movement - the, to other*, offensive smells,
disagreeable moistures - the involuntary grimace, the
lurch, roll, trot or stagger which we call our wa1k -
it is only a matter of degree between us and the victim
of 1ocomotor-ataxy or St.Vitus's dance. (9^)
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If the character of man's Sin is biological, then the satirist
finds his vocation alongside the empirical scientist. He records
facts without deference to man's illusions, his 'soft conceit':
Satire in reality often is nothing else but the truth -
the truth, in fact, of Natural Science. That objective,
non-emotional truth of the scientific intelligence some¬
times takes on the exuberant sensuous quality of creative
art: then it is very apt to be called 'Satire,' for it
has been bent not so much upon pleasing as upon being
true. (95)
As Lewis, in the essay 'The Meaning of the Wild Body', adapted Berg-
son's theory of the Comic, so does he here. In that essay, Bergson's
optimistic conception of the function of laughter - a social correc¬
tive applied when life shows signs of descending into mechanism -
was inverted to suit Lewis' pessimism - laughter is occasioned by the
spectacle of a thing's struggling to be animate.(96) Here, Lewis'
association of the satirist with the scientist is anticipated in many
details by Bergson's division, in Le Rire, of satire into an ironic
and an humorous mode. The satirical ironist, in Bergson's account,
corresponds to the satirist as traditionally conceived (as one in
whom the moral vision burns strongly), the humorist to the satirist
of Lewis' specification:
Humour...is the counterpart of irony. Both are forms of
satire, but irony is rhetorical in its nature, whilst
humour partakes of the scientific. Irony is emphasized
the higher we allow ourselves to be uplifted by the idea
of the good that ought to be: thus irony may grow so hot
within us that it becomes a kind of high-pressure eloquence.
On the other hand, humour is the more emphasized the deeper
we go down into an evil that actually is, in order to set
down its details in the most cold-blooded indifference...
humour delights in concrete terms, technical details,
definite facts. If our analysis is correct, this is not
an accidental trait of humour, it is its very essence.
A humorist is a moralist disguised as a scientist, some¬
thing like an anatomist who practises dissection with the
sole object of filling us with disgust; so that humour,
in the restricted sense in which we are here regarding
the word, is really a transposition from the moral to the
scientific. (97)
Bergson's terms - 'an evil that actually is', 'cold-blooded
indifference1, 'concrete terms', 'technical details', 'definite facts
describe exactly the methodology of Lewis' satiric portraits, of the
unmoved presentation of loathsomeness and precise research into the
physical iniquities of being, as in the description of Julius Ratner
awakening:
And now the morning eye-glue of ye 11ow-1idded, sleek-necked
Joo, was attacked by the tear-glands which he had. This
was but a dessicated trickle because Joo was a parched
wilderness of an organism so much more colloid than aquatic.
But still a few gouts gushed in the yellow rock and his mouth
held that taste of dry decay that was the invariable accom¬
paniment for Ratner of waking, presage of the disappointments
of a gastric order ensuing upon the coffee. (98)
Yet, and this is the point where Lewis' practice diverges from
Bergson's analysis, such a 'deep going down' into matutinal vileness
is not the covert operations of a moralist. There is no disguising
of an urge to edify here, or merely simulated detachment. These
lines meet precisely the requirement Lewis makes of the satirist who
works without 'an obvious moralist sanction':
It will be his task ...,1ike science, to bring human life
more into contempt each day. Upon the side of the ascetic,
in the interests of othei—worldliness, it will carry on the
good work of such pioneers as Swift. It will, by illustrat¬
ing the discoveries of science, demonstrate the futility
and absurdity of human life. That will be its ostensible
function.... And should it encounter the moralist ... why
Satire will then simply refer this ill-bred individual to
the theologian! (99)
Thus, satire, by causing in man a physical revulsion from him¬
self, will cause him, perforce, to be thrown back on that resort
which has been obscured from him by his concentration on, and immer¬
sion in, the organic cycle of life ('gestation, metabolism, hunger
and thirst', etc.), namely, his inner life, soul or spirit. This is
not the task of a moralist, because if life in itself is bad, as was
suggested in the discussion of "Physics of the Not-Self", or if it
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is futile and absurd, then it is not susceptible to reform or improve¬
ment. The 1other-wor1d1iness1 which this sort of satire will bring
about in man has a clear correlation in the Gnostic's contemplation
of the Realm of Light from which he is descended, and his vision of
the salvatory release from the body that he desires; and for both
Lewis and Gnosticism, asceticism is one route to the understanding
which dissolves physical contingency.
That is not meant by this the kind of asceticism enjoined in
'The Code of a Herdsman', which was a means of creating a safe dis¬
tance between the enlightened man and the masses, is clear from
Lewis' qualification of the nature of laughter in Men Without Art.
First, laughter is the expressive medium of the recognition
(recognition in the Aristotelian sense, that is, of tragic discovery,
or anagnorisis) of man's predicament, which is the worse for being
the effect of an evil that man has not incurred or willed upon him¬
self. But such laughter, while holding human 1ife in contempt, draws
the human essence to itself. It is not 'inhuman':
Our deepest laughter is not, however, inhuman laughter.
And yet it is non-personal and non-moral.... there is
laughter and laughter. That of true satire is as it were
tragic laughter. It is not a genial guffaw nor the
tittilations provoked by a harmless entertainer. It is
tragic, if a thing can be 'tragic' without pity and terror,
and it seems to me it can. (100)
'Pity' and 'terror', the elements of the Aristotelian concept of
pathos, are absent from such laughter, because its affectivity is not
emotional, but intellectual. The recognition which this laughter
attends is that although man knows that his reason distinguishes him
from the ontological condition of an animal, the reason which grants
him this knowledge also tells him that his essence must always be
constrained by his animal limitations. (101)
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This perplexity over the very intractability of being brings the
theory of satire in question very close, philosophically, to the
existentia 1-onto 1ogica1 model of Gnosticism. Of the latter, Haardt
cites the fundamental, or originating, experience proposed by W.
Schmithals: 'Schmithals too...uses the concept of attitude to exist¬
ence as a reductive form. "The decisive switch to Gnosis lay in
the fact that man recognized his own self, his soul, as part of the
God 'Man'.1" (102) Between this and Lewis' second qualification of
laughter, there is an analogy.
In the "Conclusion" to Men Without Art, laughter is conceived as
the means by which man knows the 'divine spark' in himself. Or it
is itself his portion of the divine. By repelling the spirit from
the organism, and thereby intensifying the life of the spirit,
satiric laughter, momentarily, apotheosizes man. Whereas in "In¬
ferior Religions" laughter was the expression of aesthetic apprecia¬
tion, man regarding himself from a distance, here it is an expression
of religious, even mystic, wisdom, man regarding himself from a
transcendent height. And finally, since Lewis sees satire, of the
kind he is specifying, as the dominant characteristic of all great art
of the present day, he exalts satire into a religious philosophy, or,
as it were, a new form of Gnosticism: (and the time seems to require
it):
...we must not encourage the god in us to laugh too much.
This transcendental viewpoint which is explicit in laughter,
must be in one sense, sparingly employed. . . .'Satire,' as I
have suggested that word should be used in this essay
(applying to a 11 the art of the present time of any force at
all) refers to an 'expressionist' universe which is reeling
a little, a little drunken with an overdose of the
'ridiculous' - where everything is not only tipped but
steeped in a philosophic solution of the material, not of
mirth, but of the intense and even painful sense of the absurd.
It is a time, evidently, in which homo animal ridens is
accentuating - for his deep purposes, no doubt, and in
response to adverse conditions - his dangerous, philosophic,
'god-like' prerogative - that wild nihilism that is a func¬
tion of reason and of which his laughter is the characteristic
expression.... by stretching a point, no more, we can without
exaggeration write satire for art - not the moralist satire
directed at a given society, but a metaphysical satire occu¬
pied with mankind. (103)
(vii)
Given that there is some relation between the antinomianism of
Lewis' theory of satire and the religious antinomianism of the
Gnostic systems, I want here to compare the behaviour and attitudes
of some of Lewis' fictional protagonists with the conduct of the
members of the Gnostic sects.
Gnostic conduct, as was stated in the short account provided in
section (i), took the form of 'extremes of radical asceticism and
antinomist libertinism'. Such opposite types of behaviour were con¬
sidered to be equally valid as means of denying the authority of the
Creator of the World and His Commandments, and as preparations of
the soul for gnosis. Furthermore, among the members of a particular
sect, either course of conduct may be countenanced and adopted:
'The radical attitude adopted towards the flesh permits, without
prejudice or preference, the exercise of a rigorous asceticism or an
equally rigorous "debauchery", for both are roads leading to libera¬
tion.' (1 OA)
The purpose of Gnostic asceticism is, however, more simply con¬
ceived. It is the denial of matter, of the body, with the intention
of purifying the spirit for its future release. And beyond this, it
is the refusal to perpetuate the existence of matter through human
reproduction. Thus, Augustine reported that the Manichaeans
abstained from meat, eggs, milk and wine, and lived on vegetables
(the least 'animate' food) which were got for them by acolytes, so
that they should have no part in the process of cultivation; and
Alexander of Lykopolis wrote of the Manichaeans' prohibition against
'marriage, sexual intercourse and procreation, so that the (Divine)
Power may not dwell in matter still longer, in the succession of
gene rations.' (105)
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The purpose of Gnostic libertinism and disobedience was twofold.
First, the belief in the transmigration of souls from body to body
until every type of life and action had been experienced meant that
the immersion of the soul in sin would free it the more rapidly from
bodily confinement. Thus Irenaeus on the Carpocratians, in the.
Adversus haereses: '... the i r sou 1 s ought to have tasted of all acts
in life, and left nothing outrageous undone or lacking, once they
depart (from their bodies), so as to avoid being forced into another
body...5ouls go on being incarnated until they have run the gamut of
all sins: and when there is nothing more lacking, the soul is freed
and departs above to the God who is superior to the world-creating
angels.' (106) Then, the belief that the Archons or world-creating
angels had perverted and caused to be regarded as sinful the desire
for coitus which the True God had inculcated in man led to the ritual
practice of immoral ism. The Commandment against adultery was
systematically flouted. (107)
Common ownership of women, love-feasts (or agapes) and orgiastic
rites became, therefore, a form of ceremonial defiance of the con¬
straint perpetrated by the Demiurge and his agents. At the same
time, the strictest measures were taken against conception, for to
procreate was to mimic the work of the Demiurge. Accordingly, com¬
munal coitus and the free exchange of partners were accompanied by
ritual contraceptive practices. Epiphanius, the Bishop of Salamis
(on Cyprus), documented these (tendentious1y, in the opinion of
recent scholarship) as including coitus interruptus, fellatio,
spermatophagy, and, as a last resort, manual abortion, the embryo
subsequently being consumed as a symbol of Christ's Passion. 'They
are also emboldened to commit another act as terrible as any that
exists. . .they smear their hands with the ignominy of their seminal
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ejaculation, and rise and pray with polluted hands, completely naked,
as if to achieve by such conduct sincerity before God.1 (108)
Whereas, however, the early Churchmen observed (or reported) only
rank depravity, Lacarriere, throughout his essay on Gnosticism,
stresses that the carnal excesses were in fact elaborations of an
ascetic rationale: 'However, the Gnostic deviations are different
in kind from those the sexologists study in that they are perfectly
conscious and deliberate, and are carried to their uttermost limit
as a form of liberating and ascensional asceticism.' (109) Further¬
more, the essence of Gnostic libertinism lay in its indifference.
Neither amatoriness, nor affection, nor personal sentiment were per¬
mitted to distract the gaze of the spirit from its object: '...if
the Gnostics were able to magnify sex and at the same time reject
love as a sentiment, if they achieved a total and radical dissocia¬
tion between these two domains, it was because all the force of their
love, their sense of fusion and identification, was turned towards
the true God.' (110)
One way of interpreting the conflict between asceticism and car¬
nality in four of Lewis' protagonists - Cantleman, Tarr, Kell-lmrie
and Rene Harding - is by referring it to the Gnostic polarity
discussed above. Each of these men conducts himself according to a
rationale, or tries to establish a theoretical or systematic control
over his personal life. The secret knowledge he professes or acquires,
or the special understanding he lays claim to, is reflected in some
way in his sexual habits.
Cantleman has 'a more human, as well as a little more divine
understanding, than those usually on his left and right.' (111)
At one point, he anticipates the concluding pages of Men Without Art,
when he reflects that man's consciousness of his animal condition is
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something he would be happier without: '...and human beings anywhere
were the most ugly and offensive of the brutes because of the confu¬
sion caused by their consciousness.1 Since this complication of the
spirit with the body cannot be remedied in the normal course of
things - 'That they could not reconcile their little meagre streams
of sublimity with the needs of animal life should not be railed at.' -
Cantleman proposes for himself an ascetic retreat into the life of the
mind alone, where he may cultivate his 'divine understanding':
Well then, should not the sad amalgam, all it did, all it
willed, all it demanded, be thrown over, for the fake and
confusion that it was, and should not such as possessed a
greater quantity of the wine of reason, retire, meta¬
phorically, to the wilderness, and sit forever in a formal
and gentle elation, refusing to be disturbed?
But the possibility of retiring thus - the course which, it is implied
ultimately, he had better have followed - he rejects, since he thinks
that, on the strength of his superior 'human understanding', can
achieve some sort of liberation from his animal confinement, or
'produce the human entirely' by more direct means.
Since man is persecuted by Nature (a demiurgic force, as it was
put in section (iii)), which, it seems to Cantleman, deceives him
into observing its rites (principally procreative and destructive)
as automatically as if he were a simple animal, Cantleman resolves
to deny life, Nature and the flesh by engaging in their processes
with a detached fury:
The thing was either to go out of existence: or, failing
that, remain in it unreconciled, indifferent to Nature's
threat, consorting openly with her enemies, making war
within her war upon her servants. (112)
The purpose of this declaration of war might be interpreted in
terms of Irenaeus' account, of the conduct of the Carpocrat i ans: to
escape from the cycle of life by exhausting life through outrages
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perpetrated thereupon. Lacarriere calls this an 'homeopathic
ascetism1: 'For the Carpocratians, the Gnostic's first task was...
to use up the substance of evil by combatting it with its own
weapons, by practising what we might call a homeopathic asceticism.
Since we are surrounded and pulverized by evil, let us exhaust it
by committing it.1 (113)
Taking his theoretical and defiant libertinism to a country girl,
Stella - 'a more methodless matter' -, he seems to be on the brink of
the required dissociation of the sublime and the animal, as he stares
indifferently up at the stars:
As their two bodies shook and melted together, he felt that
he was raiding the bowels of Nature: he was proud that he
could remain deliberately aloof, and gaze bravely, like a
minute insect, up at the immense and melancholy night... (114)
But nothing higher beckons him; or rather, he does not desire to
penetrate the enclosing darkness (beyond which, for the Gnostic, lay
the 'Pneuma', the boundary of the Realm of Light); the firmament,
with all its mad nightingales, piously folded small brown
wings in a million nests, night-working stars, and misty
useless watchmen
has become as trivial as the girl Stella ('star').
His pride, and the 'smile of severe satisfaction' with which he
walks home, indicate Cantleman's downfall. Having dispensed with
the divine in him, in favour of a ferociously humanistic project, all
he attains, momentarily, is a state of colossal egotism, an exalta¬
tion of the self, rather than the spirit. This corrupts him quickly.
In creating with Stella a child (whose existence he refuses to
acknowledge), and in beating out the brains of a German soldier with
'impartial malignity', he becomes an extremely effective subscriber
to Nature's scheme, and so remote, in his indifference, from other-
worldliness as to be indistinguishable from a brute.
Tarr reflects thus on his relationship with Bertha:
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The whole meaning of his attachment to stupidity became more
clear and consistent as he persevered, indeed: his artist's
asceticism could not support anything more serious than such
an elementary rival: when he was on heat, it turned his eyes
away from the highest beauty, and deliberately it dulled the
extremities of his senses, so that he had nothing but rudi¬
mentary inclinations left. (115)
The opinion expressed here recalls Lewis' comments on the religio-
aesthetic apprehension of the divine, in Time and Western Man. Since
Tarr's asceticism is cerebral rather than practical, he is worried
about his soul's slipping into sex, which will distract him from
gnosis, turn his 'eyes away from the highest beauty'. The attraction
exercised on him by the flesh causes him to announce repeatedly and
axiomatica11y, though with a confidence that is less than complete,
the passionless and indifferent libertinism of the artist. Thus, to
Hobson:
"...one by one his (i.e. the artist's) powers are turned
away from the usual object of a man's personal poetry or
passion and so removed from the immediate world. One
solitary thing is left facing any woman with whom he has
commerce, that is his sex, a lonely phallus....
To sum up this part of my disclosure: no one could have a
coarser, more foolish, slovenly taste than I have in women. (116)
As the Gnostic, in Lacarriere's account, displayed a sexuality from
which all spiritual feeling had been discharged, so Tarr proposes
to exclude all finer feelings from his personal affairs. The emphasis
on sheer physicality liberates those energies customarily dedicated to
love to the benefit of the immaterial side of man, that he may better
apprehend, respectively, the divine, or the divine in art. The
character of Tarr's art, he tells Hobson, is 'ascetic', distinguished
by an 'invariable severity' and free of the 'slop of sex'. (117)
And when he goes to Bertha, it is with a mind to practise the 'famous
feeling of indifference', a cold seduction ensuing: 'He drew her un-
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graciously and roughly into his arms, and started kissing her mouth
with a machine action.1 (118)
Tarr's prescription of asceticism for the artist in him, and in¬
different, coarse libertinism for the rest of the man, is threatened
by his attraction to the superb Anastasya:
...in the interests of his animalism he was about to betray
the artist in him: for he had of late been saying to himself
that he must really endeavour to find a more suitable lady-
companion, one he need not be too ashamed of. 'Life' would
be given a chance.
Anastasya's highly artistic beauty suggested an immediate
solution. (119)
The last sentence is sophistical, an attempt to make amends to his
betrayed asceticism. Tarr dissembles emotional, intellectual and
physical attraction as aesthetic pursuit (the adverb in 'highly
artistic beauty1 is desperately specious).
This temporary desertion of his creed, Tarr corrects when he
tells Anastasya herself that life cannot harbour the aesthetic -
'"Anything living, quick and changing is bad art always; naked men
and women are the worst art of all..."' (120) - and refreshes himself
with an outburst against the world (a 'bad spot') and the flesh
(Anastasya's):
"Ha! Ha! We're in life my Tarr: we represent absolutely
nothinq thank God!"
"I realize I'm in life, but I don't like being reminded
of it in that way. It makes me feel as though I were in
a 'mauvais 1 i eu . '"
"My confession has been unavailing I observe."
"To cut a long story short, you disgust me!" (121)
It has been suggested that Tarr's asceticism and sexual conduct
have a Gnostic cast. Given that Gnosticism prohibited, for religious
reasons, procreation, the issue of Bertha's child draws one's atten¬
tion to an ambiguity in the narrative of the novel.
When Tarr is first shown with Bertha, her body is 'strung to
heavy motherhood. Another baby could not long be delayed. To look
at a man should be almost enough to effect it.1 (122) The first
phrase implies that Bertha is pregnant, the following sentences merely
that she is ripe for, or desirous of, pregnancy. When Tarr learns
towards the end of the novel that she is enceinte, he is 'crestfallen
at once1, but rallies when she tells him that the child is Kreisler's.
This may be the case. On the other hand, it may be that the child
which is, in fact, Tarr's is foisted on Kreisler to damn the latter
further, by associating procreation with the destructiveness and de¬
generation that he symbolizes. The possibi1ity of the child's being
Tarr's is clear from his initial reaction; and the time-scale of the
novel is not sufficiently clear for the reader to be certain about
paternity, both Tarr and Kreisler having had Bertha as mistress (a
Bohemian flouting of morality which echoes the Gnostics' common owner¬
ship of women). '"We can get married and it can always pass as
mine"', Tarr generously and suddenly disinterested tells Bertha,
whereupon Bertha reflects that he is 'denying reality!' (By offering
to pretend that the child is his? Or by accepting her story at face
value?) Bertha, naturally concerned for her and the child's well-
being, is sparing with the truth in these passages: 'She could have
told him at this juncture the actual circumstances under which the
child had come. But the idea having occurred to her she had the pre¬
sence of mind to refrain.' (123) If Bertha herself can be certain of
paternity, either she is unwilling to reveal Kreisler's assault on her,
or, conversely, fears that revealing Tarr as the father would cause
him to act with less impartiality, and 'immediately take back1 his
generous offer. Cantleman refused to acknowledge his child, and, it
seems, a narrative complication - or sleight - absolves Tarr of
responsibility. When the child is born, it bears 'some resemblance
to Tarr1 (124), which may be socially convenient (since it is not his),
or biologically inevitable (since it j_s his). Certainly, the children
whom Tarr later fathers, the narrative dismisses with despatch in the
last five epitaphic paragraphs of the novel, in order, probably, to
keep the impression of the ascetic Tarr largely intact.
In Kell-lmrie (in Snooty Ba ronet) , ascetic carnality evolves
through three stages. The first is to view the prospective sexual
act scientifically, as a piece of biological research, so as to place
himself at a distance that makes sentiment or passion impossible:
If I have to converse for a stated time with such a giggling
fantoche as old Val, before we get down to business, I find
it best, more rational, not to begin with a juicy close-up
of the specimen I shall be compelled, in spite of myself, to
do a bit of field-work on...(125)
Then, grotesquely, he disencumbers himself, becomes less material
than he was, literally takes himself away from sex - he removes his
prosthetic leg. (126) Since, however, his whole being is complicated
in his body - as a behaviourist, he cannot divide himself as con¬
veniently as Tarr could - revulsion still ensues from the carnal act,
ejaculation entailing emesis, the body emptying itself still further:
...the folding-doors once more came violently open...A
one-legged man hopped out. He was as naked as God ushered
him into the world and as the Grave will take him back.
Sitting down upon the end of the settee, and bending over
the gilt-flowered slop-vessel, this man proceeded to be
ill. (127)
This marks Kell-lmrie's third ascetic expedient: having distanced him¬
self emotionally, then physically, he now removes himself onto 1ogica11y
by adopting the third person: 'That one-legged naked man...was me.'
When Kell-lmrie displays affection for another mistress, Lily,
the body initiates its own ascetic mortification, attempts to fore¬
stall the consummation of desire, and he feels 'uncommonly sick' and
has to lie down in the darkness for ha 1f-an-hour ' because of the beating
98.
in (his) eyes.1 12.8) To continue thus in libertinism with the body in
painful revolt is an element in a larger pattern of amoral licentious¬
ness that is to be observed in Kell-lmrie.
Another aspect of Gnostic disobedience, conveyed in Ptolemaeus1
account of the Va1entinians, was the notion that he who had gained
gnosis could sin with impunity, since he was already guaranteed
salvation. (129) The enlightenment for which Kell-lmrie, in his
study of "Behaviour", has long been preparing himself comes before the
dummy in the shop window, when he discovers that, according to his
system, his 'complex inherited technique', an automaton and a man
share a reciprocal reality:
'Behavior' had as it were turned round upon me as well.
As the man at my side observed me putting on my hat, I
was for the first time placed in the position of the dummy!
I saw all round Behavior as it were - for the first time.
I knew that J_ was not always existing, either: in fact that
I was a fitful appearance. ... I saw that I had to compete
with these other creatures bursting up all over the
imaginary landscape, and struggling against me to be rea1 -
like a passionate battle for necessary air, in a confined
p1 ace. (130)
Confirmed in the knowledge that existence is a Berkeleian struggle
(that is, to be is to be perceived), Kell-lmrie, in an attempt to
establish a relatively more permanent reality for himself, conceives
the plan of eliminating his associates from competition. He murders
Humph with hilarity, threatens to push Val from a tower, and eventu¬
ally deserts her when she contracts smallpox. (131) These outrages
are perpetrated not so much out of wickedness, or any inherent evil
that hasbeen noted in Kell-lmrie, as from confidence that anyone who
follows his system can reasonably behave in this way: 'If you are a
true behaviorist, and not merely a sham one, you behave as I have
behaved! ' (132)
The knowledge possessed by Rene' Harding is that all of human
history, as convent i ona 1 1 y presented, is a record of the evil and
destructive use of power. This form of historiography exalts the
(essentially unscrupulous) ruler, politician and statesman over the
rest of mankind, and it is in order to expose this idolatry of the
powerful that Harding has written The Secret History of World War II.
His position is that the saving of the human race will only come
about by the transcending of the 'brutal plane of automatic life' by
the creative, the intelligent and the wise, and by the re-
interpretation of the concept of history in their terms. (133)
'"History"', in the words of Harding's 'disciple' Rotter Park¬
inson, '"a la Rene Harding is an essentially pessimistic narrative."'
(134) It is so, in part, because he has a religious, Manichaean
conception of evil as an active, positive principle. If, as was
proposed in section (iii), metaphysical dread and the recollection
of archetypes were among the originating impulses behind Gnostic
thought (the positions of Jonas and Jung respectively), we can
possibly regard as regulated by similar impulses Harding's expression
of fear of the darkness that now prevails in the European mind, with
the dictatorships stirring up war (the time is May 1939):
...a dragon has made its appearance in this century. It is
not a reptilian animal about fifty yards long which spits
fire. It is a far bigger animal than that, and a far more
subtle one. It is, if you like, a mental animal: one may
identify it, almost see its fiery being in the minds of
men. I have seen it, I have felt it. For a long time now
I have known of its existence. I know why it is here, I
am afraid of it....
We are little, powerless, shortlived creatures. What I
am speaking about is supernatural, of vast powers, and age¬
less. We cannot possibly know why, at certain periods,
these monstrous things appear among us and then disappear
again. (135)
Harding's desideratum, it would seem, is that history, as he
wishes it to be written, should enlighten humanity sufficiently to
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prevent the reappearances of such a monster. In bringing 'idealism'
and 'perfectionism' (Rotter's terms (136)) to historiography, how¬
ever, in proposing an alternative history (a monument to wisdom
rather than power), Harding fails at first fully to take note of, and
is finally confounded by, the evidence of his own nature.
He professes an ascetic view of sex, marriage and procreation,
as impediments to the life of the mind:
...his mind flashed back to the figures of Mr and Mrs Hard¬
ing, pere and mere, as lifelong inhabitants of a handsome
four-poster; for the nocturnal half of life Essie and he at
night had beds that were twins. Same thing, same idea, but
less oppressively barbarous. Why did he and Essie live to¬
gether? Same idea. Nothing would have induced him to live
with a man of Essie's disposition and mediocre intellect...
Their marriage had been a bus-accident. No offspring had
resulted. A good thing. (137)
Within a page, however, he has become extremely lascivious with the
woman just now the object of such cold reflections:
In the taxi he behaved like an amorous student. And once
or twice, when the sterner side of his nature had attempted
to intervene, he pushed it away with a ho-ho-ho. (138)
Harding is aware of the struggle in himself between the ascetic and
the 1ibertine:
Being a man of great natural severity, an eroticism which
did not live very easily with it was instinctively resented:
and the mate who automatically classified under the heading
'Erotics' was in danger, from the start, of being regarded
as a frivolous interloper by his dominant intellectuality. (139)
Rotter, in his essay on Harding's thought, also refers, genially, to
this contradiction (his articles on Harding customarily containing
some mention of the latter's personality, which he is always asked
to excise from the second draft):
"I should perhaps say, however, that this implacable per¬
fectionist is, in his personal life, gaily capable of
unregenerate behaviour. He must not be visualized as a
bloodless and solemn ascetic." (1^0)
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Unable to detach himself from sex, or to rationalize his personal life
through systematic indifference (as Cantleman, Tarr and Keil-lmrie
could), Harding identifies his sex drive as a manifestation of the
absurd:
Eros was a factor he always left out of his calculations
and when he first remarked that the above pressures were
resulting in the same warmth on his side as he had in¬
tended them to induce on hers, he was traversed by what
almost amounted to a shudder. The absurd was happening. (141)
That his theory of history is complicated by this sense of absurdity,
he does not yet perceive.
Exiled on account of his secret knowledge to an hermitical
existence in a Canadian hotel, material considerations begin to press
upon Harding. His principled resignation of his professorship is
eventually compromised by the necessity of acquiring an academic post,
towards which he embarks upon a new historical volume.
Now, however, what had occurred to him previously as a perplexing
personal absurdity is transformed into a radical observation, tantamount
to the Gnostic conception of organic, material Original Sin. Contempt
for the vulgarization of history turns into contempt for life itself.
The vitiation of the exercise of the intelligence by the exigencies
of the physical make history and human life reciprocally futile:
This problem of problems can be compressed as follows: if
one condemns all history as trivial and unedifying, must
not all human life be condemned on the same charge? Is
not human life too short to have any real values, is it
not too hopelessly compromised with the silliness involved
in the reproduction of the species, of all the degrada¬
tions accompanying the association of those of opposite
sex to realize offspring? (142)
Harding had wanted the new history to be created by the enlight¬
ened, but the view expressed above makes the recording of such history
in good faith impossible. The animal in humanity prevails over the
consideration of an 'idealist' or 'perfectionist' interpretation of
history, and man (unless he be, in Rotter's phrase, 'a bloodless and
solemn ascetic1) can never rise very far above the 'brutal plane of
automatic 1ife'.
Since Harding has so often observed himself gravitating to this
plane, and since, critically, his asceticism has not led him to
countenance sex as sacramental or ascensional, but has caused him,
rather, to regard it as a succumbing to the absurd, se1f-ref1ection
on the personal level should earlier have drawn him to the general
conclusion that his model of history, based on a notion of secular
intellectual brilliance, could not be sustained. For Harding is
precisely the type of man around whom such history would be composed,
a process which has already been initiated, in little, by his dis¬
ciple Rotter. The logical consequence of the new pitch of pessimism
to which reason has taken Harding would be a retreat into other-
worldliness, the adopting of a religious position (which he briefly
considers, in the Catholic Seminary, after the death of Hester (143)).
in a manner which reminds one of Cantleman, however, he presses
on, his work becoming marked by 'excesses of virulent expression'.
Dispensing, on account of its impracticability, with the ideal of
raising and saving mankind through the exalting of wisdom and
creativity, Harding turns to the advocation of super-humanism, the
eugenic breeding of superior beings, as the only recourse left
mankind. (144) This entails a corruption of Harding's inner being,
depresses him spiritually:
His life altogether was being mechanized upon a lower level -
in everything expediency counted more with him...He was
writing a book ever so slightly too much as part of his new
plan of life, from which the old integrity and belief were
missing. (145)
Both Cantleman and Harding pursue remorselessly a humanist theory,
namely, that man alone can 'meet and overcome1 the 'dragon' (146) of
man's nature, of Nature itself. The difference between them is that
Harding persists in doing so even after his conviction has faltered -
a point which Cantleman is never permitted to reach. Harding's
motives are ordinary: financial ease and academic applause. His
soul thickens as he becomes 'dedicated', finally, 'to the ideal of
materia] security'.(1hj) From a state of rare enlightenment, he
has fallen to that of the hylic of Valentinian Gnosticism, and
become 'a glacial shell of a man', unredeemable.
(viii)
It is in The Apes of God that Lewis' interest in Gnosticism finds
its fullest imaginative expression. On the thematic, structural and
allusive levels, the acknowledging of the existence of a Gnostic
current of thought provides an hermeneutics that opens up previously
impenetrable or difficult areas of the novel. It should be stated
immediately, however, that in places, Lewis' imagination exceeds in
its scope the limits of a simple correspondence with the systems of
Gnosticism, going over into other ancient, non-Christian theologies -
whose philosophical relation with Gnosticism may, nevertheless, be
close. There is a doubling, multiplying or complication of the sig¬
nificance of images, incidents or characters, fusing the mythology
of Gnosticism with earlier mythologies. Archetypes are sought. Like
Gnosticism itself, The Apes of God is syncretic.
The non-character Pierpoint may be interpreted on one level as
figuring the Supreme Being, the occupant of the Realm of Light, the
sole source of absolute wisdom.
Discursively, the novel devolves from Pierpoint; when sense is
spoken, it is referred to him. Thus, after a brilliant disquisition
on satire and modern fiction, Zagreus acknowledges, '"At all events,
there is our great and dear friend Pierpoint's text - orally pre¬
served, quite in the primitive manner."', and, having overcome in
disputation a guest of the Keins', he exclaims: '"I was using Pier-
point's methods. Those were the methods of Pierpoint!"' Black-
shirt's attribution of knowledge is exemplary: '"I have heard this
from Pierpoint."' (148)
Then, like the True God of the Gnostics, Pierpoint is remote to
the point of absence, a 'brilliant' (isobel Kein's term) abstraction
who has no agency in the world of men. Prosaically, he is kind and
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unworldly, '"too good hearted ... but so impractica1...and very un¬
businesslike."' (149) This entails a cluster of acolytes, an
enlightened elect - Zagreus, Blackshirt (Starr-Smith), Ratner - some
of whom 'broadcast' Pierpoint's theses, and who act as his fund¬
raiser, political secretary, financial assistant.
But Pierpoint's absolute seclusion makes him impotent, and -
anticipating the benign angel (the Padishah) of Monstre Gai in this
respect - though he is the repository of the true wisdom, Pierpoint
is not clever. This eventuates in a kind of theological power
struggle, since Zagreus has been recruiting Pierpointeans according
to his own judgement, and then initiating their fall from grace. A
demonology is introduced into the novel. Thus, Dan Boleyn is cast as
Luc i fer:
The paper was a letter from Mr. Zagreus. It was to Pear
Dan. Horace had written! The Son of the Morning shouted
for joy, this letter was manna! He was on his feet at
Dear Dan in a bound as if it had been a word of command
from High Heaven. (150)
Zagreus' communication contains a document from 'Heaven', as it were,
in the form of Pierpoint's "Encyclical". 'Son of the Morning' is the
periphrastic appellation for Lucifer from Isaiah (Chapter 14, Verses
12-14). On good terms with the divine here (as Lucifer originally
was), Dan is finally precipitated from Heaven after the Lenten Party,
when he learns in a letter from Zagreus that Zagreus and Blackshirt
have blamed him for the violent chaos in which that function concluded.
(151) Pierpoint, apparently, is susceptible to lies. The same
leter refers to the ejection from favour that is the fate of Ratner,
who is also represented as the Devil:
"In talking the matter over with Archie Margolin, he agreed
with me that Pierpoint's estimation of Ratner was in some
ways fallacious, and Pierpoint has now come to be of my
opinion. . . . (Ratner) was a minor Satan perverted by
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his little literary vanity, and so really a sort of Ape of
God rather than a minor Jatan."
And now Zagreus has a '"new tame devi1"' (he is Margolin's cousin)
...'"a perfect minor Satan of the first water."'
Lewis' imagination seems to be working syncretica11y in these
passages, and in a manner that is rather difficult to interpret. It
may, however, be of assistance to cite Wilson's account (in The
Gnostic Problem) of the sources of Gnostic demonology: 'The cosmic
powers, angels, and demons of Gnosticism derive from a view of the
world such as that which lies behind the New Testament... The Gnostic
Demiurge plays a part analogous to that of Satan in Jewish and
Christian theo1ogy...the Demiurge in Gnosticism is...a distorted image
of the Old Testament Yaweh.' (152)
Now, Dan Boleyn and Julius Ratner may, as fallen Lucifers/Satans,
be intended as figurations of the Demiurge, or, more probably, of his
agents - demonic angels, Archons, world-creating devils - since to
dabble incompetently in art - as they do - is to indulge in demiurgic
activity (and Pierpoint's "Encyclical", his '"review of this society"',
has paid special attention "'to its reaction upon art"' (153)). Thus,
Zagreus' '"new tame devi1"' is redeemed by the fact that he has '"no
pretences whatever of intellect"' (15^) - that is, he does not dabble.
Why, however, should Zagreus be cultivating the company of devils,
'minor Satans' or Archons, contending in knowledge with Pierpoint and
telling sinister lies, unless he himself is to be viewed as the Devil
or Demiurge (a representation of him that is not, however, consistent
throughout the novel, as I shall show)? Possibly, Lewis' interest in
diabolical archetypes, as manifested in the passages quoted, as well
as in the very title of the novel, cannot be schematized straightfor¬
wardly. And, incidentally, to call the Jewish Ratner a 'Satan' is
to suggest a spirit of evil who is both pre-Biblical and pre-Gnostic,
since it is suggested by Wilson that 'Judaism seems to have drawn its
demonology ultimately from Persia, Satan being modelled on Ahriman'
(155) (and Lewis' interest in that figure will be recalled from
sect ion (iv)) .
Yet, on a more general level, there may be elicited from all this
an archetype of satire, already glimpsed in the characterizations of
Dan and Ratner. The allusion (present in the decline of Dan and
Ratner) to the fall of the Demiurge or his agents from the Realm of
Light, or of the Son of Morning from Heaven, contains the idea of the
first showing of evil or recklessness in the cosmos, and consequently
the first instance of the sin of excessive ambition, pretence and
pretentiousness. That is to say, in the first fall, the fall of
light, exists the primordial satiric spectacle. This reappears in
satire such as that exemplified by The Apes of God, or The Dunciad,
whose object is the bad or stupid creation that ensues from the
aping of the divine by the Devil, Demiurge or a related principle of
darkness (Pope's 'Dulness', for example).
As time advances, however, the availability to the satirist of
the Christian Satan as the archetype of the malign or foolish
creator evanesces. Where the Devil of the Old and New Testaments
had once personified evil, theology has come to qualify it as a
mere absence, a principle of disorder or emptiness - the Church has
taken the person out of Satan, as it were, or it has demateria 1ized
evil. This has induced in lesser satirists an optimism about the
prospect of straightening out or correcting the disorder, or filling
up the emptiness with ethical exempla and decent advice (it is apt to
recall Lewis' comments on 'non-moral satire' here, from Men Without
Art). I have been following the Argument of Alvin Kernan, who pro-
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poses that all satire of the first order must, ultimately, repose on a
Gnostic, ratherthan a Christian,basis, since only thus can it recog¬
nize evil as a positive, metaphysical force that expresses itself
through creation, rather than as a void into which dunces stumble.
The fallen and malign Demiurge, accordingly, becomes the arch-opponent
of the satirist: 'After a good deal of bloodshed and strong coercion,
the Christian community was at last made to understand that evil and
its personification, the Devil, are not positive forces existing in
their own right, but are rather negatives properly defined only as the
absence of good. Satire has most often been regarded from the same
orthodox perspective and treated as a negative literary genre which
shows not the action of some essential force - as comedy, tragedy and
epic do - but rather the bumbling confusion which occurs in the
absence of good sense and with the loss of traditional values. The
better authors of satire, however, have been literary Manichees who
have shown an ancient and powerful force operating constantly and
expressing its own nature through all lands and times.1 (156)
If Pierpoint, in terms of the present reading of The Apes of God,
symbolizes the divine, Horace Zagreus at once represents the Gnostic
teacher on earth and constitutes a figure of mythic and syncretic
complexity. Part XI, "Mr. Zagreus and the Split-Man", is the
re 1igio-mythic core of the novel. A colossal iconolatry, a vast,
allusive confluence of ancient cults, fragments of doctrine and
secret lore is presented, a strange and eclectic pantheon invoked.
In these pages, Zagreus, clad in a symbolic costume of out¬
landish and sacerdotal ornamentation, instructs Julius Ratner (the
'Split-Man') in the mysteries of the Hermetica, Neo-P1 a tonism,
Orphism, ancient Egypt, the Talmud, the Old Testament, Taoism,
Zoroastrianism, the rites of Dionysus and the phallic ceremonies.
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The hermeneutic effort required of the reader in this chapter -
circumvented by an early critic of The Apes of God, when he wrote that
'("Mr. Zagreus and the Split-Man") is...nothing more than an extrava¬
ganza, of, however, extraordinary power.1 (157) " constitutes in
itself a kind of search for gnosis. Reading is replaced by exegesis
of the cryptic, and understanding comes in speculative fragments - as
one inspects, for example, the composition of Zagreus' get-up:
Round the neck hung an Anguinum - egg composed of saliva
from the jaws, and froth from the bodies of snakes....
Below this came a gilt necklace of twenty hearts.
Below this hung the disk of a monstrance, only in place
of the cross was a thermuthis.
The mantle of Graziano - corrugated like a peplum - fell
from the shoulders and swept the ground.
A black fustian jerkin, with large silk buttons like
plovers' eggs. (158)
Two deities are very obliquely revealed here, making of Zagreus, in
his regalia, an Ape of gods, as it were: the 'monstrance' is the dish
used in Roman Catholic ceremony to contain the host, for the adora¬
tion of the transubstantiated body of Christ - but this becomes
cryptic again, with the replacement of the 'cross' by a 'thermuthis1
(which is not to be found in the Oxford English Dictionary); then,
a specially embroidered pep 1os (a woman's cloak) was offered in tribute
to Athena in the ceremony of Panathenaea, in ancient Athens. A more
fruitful line of interpretation, I would suggest, proceeds from en¬
quiring why Zagreus' disguise is surmounted by 'a pergamene mask of
coarse malignity'? (159)
'Pergamene' etymo1ogica11y is associated with the Latin perga-
mena ('parchment'); there was also, however, a Pergamene school of
Neo-P1atonism. Caird explains that the pessimistic influence exer¬
cised by Neo-P1atonism on the early Church was intensified by the
teachings of the Gnostics, and that Plotinus, foremost among the Neo-
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Platonists, concurred, in spite of himself, with the Gnostic dualism
of soul and body, and the conception of the body as the means of evil's
introduction into the soul. (160)
Accordingly, Lewis' use of the word 'pergamene' might be seen as
bearing upon - as a sort of historical counterpoint - the recurrent
satire in The Apes of God on Ratner's bodily condition, of which he is
more painfully the victim than any other character (as demonstrated in
section (vi), and worse still is p.160, where '(Ratner) doctored the
crater left by a blackhead and inspected a yellow fang, to rescue it
from tartar, that encrustation of saliva.'); for Plotinus, like the
Gnostics, considered that the only escape from evil was by the release
of the soul from the body - something which Zagreus has also considered
for Ratner: '"I should have liked, Julius, to have fitted you out as
a homunculus, a disembodied mind. Or as the Holy Ghost..."' (161)
Beyond this, the phrase in question intimates, possibly, a cause
of the fascination to which Ratner grudgingly yields in the strange
presence of Zagreus ('"What a re you doing?" sneered Ratner sheepishly.'
... 'His countenance was lighted with the sultry covetousness of the
dung-fly.'... '"I think it very interesting, like everything about you
Zagreus!"' (162)). The Pergamene School was remarkable for the
revival of mythology, philosophy and superstition in its teaching
(and Zagreus, in this chapter, undertakes a similar revival of obscure
arts). Its most celebrated convert from Christianity (which earned
him the name 'the Apostate') was the Emperor Julian, around 360 A.D.
(163) Ratner's forename is cognate with that of the Emperor, and he
is ripe for a conversion from his faith, from which he has inherited
a 'bitter Conscience' that makes him 'uneasy' about his sham literary
endeavours. (164) That we are intended to appreciate the trace of a
mock-heroic reincarnation in Ratner might further be inferred from the
fact that Zagreus informs Ratner of the Roman and imperial associations
of his name: '"Of course Ratner is not your name at all I suppose -
any more than Julius which you have stolen from Caesar!1" (165) More
than the dictator may be implied here, since after him, emperors for
some time took the name 'Caesar1, and it was given to Julian at the
time of his military command in Britain and Gaul. The significance
of Zagreus' ordering Ratner to '"Go to Bath..!"' (166) is unclear,
unless it has to do with the status of that town as a resort for
prosperous Romans and a provincial centre of paganism where a healing-
cult flourished (Julian's apostasy having consisted in an attachment
to paganism, as well as in his later conversion).
Zagreus' abstruse pedagoguism, together with his accretively
emblematic costume - '"salute this strange shell I have grown!"'
(167) - in which various times and cultures coalesce, makes of him
an archetypal figure. An exhaustive rhetoric is assigned him which
professes omniscience; and in him is comprehended instantaneously
and allusively something of the spiritual life of the Egyptian, the
pagan, the Jew, the Christian, the Hindu, the Arab, the Ethiopian,
the Mexican, and the Buddhist. (168) Thecalling up of this wise man,
universalized through affinity (intellectual or symbolic/ornamental)
with a totality of cultures, brings to mind the statement which occurs
at the end of The Wasteland: 'These fragments I have shored against
my ruins'. It is a response to a cultural exigence, to the spectacle
of society on the ebb, or of 'a moronic inferno of insipidity and
decay', as Lewis was later to describe the world of The Apes of God.
(169) In this archetypal role, Zagreus constitutes a 'primordial
image' of redemption, of the kind here characterized by Jung: 'The
archetypal image of the wise man, the saviour or redeemer, lies buried
and dormant in man's unconscious since the dawn of culture; it is
awakened whenever the times are out of joint and a human society is
committed to a serious error. When people go astray they feel the
need of a guide or teacher or even of the physician. These primordial
images are numerous, but do not appear in the dreams of individuals or
in works of art until they are called into being by the waywardness
of the general outlook. When conscious life is characterized by one-
sidedness and by a false attitude, then they are activated - one might
say, 'instinctively' - and come to light in the dreams of individuals
and the visions of artists and seers, thus restoring the psychic
equilibrium of the epoch.' (170)
One thing Zagreus teaches Ratner is the mysterious power of
nomination:
"Why was I named Zagreus?". . .
"I didn't think you were. I thought you were called
Mr. Zagreus stopped him with a menacing hand. . . .
"Never change the barbarous names given by god to each and
a 11 - you read in the spurious AVESTA compiled in Alexandria:
Because there are names possessing an unutterable efficacityl'
"But in any case the Hebrew god would keep his real name up
his sleeve - he would be afraid to leave that lying about
where anyone could get hold of it! I prefer some of his Shoan
names to the tetragram: I 1 iIfarsangana-e1 for example: Telk-el
Walib-el Bel Mel. Or his secret ones - Coltekolcol (like a
mexican god). Gohatjir is a good one. Hajirji : Gorgovajir:
Corook i ng
"What is the real name then of Pierpoint?" Ratner asked.
"Ah!" Mr Zagreus exclaimed. "That! - Pierpoint! No."
"Pierpoint? Is it?"
"Ah."
"Why, is it a secret?" Julius limply coaxed..."You are so
mysterious Horace!"
Dr Mysterion wetted his naphtha-eyes and flashed up two
liquid sparks to our firmament. (171)
The 'efficacity of names' is explained by Wilson in The Gnostic Pro¬
blem: 'Return (of the soul) to its true abode in the higher regions
was secured ... by p magic knowledge of the names of the ruling powers
and of the passwords which were the keys to unlock the gates which
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barred the way... true being belongs to God alone, and to those whom He
deigns to endow with the knowledge which alone can save. Only to some
it is given to realize their true state, and to appropriate the saving
(gnosis), upon which great stress is laid. In some cases, it is no
more than a crude magical knowledge of spells and passwords, for to
know the name of a god gives power over the owner of the name....
Thus it was customary to invoke a god by every possible title, and even
to guard against any omission by use of some such formula as "or what¬
ever thou dost choose to be called".1 (172)
Zagreus1 incantatory recitation of names culminates in gnosis -
the image seems quite explicit: '(he) flashed up two liquid sparks
to our firmament1 (the divine spark of the spirit-self of Gnostic
doctrine, that is). And the long list of obscure (or invented?)
Ethiopian ('Shoan'), Mexican and Vedic-sounding deities certainly
show him 'guarding against any omission'. Purposely, however, the
name of Pierpoint (the True God) is kept from Ratner, and consequently
divine enlightenment denied him. Satirically, this might imply that
Ratner is (still) too much contaminated by his material condition to
be redeemed. But Lewis' interest in the Gnostic Marcion (whose Church,
as was explained in section (iv), rejected the God of the Old Testa¬
ment on account of His wickedness) also comes to mind, for Zagreus
tells Ratner that Ratner's God tricks His people, and, presumably,
refuses them salvation, by 'keeping his real name up his sleeve'.
It will also be noted that Zagreus has forbidden Ratner to utter
his own name - '"I thought you were called Now Zagreus, dis¬
cussing the Lenten Party with Ratner, has already told him of an
identification of himself with a self-proclaimed Gnostic deity,
That fool Kit Hanna has told them that, like Simon Magus,
I can walk through walls, and that Helen of Troy is my
mi stress. (173)
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and it will be necessary here to amplify and supplement some of the
remarks made on Simon Magus previously.
Simon Magus, a native of Samaria in the second century A.D., is
held by many sources (as stated in section (iv)) to have been the
first Gnostic teacher. Justinus, in the Prima Apologia, reports that
Simon has set himself up as the True God: 'And almost all Samarians,
with some amongst other peoples, recognize that (Simon) as Supreme
God and worship him.' (17^) The Apostle Luke describes Simon's
occultism and wizardry: 'But there was a certain man, called Simon,
which beforetime in the same city used sorcery and bewitched the
people of Samaria, giving out that himself was some great one: To
whom they all gave heed, from the least to the greatest, saying, This
man is the great power of God. And to him they had regard, because that
of long time he had bewitched them with sorceries.' (175) To
Irenaeus, Simon was a fantastic and blasphemous se1f-aggrandizer:
'He stated that he was the Supreme Power, however, i.e. the Father who
stood over all and who allowed men to call him by whatever Name they
pleased.' (176) Traces of such a polyonymous self-apotheosizing, we
see in Zagreus, for example: '"You can address me as Mfumo, Bassar,
Tabib, Bomor, Mganga."' (177)
Luke also charges Simon with circulating the rumour that the
Apostles had performed miracles and healed the sick through magic,
rather than by communion with God or the Paraclete, and with trying to
bribe the Apostles to share their power: 'This Simon now professed to
be a believer, meaning thereby that even the Apostles had healed the
sick by magic and not by the power of God; and that by laying on of
hands and faith in God, they had f i 1 led ((persons ) wi th the Holy Ghost
through Jesus Christ, whom they had foretold. Even then he suspected
that it (only) happened as a consequence of a knowledge of magic
superior(to his own), and offered the Apostles money in order to obtain
for himself the power to communicate the Holy Spirit to anyone he
wished. Then he heard the words of Peter: "Thy money perish with
thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased
with money."1 (178)
The charge that Zagreus, like Simon Magus, is a charlatan who
exchanges money for Pierpoint's wisdom, to feel within himself the
power of Pierpoint, is made with fervour by Blackshirt:
It «>Self
"...Horace Zagreus/\is the worst Ape of the lot! Does he not
take all his ideas from Pierpoint? Is he not essentially
a rich dilettante? Is it not owing to his money - not that
he always pays! It is absurd!" (179)
Hugh Kenner calls Zagreus 'completely sterile1 and a 'fraud' and
Robert Chapman considers him 'just another ape' and a 'mere imitator'
(180) - on account of Blackshirt's accusation, and on the strength of
the fact that Zagreus' 'broadcasts' and other discourses replicate
exactly Pierpoint's words, as when Zagreus informs Ratner, after his
bravura performance in Part XI:
"It was Pierpoint...who said" he paused and struck up his
moustache, "all that I have said to you!"'
"Figuratively Horace?"
"No (181)
But it seems to me superficial to condemn Zagreus thus, and to insist
on seeing satire where it is not necessarily intended. For a start,
Blackshirt is not on good terms with Zagreus (182) , is inclined to
denigrate him (183) since he resents his authority, and, moreover,
issues 'broadcasts' himself (which makes his attack on Zagreus some¬
what hypocritical) (l84). Then, Zagreus is too complex a figure
either to be approved of wholly, or to be bracketed dismissively with
the other Apes. Throughout the novel, his presentation hovers ambi¬
guously between the admirable and the ridiculous. Certainly, more
116.
imagination is expended on it than would be merited in the portrayal
of a mere mimic with no ideas of his own. But beyond all this, why
is he a 'fraud' or 'mere imitator'? He does not attempt to pass off
the knowledge of another as his own - which would be typical apish
behaviour - but rather, on every occasion, insists (often with
exaltation) that his brilliant monologues, or rhetorical methods, are
the medium of Pierpoint's wisdom. There is some humility involved in
this, since Isobel Kein reminds Zagreus of an occasion when he had
argued successfully against Pierpoint, and Zagreus replies: '"I only
did that to give him the obstacle he required to display his mind".'
(185) Thus, Zagreus is capable of intellectual independence, but is
content, on the one hand, to play Plato to Pierpoint's Socrates (186),
and on the other, to view himself as an oracle: '"Well, I am but the
instrument!"' (he tells Isobel (187)). The impression he gives of
speech divinely inspired (by the God Pierpoint) is intended to call to
mind, I would speculate, the linguistic afflatus of the Apostles (which
Simon Magus coveted): 'And they were all filled with the Holy Ghost,
and began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit gave them uttei—
ance.' (Acts, Chapter II, Verse 4)
Simon Magus' reputation as a magician who brought 'amazement to
many' (188) is shared by Zagreus, who is known as an accomplished
conjuror and performer of elaborate party-tricks:
"He is a magician now," said 0. (i.e. Lord Osmund Finnian
Shaw) with rounded eyes, to welcome magic. "They say he
can walk through walls. He learnt to do so in the Orient
where he has spent many years - he is an adept of afghan
mag i c ."
"Is he going to put us under some spell this evening?" S.
made haste to ask.
"No, he will not this evening," 0. disappointed S. "He says
it is not worth while. He has promised however to cut one
of his assistants in half: also he will make a flagstone
float upon the surface of the bath-water..." (189)
There follows a discussion of how Zagreus lately caused 'Lady Shuter'
to vanish into thin air, leaving 1"nothing...but a rather dirty stain
on the floor1", and, having spirited her away, found it difficult to
bring her back.
It is tempting for the reader to gloss all this in a rather know¬
ing manner, by identifying it as another element of the fantastic,
nursery play-world of the Finnian Shaws, as a joke at the expense of
their gullibility, and as more evidence of Zagreus1 char1 a tanism.
Yet to do so is again to insist on seeing everything connected with
Zagreus from an exclusively satiric perspective. It should be borne
in mind that Lewis stated that although this novel was his only 'pure
Satire', there were 'other things there too'. (190) And it might
reasonably be conceded that the facility in illusion (if not the
supernatural potency) required to make someone disappear through the
floor and come back through the ceiling ('"regarded by several people
...as the best trick they had ever seen"' (191)) is, in Lewis' own
terms, proto-aesthet i c, an expression of the older form of the
creative principle: 'For me art is the civilized substitute for
magic.... That the artist uses and manipulates a supernatural power
seems very likely.' (192)
Lewis' treatment of Zagreus, however, swings to the farcical
pole in the scene in which he performs his trick, and provides what
might be interpreted as a variation on one of the stories of Simon's
end.
Lacarriere relates that Simon, having set magic over faith (and
having fascinated potential converts of the Apostles), was challenged
bythe Apostles to a miracle-contest. One version of his death has it
that having been called on to fly, Simon, airborne, was brought to the
ground and smashed to pieces by a prayer uttered by Peter. In an¬
other account, Simon, having claimed that he could repeat Christ's
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Resurrection, was shut up in a coffin by the Apostles and buried under¬
ground for three days, whence he was never to emerge. (193) Zagreus,
essaying a piece of magic cruder than those of which he is reputedly
capable, shuts Dan in a box with a partition, which makes it seem that
that latter has vanished. When Dan's nose begins to bleed, leaking
copiously through the side of the box, the astonishment of the
audience turns to 'horrid laughs with a great deal of stamping and rude
ca11ing. ' (1 9*0
Zagreus' reference to Kit Hanna's statement ('"...like Simon
Magus, I can walk through wa11s...and...He 1 en of Troy is my mistress'")
involves, in a complex literary a 11 us ion, Zagreus' homosexual consort
Dan.
Now, in the previous discussion of Simon Magus and his partner
Helena, it was noted that Simon claimed to have brought forth Helena
from himself. That is to say, Helena embodied a thought of Simon's,
the first conception of his mind - she was an emanation of the
Supreme Being (whomSmon professed to be) - and incarnated, according
to him, the cosmic feminine principle. As such, she gave birth to
the angels and archangels, then to the world-creating angels, who,
through envy, incarcerated her in flesh, in order to prevent her from
returning to Simon. In the words of Irenaeus: 'He himself (Simon)
was completely unknown to them, yet his Ennoia (Thought) was held in
bondage by the powers and angels emitted by her; and they subjected
her to every form of humiliation to prevent her from hastening back
to her Father. So far did this go that she was confined in a human
body, and for centuries, as if from one vessel to another, trans¬
migrated into other female bodies. She (Ennoia) was also in that
Helena for the sake of whom the Trojan War began.' (195)
Zagreus, too, has 'created' or 'brought forth' Dan Boleyn, as it
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were - not only because he has introduced Dan into Ape society, but
also because Dan is his 'genius' (this being a term applied fairly
indiscriminately to young men to whom Zagreus has taken a fancy (196)):
'genius' etymo1ogica11y is derived from the Lagin gigno, genu i ,
geniturn ('to bear, beget, or bring forth'). Then, at the Lenten Party,
Dan is kept away from Horace by Mrs Bosun and Willie Service (wicked
angels, as it were) who invest him in the costume of a woman. (197)
In this ravishing incarnation - 'A lovely tall young lady it was,'
with 'a neck of ivory, nipples of coral, a jewelled ankle of heart¬
breaking beauty-1ine...' (198) - Dan is accosted by an orotund and
lascivious popinjay, who believes him to be a girl, and will not let
him escape. Towards the end of his ordeal, Dan again yearns for his
absent partner, would 'hasten back' to him, as Helena to Simon: 'His
heart was weighted with a heaviness against which no effort of his
could prevail and which could only be expressed - if at all - by
d >5 L~a 1 ("
the one ponderous word never farAfrom his loyal lips - namely HORACE.'
(199)
The validity of proposing these parallels would seem to be confirm¬
ed by the fact that Dan's first entrance in his female incarnation is
accompanied by an authorial comment on the Bluestockings and
feminists, who deny woman her traditional role as adorner and beauti-
fier of self:
What has not been the lot of girls since the first sombre
circles of Bluestockings assembled . . . that was embodied
once more in Dan - as if to say "You must come to poor
defeated Man if you desire to find what was once the
Eternal Feminine - ... - by Man invented, by Man never
betrayed!" (200)
First, Simon's Helena was the eternal female principle, 'invented'
by him as Dan, Horace's 'genius', is 'begotten' by his adored master.
Then, the reader is intended to note, I think, the allusion to the
last lines of Goethe's Faust: 'Das Ewig-Wiebliche zieht uns hinan
(variously translated as: 'The Eternal Womanly/Feminine draws us up¬
ward'/ 'The Eternal, incarnate/ In woman, leads on' (201)). Dan's
duress, his incarnation as a woman, into which is introduced a
Faustian theme, furnishes an echo of Helena's. And one of the 'ves¬
sels' into which Helena transmigrated was Helen of Troy, whom Faust
conjures up to be his mistress in the drama.
Reciprocally, this makes of Zagreus a Simonian-Faustian complex,
adding li terary, historical and religious dimension to his characteri¬
zation. Later, it is revealed that Zagreus (like Faust) is 'always
reading... 11 books of demonology' (202); and, interestingly, Nugent
identifies Faust as a type of mediaeval Gnostic: 'Faust is a figure
of Gnosticism and can suggest its affinities with the demonic.' (203)
The symbolic potentiality of Zagreus, Lewis intimated, when he
called him 'a central myth'.(204) His patronym is taken from a god,
and explication of the mythic element in his composition not only
suggests further germane Gnostic themes, but also assists in inter¬
pretation of two of the mos t mys ter i ous passages in the novel.
In the creation myth of Zagreus (also called Dionysus Zagreus),
he was the son of Zeus and Persephone, and given the rule of the
world. At the instigation of Hera, the Titans murdered and ate the
boy, leaving only his heart. From this, Zeus remade Zagreus, and
implanted him in Semele. Hera, jealous once more, persuaded Semele
to pray to Zeus to visit her in the panoply and brilliance of a god.
When he did so, she was destroyed by his lightning. The unborn child,
however, Zeus rescued from the ashes, and placed in his thigh, whence
he was later born as Dionysus. This myth of genesis in the midst of
light, Lacarriere parallels with the anthropogenetic myth associated
with the Gnostic Valentinus. According to this, Sophia, one of the
lowest Aeons, desired to behold the Pleroma and the Supreme Being. On
entering the Realm of Light, she was dazzled and fell to earth, but
not before she had been made 'pregnant by the Plenitude, the numinous
The issue of her foolish desire and passion was a 'formless substance
an 'inhuman monster,' from which 'man was born, after certain modifi-
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cat ions,Aadditions and retouchings had been carried out with the help
of the Aeons of the Pleroma.' (205)
In bright sunlight, a peculiar psychological transformation is
undergone by Zagreus. Memory begins to work in a disturbing way.
There is an impression of an unusual pitch of understanding's being
within his grasp. This feels to him like madness, or perhaps fugue,
since he has once literally been too much in the sun, and suffered
sunstroke. (206) Here, he and Dan are waiting outside the residence
of the Keins (aficionados of Proust), and Zagreus imagines his and
Dan's shadows, cast on the door, stretched out in succession on the
other side:
Were they inside the door as well, in further projections
of still less substance - their stationary presences multi¬
plied till they stretched out like a theatre gueue?... He
saw the horse, black and primitive "like a pompeian fresco,"
that drew the mortuary chariot from which Proust peeped.
That processionary fresco extended from Pompeii to Kein's
door.... And so back to the modern environment, to the
theatre queue. The sun struck him with its hot shaft upon
the back of the neck. He shifted his hat. "My place in
the sun," he muttered, not expecting an echo - always the
sun made him madder as he knew. (207)
Zagreus' mysterious comment about belonging (?) in the sun is a soli¬
tary incidence of direct speech in a passage which renders conscious¬
ness by a peculiar resort to indirect free discourse, or the
'internal method'. It is peculiar because discussing The Apes of God
in Satire and Fiction and Men Without Art, Lewis makes trenchant
remarks about the vogue for stream-of-consciousness and interior mono
logue, which he regards as a symptom of literary decadence: such
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techniques for conveying the thoughts of a character should be strictly
confined, he states, to the portrayal of infants, idiots, animals (?)
and the senile.(208) Since Zagreus is none of these things, it might
be speculated that his creation was fed by sources in Lewis' imagina¬
tion deeper than the level of the self-imposed technical dogma
which, elsewhere, is consistently observed (except in Fredigonde -
senile, as Lewis points out - and in Dan's vision, another anomaly,
though he is, anyhow, presented throughout as a 'half-wit' (209)).
Following this passage comes Zagreus' observation about the Keins'
place being furnished with 'all required by the human worm for its
needs' (which echoes the doctrine of the Gnostic Saturninus, as was
pointed out in section (iv)). Then, during lunch, the motifs of the
'theatre-queue', the 'shadows' and the sun's beating down recur, Lewis
again going over to the 'internal method':
The sun was upon his neck - the same sun, or another, that
had struck him, the young bematist, swinging a plumb-bob,
in the plantations where the De Castro factory now stood....
The theatre-queue had come to life, now: here, all about him,
in solid ranks, it chattered and ate. He had imagined a
queue. But here it must be - less and less resembling the
original - shadows upon the walls of Pompeii, of Paris, the
hot andean plains - a horrible family of shadows. An ape-
herd, all projections of himself, or he of them, or another -
gathered from everywhere, swarming in after him, or collected
to await him...Or the queue had started acting - for want of
an author, as he had just said - after a fashion. When
their eyes met his it was always himse1f, in some form, at
some time. The intensity of this truth, like a piercing
light, often compelled him to turn his head away from people,
as he might from the image in a mirror. (210)
What is to be observed here in Zagreus is that the memory of an in¬
cident in the sun, the going back of consciousness into another time
and another bright region, the more recent recollection of the sun
on his neck outside the Keins', all these things induce another
illumination, an 'intense' and 'piercing light' of truth, or qnosis.
Given Zagreus' name, and his function as a 'central myth', there is
the suggestion of a memory of origins, of the dazzling of Semele by
Jupiter, or of Sophia by the Realm of Light, at the genesis of the
first man.
This might call to mind the proposed essence of the psychologica
model of Gnosticism (discussed in section (iii)), which consisted in
'the mythical projection of the experience of the self1. At the same
time, Zagreus' intuition that the Keins1 guests are all 'projections
of himself', that 'when their eyes met his, it was always himself, in
some form, at some time', that, in fine, his relation to them is, in
some degree, ancestra1 , may suggest that at some level these complex
passages are informed by the Orphic creation myth, or the Gnostic
myth of the 'Primordial Man-Redeemer', or both.
In the Orphic mystery religion, man was considered to have a
part-divine, part-evil nature, since he had been formed of the ashes
of the Titans, who had devoured the divine infant Zagreus - whose
essence inhered in the ashes. It might be mentioned here that one of
Zagreus' accoutrements in "Mr. Zagreus and the Split-Man" is a
'gas-filled follicle at the end of a string', painted with a serpent
as an 'emblem of the Orphic egg' - this being an element of Orphic
cosmogony.
The 'Gnostic Redeemer Myth' is formulated thus by Haardt:
'"From the Realm of Light a divine figure is sent down to earth,
which is ruled by demoniac powers, in order to free the Light-Sparks
which originated in the World of Light, and owing to a Fall in the
Primeval Age have been exiled in human bodies. This envoy assumes
human form, and does the work entrusted to him on earth by his father
so that he is not 'cut off' from his father. He reveals himself in
his sayings ("I am the Good Shepherd", etc.) thus completing the
separation of those who can see from those who are blind, to whom he
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appears as a stranger. His own listen to him, and in them he awakens
the memory of their Home of Light: helps them to recognise themselves,
and teaches them the way back home, whither he himself, a Redeemed
Redeemer, once more ascends."' (211)
Regarded in terms of this myth, Zagreus comes from a remote 'place
in the sun', and more recently from the dazzling sun outside the Keins',
to do 'the work entrusted by his father', represented by Pierpoint.
This work is the 'broadcasting' of Pierpoint's analyses of art and
society, and the gathering together of those who Zagreus believes 'can
see' (Margolin, Ratner, but above all Dan, who is 'fey' (212)). These
'listen' to Zagreus, accompany him regularly, and to them he 'reveals
himself' by his 'sayings' (as, for example, in the chapter "Mr.Zagreus
and the Split-Man"). Those who are 'blind', the 'horrible family of
shadows', the 'ape-herd', Zagreus indicates to Dan throughout luncheon
at the Keins', and, eventually thrown out of the house for daring to
do so, exits, or returns once more, with Dan, to the light: 'Zagreus
looked straight into the sun, for now it was bright'. (213)
Finally, what has been said about Zagreus' visit to the Keins'
residence might usefully be supplemented by the introduction of
Plato's simile of "The Cave".
The image of a cave is propounded, in which a number of prisoners
sit in chains, and are unable to look in any direction but ahead.
Behind them are fires, and an elevated shelf, on which objects are
placed and moved about from time to time. The prisoners behold the
shadows of these objects cast on the wall in front of them, and
believe them to be the 'real things'. When a prisoner escapes from
the cave to the world above, he is at first dazzled by the light of
the sun, then begins to perceive reality, the concrete form of things.
Having forced himself to return to the cave for the enlightenment of
his fellows, he is blinded by the darkness, sees things even less
clearly than they are as a consequence, and is unable to convince the
prisoners of their delusion, seeming to them to be a fool.(2l4) The
purpose of the simile is to illustrate the ascent from delusion (the
general condition of mankind) to philosophical understanding (in which
goodness inheres), the obligation to communicate this understanding,
and the difficulty of doing so.
With certain modifications of sense, the Keins1 house - into
which Zagreus steps from the bright light of the upper world, whither
he later returns - might be seen as figuring Plato's cave. Therein,
he is confounded, as is the philosopher in the simile, and unsure of
what he sees, as he feels again the 'sun upon his neck': the people
amongst whom he sits and delivers wisdom over lunch move out of focus,
becoming 'shadows upon walls', 'less and less resembling' some distant
or original reality. In their delusion, however, they give the im¬
pression of a complacent reality, 'chattering and eating' in 'solid
ranks', fulfilling a common desire by acting as if characters in each
other's novels. Then, in a flash of truth, Zagreus sees that, having
returned to the cave, he has become indistinguishable from them
'When their eyes met his it was always himse1f' - and, hence, cannot
enlighten them; or worse, he is taken for a foo1,gossiped about as
someone who has had too much of the sun: '"He has had sunstroke - he
was in Panama or some country in the tropics as a young man. Some¬
times he is very peculiar indeed."' (215)
This interpretation, compassing as it does Plato's light of
philosophical goodness, Zagreus' association with the world of sun¬
light and his apprehension of truth like a 'piercing light' calls to
mind the essay "Physics of the Not-Self", where, it will be remembered,
Lewis adduced for comparison the Socratic identification of goodness
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with wisdom and Hani's quantifying of goodness in terms of the light
contained in a person.
On the manifold figure of Horace Zagreus, this attempt at a
Gnostic analysis of The Apes of God has centred. In his complex per¬
formance, two roles remain to be identified - those of guide and
judge. These are alluded to in the following passage, where Zagreus
is explaining his costume to Ratner:
"I have two wings of an air-pilot's jacket in my pocket,
wired and united in a socket which fits on the end of this.
So I get roughly my caduceus, if necessary - if Hermes
Trismegistus is in the wind,and you have enough fancy to
see the gilded olive wood in place of calamus."
Replacing the staff in the corner, Zagreus picked up from
the table a small beam and scales, its brass dishes suspended
from chains.
"Thoth. It is a small balance - but too large for the
hearts that we shall be called upon to weigh." (216)
The 'air-pilot's' wings allude to the wings traditionally por¬
trayed as surmounting Hermes' staff (his 'caduceus'), while 'calamus'
is a writing-reed, of the sort employed by the scribe in antiquity.
The Greeks identified Thoth with their god Hermes; the Neo-P1atonists
conferred upon Thoth the title 'Hermes Trismegistus' ('thrice-great
Hermes'), and regarded him as the author of the Hermetica, a collec¬
tion of mystical and sacred writings in Latin and Greek, which has
been used as evidence of an Hellenic species of Gnosticism, though
its content is principally of a Neo-Platonic nature.
Among the Gnostics, Hermes was an highly esteemed deity: '...
Hermes is one of the favourite gods in their pantheon...Sinee Hermes
was also the god who acted as... a"psychopomp" in ancient mythology
(that is to say, one who accompanies souls through the kingdom of
tkrec .
the dead, guiding them to the tribunal of theAinferna1 judges), he
became known as the one who keeps his eyes wide open, like a living
being, even in the realm of shadows, and who stays awake in the very
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heart of death.1 (217) In Egyptian mythology, Thoth, too, plays a
role in the underworld, where he weighs the hearts of the deceased at
their judgement, and informs Osiris and his fellow arbiters of the
results - as Lewis put it elsewhere, discussing the art of mummifica¬
tion: 'Thoth, in massive trutination, is weighing life against death.'
(218) Furthermore, Zagreus was associated in the Orphic cults with
the underworld, where the souls of men, regarded as bearing the guilt
for his death, were punished and required to make atonement as a con¬
dition of rebirth.
Such considerations help the reader to discover an eschatologica1
structure in The Apes of God. Intimated as this is by Lewis' refer¬
ence to the world of the Apes as a '(moronic) inferno' (my italics),
it is somewhat surprising that no critic of Lewis has registered its
presence (preferring, typically, to regard the novel's episodic form
in terms of the 'peregrinations of..a naif' (i.e. Dan), or of a
picaresque 'grand tour' (219)). Accordingly, what I want to suggest
here is that to an extent, The Apes of God might be interpreted as a
mock-heroic passage through hell, and that it shows certain symbolic
correspondences with accounts of such a journey in classical litera¬
ture. (I would mention in passing that this raises the possibility
of comparing Lewis' and Joyce's respective modifications of classical
themes (Lewis' admittedly more oblique), since in U1ysses, the epi¬
sode in which Bloom attends Dignam's funeral parallels Odysseus'
journey through Hades.) In the ensuing discussion, I shall use as a
model Aeneas' descent into the underworld, in Book VI of the Aeneid.
Zagreus (as the 'psychopomp' Hermes) functions as Dan's guide,
in a relationship corresponding to that of the Sibyl and Aeneas: and
like the enigmatic and oracular Sibyl, Zagreus explains to Dan as
they go the features of the underworld and the condition of the
ghos ts.
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The gloom of the great entrance hall of the Follets' mansion,
with its 'night cast by a cluster of statuary', described in the
first lines of the novel, corresponds to the cave near Lake Avernus
through which Aeneas and the Sibyl begin their descent into Hades, and
to the dark and empty halls of Dis through which they subsequently
pass. (220)
Having entered the Follets' residence, Zagreus and Dan are,
symbolically, across the threshold of the netherworld. A spectre
from Zagreus' past advances on them:
They turned into the wide thoroughfare...At that moment
(Zagreus1) eye fell upon an approaching figure....Taking
Danie-li arm, he turned them into the road...As they mounted
the opposite pavement he sighed.
"What - is the lapis mana1is off this morning? That's
the second ghost I've seen." (221)
The image of the lapis Mana1is is of critical importance with regard
to the present discussion. In Roman myth, it is the stone which
blocks the mouth or entrance of Orcus (the underworld), and which,
when moved,allows the exit of the infe rn i ('those below', that is,
the souls of the dead) to the world above. The particular ghost who
catches up with Zagreus and importunes him is a former homosexual
acquaintance, Francis: '"...aren't you going to ask to see me?"...
the old companion's claim to recognition for things dead and gone.1
(222) This might be read as echoing satirically (and with some modi¬
fication of respective roles) Aeneas' meeting with his old companion
Palinurus, on the banks of the Styx. The latter, helmsman of
Aeneas' ship, was lost at sea, and eventually slaughtered by barbarians.
He begs Aeneas to take him across the infernal river, but the Sibyl
prohibits such a favour, for his corpse has not received a proper
buria 1. (223)
The Latin umbra can mean both 'shadow' and the 'shade', or ghost,
of a dead person. Zagreus' vision at the Keins1 luncheon (previously
discussed), which revealed the Apes to be not real beings but
'shadows', is a second indication (after ' lapis manalis') that Dan is
being conducted through the realm of the dead, the inferni.
These are displayed to him in postures of ironically voluntary
stasis, trapped in time, frozen at a point in life, as occupants of
a limbo of vanity. As such, they present a degraded version of the
heartrending spectacle beheld by Aeneas on the banks of Cocytus
(tributary of Styx), where the ghosts of heroes, matrons, boys and
unwed girls wait interminably to be ferried across to judgement, or,
worse still, wait in vain, since, like Palinurus, they have not
received the rites of burial.(224) Thus, the guests at the Lenten
Party are of three sorts.
There are the relics of the fin de siecle, who in manner, con¬
versation, memory, want forever to be in that time. One of these is
the Sib, who 'belonged to a distant generation', and supplies Lord
Osmund 'with tit-bits of Gossip arranged with his favourite sauces,
the old yellow sauces of the Naughty N i neties . ' (225) Her companion
(the old Don) still professes, in his decreptitude, the decadence of
that decade: '"I think all people of character must be cruel", said
the old Don with ferocity, sad sadic embers smouldering up in his
owlish glances at her....(he) fiercely sighed - an empty old blood¬
thirsty homosexual sigh.' (226)
A larger group is composed of the men who, modelling themselves
on the Finnian Shaws, refuse to grow up, clinging to the style and
habits of youth or adolescence, and enthusing over toys and fairy
stories: they are a manifestation of the 'Child-Cult', against which
Lewis frequently inveighed.(227) Here, they are presented in a parody
of the epic-heroic catalogue of names:
Jasper Summerbell, Freddie Parsons, Nicholas Compton, Theodore
Goddard, Julian Casbolt, Clement Glenny, Frank Brunrrer,
Stephen Boyce, Martin McGregor, Raymond Charrington, Peter
Runacres, Raymond Freedlander, Cecil Dawson and Ronald Sha-
farek, although all pigmented differently and of various
height, age and build (some were wide and some narrow, and
the heads of some were small and of others large) yet they
all conformed to the osmundian canon but had the air in most
cases for preference of an impossibly early undergraduate
life - as if just turned out in spick and span, passionless,
lisping rows by Eton for Oxford Colleges and Inns. (228)
Finally, Dan observes a group of aged military and naval officers,
'tomato-pink veterans', who, parading before the other guests in full
dress, are turned upon in an access of anti-mi 1itarism, mocked and
bu11ied.(229) The satire here is twofold. The 'Old Colonels'
deserve to be vilified (because they are unthinking agents of war),
but not by the Finnian-Shaws and their baying guests. For the
privileges in life enjoyed by these aristocrats and their coterie
are the fruits of Britain's imperial position, which was created, and
is maintained, by precisely the sort of men whom they are now taunt¬
ing.(230) As defenders of the Empire, the 'Old Colonels' are
burlesque counterparts of the martial heroes displayed in pageant
to Aeneas, on whom the future glory of the Roman Empire rests.(231)
Vergil's abode of the blessed is also burlesqued in the Lewisian
eschatology. In the Elysian Fields, Aeneas watches the souls of the
virtuous disport themselves on grassy plains in dance or athletics.
(232) Dan Boleyn loiters miserably outside Hyde Park, envying the
courting couples who sprawl on the 'dirty field of grass', then
enters to step among their bodies that lie so still as to seem
'struck dead ' . (233)
Dan, however, is not only led through the inferno as a spectator;
he is also there to be judged. As Thoth, Zagreus weighs Dan in the
balance, as it were, and informs Pierpoint, here figuring as Osiris,
of the results. And, final.ly, Dan is found wanting. This judgement
is conveyed in Zagreus1 last letter to Dan, in which it transpires
that the latter is to be abandoned, because he is an intemperate and
violent drunk (the falsest of all judgements in a world in which sham
values have been consistently exalted): 111 - well Dan I think you
must agree that it is high time I separated myself from a person
who...in such a striking degree bet rays that notorious failing of your
race. With such intemperate habits even the greatest genius cannot go
far.'" (23^) Dan is consigned to the inferno, is to finish up in a
very 'hot place' indeed, as the artist Melanie Blackwell plots to
take him to the South of France, bent on seduction. (235)
The eschato 1ogica1 structure is completed, and the cycle of
passage through the underworld simultaneously recommenced, when
Zagreus passes once more through the threshold of the Follets' man¬
sion, this time with Archie Margolin. This building is situated in
a private street, at each end of which stands a gate. The image of
the pair of gates calls to mind the twin gates, of horn and ivory
respectively, portrayed at the end of the sixth book of The Aeneid,
the one allowing the exit of true dreams, or shades, the other of
apparitions, to the world above. (236)
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(ix)
I want in this last section of the present chapter to indicate
the extent of the Gnostic influence in Lewis' last novel in the tri¬
logy of afterlife, Ma 1ign Fiesta, with some further reference to The
Apes of God.
If The Apes of God offered a symbolic eschatology (a portrait of
a world of dead minds), Ma 1ign Fiesta presents an actual one - it is
"Not Ideas about the Thing but the Thing Itself". It is the final
account of the career of a dead man, James Pullman, for whom, 'torn
away from his earthly life, and finding himself in a nightmarish
existence ... the supernatural (has become) real...a death-life full
of traps.' (237)
As Pullman, Satterthwaite, the Bailiff and two colleagues arrive
in Matapolis, there is the suggestion of a Gnostic geography:
The five figures were exchanging hollow buffets, and it
was with the actions of a dance that they delivered them,
darting hither and thither in an unreal way.... Was this
a stick-up by Asiatic thugs, in an Alexandrian suburb, or
outside the modern Antioch? (238)
Lacarriere writes that, 'the Gnostic communities developed in the
only cities of that period (i.e. the first centuries A.D.) which were
cosmopolitan in character: Alexandria, Antioch and Rome.' (239)
Saturninus, whose system was mentioned in section (iv), was an auto¬
chthon of Antioch, as was Basil ides, who went between there and
Alexandria; and in Alexandria, Valentinus first taught, and thither
Simon Magus brought his system. (2 4 0) Of all cities, Alexandria was
the most fecund for the growth of Gnostic thought: here, all cults
and religions were represented, and philosophers and exegetists
convened:
At just about the time of Hadrian's visit to the city -
approximately 130 A.D. - we find several of the most
renowned Gnostics teaching in Alexandria: Basil ides, Carpo-
crates, Va1entinus.... Henceforth, Gnosticism is established...
in the City, Alexandria, where it finds a rich and fertile
soil. For here all systems meet... Egyptian, Greek and
Roman paganism, Copt i c Christianity, Judaism, Neo-Platonic
philosophies, Hermetism . . . Basil ides, Carpocrates and
Valentinus take whatever they findV^rom wherever they may find
i t. . . . Christianity, Judaism, Neo-Platonic philosophy,
Stoicism, Epicureanism, Cynicism and Hermetism have all
served Gnosticism. (241)
The visionary eclecticism of the Alexandrian Gnostics constitutes an
historical model which is evident, after a fashion, in the composi¬
tion of some of the Zagreus passages in The Apes of God. Similarly,
the demonology and theology of Ha 1ign Fiesta partake of the sort of
syncretism and adaptation described by Lacarriere. Beyond this,
however, the reference to Alexandria on the first page of the novel
is a satiric topos: recalling a city where thought was endlessly
refined in the interest of the spirit and intellect, it holds up for
an instant, before the descent into cacatopia, the image of a Golden
Age. For in Matapo1is,Lewis1 Satan vulgarizes current philosophy in
the service of a sinister vision.
Strangely, the first steps into Hell in Ma 1ign Fiesta take one
back to The Apes of God. The details of the gateway to the inferno -
this is the impression given - were, forLewis, of the nature of a
recurring dream. (Elsewhere, Lewis states that the 'true character
of artistic creation1 is oneiric. (242) He also titled a painting
"Inferno", in 1937- (243)) In both novels, moreover, a wise man and
a booby - Zagreus and Dan, Pullman and Satterthwaite - enter the
mouth of Hell, and the first personage encountered therein is an
extremely aged woman of lofty mien.
I n The Apes of God:
A CAT like a beadle goose-stepped with eerie convulsions
out of the night cast by a cluster of statuary, from the
recesses of the entrance hall. A ma id wi th match 1 ess
decorum left a door silently, she removed a massive copper
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candlestick. She reintegrated the gloom that the cat had
left.
The cat returned, with the state of a sacred dependent,
into the gloom. Discreet sounds continually rose from the
nether stair-head, a dark whisper of infernal presences....
A mighty canvas contained in its bronze shadows an
equestrian ghost...
In a room upstairs a dead domestic, sneezing behind his
hand because of the chill he had received as he entered
the vast apartment, placed heavy chiselled blocks of coal
within the well of a grate... (244)
Here is an unfamiliar, inspissated darkness, 'reintegrated' by
silently-stepping beings, cat and maid, along with suggestions of the
underworld, in the adjective 'nether', and the 'dark whisper of in¬
fernal presences'. A ghost on horseback threatens to disturb the
deathly stillness, and another servant, already, in a startling meta¬
phor, 'dead', is a spectre stoking the fires of Hell.
The motifs reappear in Ma 1ign Fiesta: a great house with a gloom-
filled hallway; a darkness that is preternatura11y thick, and absorbs
bodies; deathly-quiet domestics; and something making its way from a
recess. Pullman and Satterthwaite are conducted in bythe Bailiff:
He was almost in the dark, but he knew his way, and stepped
out briskly in this carpeted well, in this lofty black hall
of his ancestral dwelling. Two domestics moved in the dark¬
ness....A sound of a lift was heard. When it stopped an old
lady came out of it in a recess of the hall. An anonymity
reminiscent of the windowless front of the house marked the
falling black segments of her robe.
• • •
The servant...made his wayAinto the great opacity, re¬
traced his steps towardsthe front door, which he opened
slightly, and beckoned to the four figures...Seeming1y it
was the idea not to allow too big a slice of daylight to
dispel the gloom of this windowless tower which resembled
another medium than air...
Pullman appeared to be adapting himself to this unknown
medium, with great unsteadiness following the servant into
the black hall...He could...see nothing, but followed the
silently moving figure ahead of him. (245)
The accumulation of variants on thetheme of darkness establishes the
leitmotiv of a novel whose Stygian obscurity is only dispelled in
the closing pages; it also foreshadows the mythic origin of Lewis'
Satan, and underpins the complex genealogy of the old lady just
g1impsed.
Her prototype, however, is Lady Fredigonde Follet, of The Apes
of God. The latter is associated by metaphor with the grave,
Trapezoid in profile - an indoor model of the Maya Pyramid,
the building for which that structure is the blank pedestal
represented by her savage head - Lady Fredigonde Follet re¬
ceived the combing at first with immobility. (246)
as is the old lady of Ma 1ign Fiesta (Madame Heracopou1os, the
Ba i 1 i ff1s mother),
This progress, kept on its course owing to the forward
movement of a grey silhouette, terminated in Pullman's
stumbling into the room where the sepulchral lady and
her shadow, the ex-Bailiff, awaited him. (247)
and her abode is a 'mausoleum1. (248) Then, each having recently
completed her toilet, the two women are similarly framed:
The elements of the arrangement proposed were as follows.
Three distinct zones were involved. There was that of
the white arcs in perspective of the cap, there was the
green region of hair, and there was the pallid copper of
the skin. (249)
'Three distinct zones' are presented again in this portrait of the
Bai1iff's mother:
The metallic silver of the hair, as though of a false
white, the awful pallor of the face, the deadly black
of the tight mantilla... (250)
But the head of Fredigonde is done in an artist's polychrome: it
is a painter's description. In contrast, the bust of Madame Hera-
copoulos is cruder and more direct (one need not here, like Fredi¬
gonde, await the 'synthesis' (251)). It is a monochromatic struggle
of light and dark, with dark prevailing. The description continues:
...and the rest of her person suggestive not of a human
body concealed by layers of black cerements but of some
kind of form crouching there perhaps, a bejewelled claw
at times bursting out, she was an evil apparition. (252)
In the second inferno, formal considerations (the 'resistant and
finely sculptured surface, of sheer words' that Lewis had aimed at
in The Apes of God (253)) are replaced by an urgent moral vision
(such a transition of charge from expression to content, Jameson sees
as a general consequence, in the late novels, of Lewis' blindness
(25*0). This modification of style is marked by a going over from the
concrete to the abstract: the exact word has become less important
('sepulchral' will now do for 'Maya Pyramid'), as has solidly speci¬
fied evocation: in spite of their thematic resemblance, there is far
less to catch the eye in the hallway of the Bailiff's 'ancestral home'
than there is in that of the Follets'. A much smaller lexis is em¬
ployed: the reiterated motifs of darkness and blackness (as evidenced
in the passages cited above) are substituted for the superabundant
terminology that served the taxonomies of the 'external method' in
The Apes of God.
The declining interest i nthe compe11ing surfaces of life that is
indicated by this recourse to a more restrained, conceptual prose
might be accounted for by reference to the enlightenment which comes
to Pullman, towards the end of Monstre Gai. Here (in passages whose
importance Lewis brought to Kenner's notice (255)), Pullman begins
to understand that, in the presence of the supernatural, everything,
beneath the superficies, is revealed to be stark black or white, to
be comprehended by the categories of good and evil. Earthly life
merely sophisticates these distinctions with a veneer of urbanity:
"What is, in the first instance, responsible for these
extraordinary confusions, is the introduction of the
supernatural into the play, as performed in Third City.
What here are archangels or disguised demons, were on
Earth simply men and women like ourselves. It may be
that they were angelic or diabolic. But this was not
visible. So, when you were transported to the scene
of Third City, these inoffensive persons with whom you
137.
had been associated on Earth were suddently transformed into
supernatural beings, with a strong suspicion of diabolic
origin. Or, on the other hand, the most prominent figures
on your side in the earthly struggle were transformed into
archangelic personalities." (256)
The choice between good and evil with which these reflections confront
Pullman 'must sound (absurd) to a human ear':
It would not do so, however, were the Powers for ever in
conflict on the earth to be visibly supernatural. If any
side you took on Earth were certain to condemn you to
take some prearranged role in a highly ethical play in a
scene in Third City, then all our actions as living men
would be indulged in less lightly. (257)
T.S. Eliot called this a moment of 'high tragedy': 'here the super¬
natural reveals itself, and Good and Evil can no longer be disguised.'
(258) I would add to this the observation that, just as the
Gnostic's otherwor1d1iness existed in a reciprocal relation with his
sensitivity to good and evil - the one augmenting the other - so,
with Lewis, it requires the realization of the supernatural, the
projection of the imagination into other worlds, for the moral vision
to emerge. Thus, whereas moral ideas were deprecated in Men Without
Art as a 'source of interference' 259) > and it was maintained that
the artistic mind was so refined or complex as to be super-ethical,
it is now averred (by Pullman) that:
...there was no such thing, for a man, as "Beyond good and
evil". That was merely the self-advertising eccentricity
of an intellectual. (260)
So, in The Apes of God, an old woman's mutterings about the flavours
of Hell are conveyed with a sinister playfulness that is neither
admonitory nor affective, and, above all, has no referent - a
ludicrous unreality is propounded:
She sniffed without nostrils a disembodied odour that was
not there.
So far at least that abominable stench had kept away
that was something! It was a disadvantage there was no
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denying, that disgusting mouldering scent - a little bit too
near corruption! No sooner had the eyes ceased to function
than the nostrils announced it. Like a whiff of Pluto's
pantry, on an inner wind blown against the inside of the
senses, filling the brain, it was there, almost immediately. (261)
'Pluto's pantry' is a fine burlesque alliteration.
Contrastingly, in Ma 1ign Fiesta, predicative statements register
the immediate presence of evil - on the sensibility,
"She is not the kind of person that I would wish to see by
moonlight or by sun 1 i ght, aJ i ve or dead, anywhere in the
world or out of the world." (262)
or on the senses,
...his new environment - its colour, its smell, its absence
of sound...was of course not to his taste - he did not like
the windowless hall, lit by two small hooded lamps. The
eyes of the domestics were like those of animals existing
in the darkness; and there was that faint trace of an odour
which he recognized; its association was demonic...(263)
Nor is any distancing or mockery allowed by the narrative, even when
Pullman's fancy goes to work on the terrible being to whom he has
been introduced,
...the thought of this old being, moving with the speed of
light across the universe, elicited the picture of a
flashing witch, clutching a metaphysical broomstick in an
astral night (264)
or on her hall way,
What had been vaguely sinister was now plain sailing! This
was the towering ante-chamber to the domesticity of an
ogress. (265)
Like Fredigonde, she endures a sort of living death, but with a
malignant vigour: like the Sibyl of The Aeneid, she ages and shrivels,
but cannot die. And in a further resemblance to Vergil's prophetess,
she is Pullman's first source of information about the ways of the
inferno. With appalling merriment, she explains the regime of 'Dis1
(here, the Punishment Centre): by surgery, the tongues of the
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loquacious are cut in ribbons, the noses of the inquisitive sliced off,
and (something in which Madame Heracopoulos has herself assisted) the
cuticle of female sinners stripped away.(266) In a moment which makes
the heart sink, Pullman himself is jovially threatened:
"If you were a Sinner, and I were your guardian, I would
tickle your pretty feet, and draw out your banter....I
could shorten your tongue for an inch or two if it seemed to me
too long." She fell into a paroxysm of sadic mirth. (267)
The darkness which surrounds and emanates from this old woman -
who exists in a 'black immobility', and 'on either side of (whose)
nose were two deadly cold black eyes' (268) - is not only a symbol
of her wickedness, but also, I would suggest, its source. In his
conception of Madame Heracopoulos, I want to propose, Lewis' imagina¬
tion acted in parallel with, or intuitively reverted to, a specific
Gnostic creation myth (the discussion of Jung's essay and the
psychological model of Gnosticism in section (iii) has some bearing
upon the ensuing analysis).
She offers the following genealogy of herself, the Bailiff and
their kind:
"We are known as Nephalim," Madame Heracopoulos told (Pull¬
man). "That is a Hebrew word, of course. You perhaps have
heard how a great many angels grew tired of the sterility
of their life in Heaven, and, when they had established
themselves, in some sort, on the Earth, according to the
view of God Almighty (as you call him), most improperly
had carnal intercourse with women. Eventually a race of
giants came to pass. We poor little square-nosed persons
were the outcome. We have enough of the angelic and the
supernatural in our blood to cause us to differ from men.
We live much longer, to begin with." (269)
The prototypical version of this family history occurs in Genesis,
Chapter 6:
1 And it came to pass, when men began to multiply on the
face of the earth, and daughters were born unto them,
2 That the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they
were fair; and they took them wives of all which they chose.
3 And the Lord said, My Spirit shall not always strive
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with man, for that he also is flesh: yet his days shall be an
hundred and twenty years.
4 There were giants in the earth in those days; and also
after that, when the sons of God came in unto the daughters
of men, and they bare children to them, the same became
mighty men which were of old, men of renown.
5 And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the
earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his
heart was only evil continually.
6 And it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth,
and it grieved him at his heart.
Interpretation of these verses depends on the construction placed upon
the phrase 'sons of God1.
Milton (in Paradise Lost XI, 11. 556 - 637) takes the phrase to
mean the descendants of Adam (i.e. men), and presents what Alastair
Fowler calls a 1de-mytho1ogized 1 account of the story from Genes i s 6:
Adam's vision, before the expulsion from Eden, is of how men, dis¬
tracted by pride in their own arts and by the allure of women, become
forgetful of their duty to God, and are subsequently punished by the
Flood. (270)
The Genesis story was also treated of in the exegeses of Tertullian,
Clement of Alexandria, and Philo, the last of whom, according to Wilson,
too ingeniously employed it as the basis of his anthropogony, and as
an account of the ascent and descent of angels, in his De Gigant i bus.
(271)
Several Gnostic systems also utilized Genesis 6 as the basis of
creation myths, and, in common with the exegetists cited above, under¬
stood 'sons of God1 to mean angels or supernatural powers. The Ophites
and the Va1 ent i n i ans were among the sects to adapt this chapter from
the Old Testament (272): though their interpretations do not here con¬
cern us technically, what is of interest is the fact that both
Christian and Judaic exegetists and Gnostic teachers went to the
Genes i s story as a source of explanation, this testifying to its
mythopoeic power; and that, taken together, they demonstrate a consensus
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over the meaning of 'sons of God' which accords with Lewis' description
of angels' mating with mortal women. One Gnostic document, however,
seems to be particularly close thematically to the demonology that
Lewis devised for Madame Heracopoulos and her son, and, beyond this,
to the central subject of Ma 1iqn Fiesta.
This document is the Apocryphon Johannis (The Apocryphon of John),
referred to by early commentators on Gnosticism, but assumed to have
been lost. It was re-discovered among the documents of the Gnostic
library unearthed at Nag Hammadi in 1947, the full text becoming avail¬
able in 1955 (by curious coincidence, the year of publication of
Ma 1ign Fiesta) . (273)
The text (putatively an account of the system of the Barbelo-
gnostics) contains the vision of John, the son of Zebedee, and Wilson
writes of it that: 'One striking feature is the re i nterpretation of
the Genesis narrative which forms so large a part of the treatise.'
(274) In the system described therein, the true God does not reveal
himself, and dwells in 'pure light'. Its revision of Christian theo¬
logy is in essence Marcionite: '...the God of the Old Testament has
been degraded into the chief of the rulers of this world'. (275) He
is represented asthe Demiurge, or satanic figure, of this system,
laldabaoth, who 'set Adam in Paradise, to deceive him, ' its
superficial bliss inducing in him forgetfu1ness of the Realm of Light/
other world; and by means of the serpent in Eden 'implanted in man
sexual desire; procreation increases the number of men in the world,
and therefore the number of divine sparks in the power of laldabaoth,
and so serves his purpose.' (276) Thus, The Apocryphon of John inter¬
prets Genes i s 1 - 3.
Now, to the sixth chapter, alluded to in Madame Heracopoulos'
account of her origins: 'A question from John about the origin of the
142.
^ / —
>\,JT<-fj t[/-jr✓£ vp a- ( i n^n t; m; mon pneuma" (" I m i ta t i on-Pneuma") , a
demoniac force which is to rule over the divine Light-Spark in Man,
by the will of the Powers.' (277)) leads to a continuation of the re-
interpretation of Genesis. laldabaoth and his powers brought e C p < C* ^
(fate/destiny (278)) into being, and by times and seasons fettered the
gods of heaven, angels, demons, and men, but then he repented and re¬
solved to destroy his creation by a flood. The Epinoia of light warned
Noah, who told the other men, but they did not believe him. Noah and
a few elect companions covered themselves with a cloud of light, and
so were delivered from the darkness which laldabaoth poured out over
all things. The powers then sent their angels to the daughters of men,
but at first had no success and so resolved to create the a. *•/ a
•xTV&rc7|Va^wh i ch they implanted in the women. Their offspring were chil¬
dren of darkness, in whom the V was so strong as to
prevent them learning the truth.1 (The emphasis is mine.) (279)
Haardt gives the text itself, and I will here quote an extract
which contains a detail omitted in Wilson's paraphrase, but bearing
upon the present discussion: 'They (laldabaoth and his powers) sent
their angels to the daughters of men to generate descendants from their
bodies, for pleasure. At first they did not succeed in their purpose.
They all came to a decision, to create the Antimimom Pneuma in memory
of the Pneuma which had descended, and the angels changed their (out¬
ward) appearance into the shape of their (i.e. the women's) husbands.
And they impregnated them with the Pneuma which filled them with dark¬
ness....They led them into temptation...And they seized them and begot
children out of the darkness.' (280)
Thefollowing parallels now emerge between Lewis' reading of
Genesis 6 and that given in The Apocryphon of John. First, both take
it that it was ange1s that had sexual intercourse with women (regard-
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ing which the Bible is ambiguous, Milton opting for the prosaic
alternative). Then, absent from the Old Testament story, but present
in both of these interpretations, is the idea of the issuing of a
being of darkness (represented by, respectively, Madame Heracopoulos
or the 'children of darkness1) from the alliance of wicked angels and
women. Finally, while Genesis 6 is unclear with regard to the change
of stature in the angels which precedes their sexual union with women
(though Verse 4 does refer to 'giants'), both The Apocryphon of John
and Ma 1 ign Fiesta describe explicitly a transformation to human dimen¬
sions - Madame Heracopoulos' account continues:
"...the angels, who are titans of enormous size, can reduce
themselves quite easily, and must have done that to have
sexual intercourse with a woman. The 'giants', who were the
earliest offspring of these, would assume for good the
height and habits of an average man, and so they would
arrive at us." (281)
Two possibilities, by no means mutually exclusive, now suggest them-
se1ves.
On the one hand, Lewis may have been unconscious of these paral¬
lels, and have had no knowledge of The Apocryphon of John: the matter
of Genesis 6 provided him with the inspirational archetype for a
demono1ogica1 creation myth, as it inspired the author of John's vision
and, in the passages of Ma 1 iqn Fiesta in question, he was, like Jung's
visionary artist, directed by intuition.
The other possibility is that Lewis was cognizant of some form of
the vision of John (though not, of course, of the full text, since it
was published in the same year as Ma 1ign Fiesta) . That he could have
possessed such knowledge is not out of the question, since Wilson points
out that reconstruction or summaries of The Apocryphon of John were
published in the works of Schmidt and Sagnard in, respectively, 1907
and 1947. These summaries are based on Irenaeus' account of John's
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vision in the Adversus Haereses, which is extant. Lewis may have looked
up any of these sources, though most likely the last, since Wilson does
not indicate that Schmidt or Sagnard exist in translation (from the
French or German). (282)
I have been prompted to raise this second possibility by a detail
in Ma 1ign Fiesta which either indicates Lewis' knowledge of secondary
sources of The Apocryphon of John, or else is of a purely coincidental
nature. This is that, after his life is spared by Sammael, the Bailiff
I I
begins to be called 1Zoe1. Sammael, for example, says to Pullman: "'I
I I
...contacted your friend Zoe...you still think of him,of course,as the
Bailiff, don't you?"' (283)
Now, in The Apocryphon of John, the true God sends Adam a 'Thought'
('Epinoia') of light, who advises him of his true home, of how the
divine-spark is trapped within him, and of how he may re-ascend to
I I
the Realm of Light. This 'Epinoia' is named 'Zoe': 'laldabaoth and
his powers brought Adam down to the material world and fashioned for
him a body from the four elements; this is the grave of light that is
in him, and fetters him to the material. The supreme God, however,
in his mercy sent him a helper, the Epinoia of light, whom he called
I I
"Zoe"; this was hidden in Adam, that the archons might not become
aware of it.' (284)
If Lewis intended anything by the use of this name, it was,
possibly, a twisting or inversion of the vision of John. The Bailiff
is the helper of man in the midst of evil, insofar as he secures for
Pullman a safe and important position (though it is he who has brought
Pullman to Hell in the first place). Then, in the capacity of head of
the Secret Service (after his reprieve by Sammael), the Bailiff is
again of dubious assistance to man, insofar as he plays a central part
in Sammael's scheme to exalt humanity over the divine.
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Finally, an allusion in The Apes of God may have some bearing
I I
upon the question of Lewis' familiarity with the Gnostic myth of Zoe.
I I
Wilson notes that Till's commentary on The Apocryphon of John sees Zoe
as prefiguring, or corresponding to, Eve, and refers to the 'tradition
of the creation of a woman before Eve' in which 'Lilith' is the name
of another such forebear of Adam's mate. (285) Zagreus, explaining
to Ratner the amulet he is wearing around his neck, says:
"There are three names on it, you see: Senoi, Sansenoi,
Sammangelof. It is a charm against our bad mother, Lillith.
The three names are of the three protecting angels who flew
with her in conversation as she hovered with her illicit
wings above the Red Sea." (286)
Like Madame Heracopou1os, Sammael (Lewis' Satan) is associated
with darkness, but it is, in his case, pre-Biblical in its essence.
Christians, he explains to Pullman, have the wrong impression of their
Devil. For a start, he is not God's creation, has always existed, or
at least, his customary characterization is a product of the syn¬
cretism of Judaism, Christianity and an older religion:
"I am pre-Genesis, whether in Rome, Canterbury, or Geneva.
But, as far as the created earth is concerned, my origins
are Mazdean, or shall we say Persian. The language which
I, and all other angels, first spoke, proto-1 ranian. Now,
in speaking to a Christian I must tread warily, but the
Jewish God (and subsequently the Christian God) came from
Iran, too. The language we spoke when we first knew one
another was Iranian: when the Hebrew selected God, his new
God learned Hebrew: and that subsequently was the language
we spoke - with a strong Persian accent." (287)
Mazdaism (mentioned in section (iv) in connection with The Art of Being
Ru1ed) was a late phase in the development of Zoroastrianism. It was
founded on the dualism of Ormuzd (Ahura Mazda) and Ahriman, the good
and evil principles, who embodied, respectively, eternal light and
darkness. Gnosticism (of the Iranian species, and, later, Manichaeism)
incorporated within its system this dualism, and the divine being and
proto-Satan attached to it. Sammael's version of the evolution of
religion is sound: the Jewish Satan (as was noted in reference to
Ratner in the last section) is very probably derived from Ahriman; and
Wilson writes that the Judaic hierarchical theology 'with God as
supreme1 seems to have been influenced by 'Persian angelology'. (288)
Sammael himself has been modelled on Ahriman, or, rather, has had
that role foisted on him, he maintains:
"I have had no purpose in saying all this - I have no diabolic
desires to debunk God - except to demonstrate how it came
about that Christianity has a Counter-God, as it were, an
Anti-Christ, a Devil. The fact is that the Iranian dualism is
at the bottom of God's mind. There was from the first a hank¬
ering after an Ahriman - a desire to have 'His Darkness' - to
use Byron's expression - to balance 'His Brightness'. There
was no one in sight who was a suitable opposite of sufficient
weight, impressively hideous, out of which to make an Ahriman.
And then I appeared, with my historical opposition to Man. He
installed me - a most unsuitable personality, a 'Son of the
Morning' and all the rest of it - as his official Opponent,
his Ahriman. To conceal my objectionable beauty, a monstrous
myth was built up by his publicity agents. And so it is that
every Sinner confronted by me as the Devil is looking for my
horns and tail....
The Jewish Religion is, of course, very parochial compared
with the Iranian. So its derivatives, Christianity and Mo¬
hammedanism, are mainly mythological (indeed, often homely),
whereas Iranian thought, in comparison, is conceptual.
Iranian divinity certainly had geographic roots, but Mazda
is not a national God in the way that Yaweh was..." (289)
Sammael's complaint is that he is the victim of the propaganda that is
the instrument of God's ambition to transform Christianity from a nar¬
row, derivative religion into an ideal, or universal, system, to re¬
cast it in the form of the eternal Persian dualism of light and dark¬
ness, good and evil. In order to aggrandize Himself, God must seem to
have a worthy opponent, hence His putting it about that Sammael is the
very principle of darkness. What Sammael's initial comment about his
origins being Mazdean 'as far as the created earth is concerned'
implies, I think, is that, just as in Iranian Gnosticism or Manichaeism,
the Supreme Being created the world in order to have a battlefield
to fight for the release of the portion of divine light that has be-
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come mixed up with darkness, so the Christian God wants to give the
impression that he is involved in such a struggle with Sammael. This,
in Sammael's view, shows in God a taste for melodrama: in the Persian
systems referred to above, (in Haardt's phrase) 'The cause of Light's
imprisonment in darkness is an,attack by Darkness on Light'; (290)
but no such primordial assault has occurred here, merely a 'disagree¬
ment ' :
"This piece of history in which I have been indulging may
be summarized as follows. Into an essentially tribal,
'chosen people' religion, a phoney cosmic dualism has been
introduced, in which I play a ridiculous part. I am where
I am as a result of a disagreement with your God, not because
I am a malignant promoter of disorder, or because I was born
bad. There are plenty of people who are by nature evil, but
I am not one of those. Therefore, in the Christian system, I
am miscast and, naturally, a weakness has ensued from that." (291)
To make of Satan a lecturer in comparative religion was a brilliant
means of providing the 'Father of Lies' with a new veneer of plausi¬
bility. All of Sammael's knowledge is employed in the service of
deception, and perfectly calculated to appeal to an intellectual such
as Pu11 man, who:
allowed a few observations to form, such as these. Were
these two Iranian titans, one an angel, the other an un¬
attached gentleman, supposed to meet in the mists of the
early world? On what basis did they form an association?
... This long discourse had interested Pullman extremely. (292)
In denying that he is evil, and in disowning with weary scholarship
the dark roles with which he has been identified - 'Ahriman', 'Asmo-
deus', 'Counter-God', 'Anti-Christ', 'Devil1, 'His Darkness', 'Son of
the Morning' - Sammael is, of course, behaving true to form: he is
displaying the classic Satanic skills of policy and dissembling. Of
the character(s) of Satan, Nugent writes: 'The "prince of this world"
(John 12:31) is not political in the conventional sense - excepting
deceit. He is more what we might call the elemental political
personality , that is, a manipulative and power-oriented being obsessed
with controlling others. Through fear and deception. The Bible helps
further to embody this personage by calling him "the father of lies"
(John 8:44). Seduction he has made into a fine art. The Scriptures
he can quote to his own purposes. One of his oldest tricks is in
denying his very existence. He is not necessarily interested in "evil"
he simply makes of it a virtue...He is protean and polymorphous, and
his face is sure to change with the fashions of time.1 (293) Thus,
Sammael 'resents' the job of punishing man (294)and is sick of the
manipulating of his image by God (grand manoeuvring this: impute your
own worst trait to the enemy):
"I have played the villain for him, a part he cannot do
without - or so he be 1ieves...No - this is the point - I
wish to cease to be his Devil." (295)
Through fear, deception and seduction, Pullman is induced to assist him
in his scheme.
This is to annul his relationship with God by changing the onto-
logical and physical status of himself and his angels from supernatural
to human. Pullman is beguiled by this, since the blending of angels
(stupid, as Sammael has owned (296), but immortal) with men (intelli¬
gent, but of short span) seems to promise a race of beings who, con¬
ferred with a limited immortality, will realize the full creative and
intellectual potential of humanity (in preparation for which, Pullman
is entrusted with the important work of establishing a university for
the angels (297), and seduced by the privilege of special quarters in
'Haus Europa ') :
"In proposing to my fellow angels to change themselves from
angels into men I am planning a liquefaction, as it were,
of those titanic immortal units - their immortality will
dissolve into mortality, their vast individual shapes will
be cut up into thousands of facsimiles of themselves. There
would be everywhere a swarming of ephemeral units in.place
of a world of larger and more stable things."
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"Yes, sir. There is lethargy in that vast stability. You
prefer to sacrifice individuality for the mass mind of man,
a thousand minds, each possessing the freshness and
creativeness of a momentary existence - accumulating in
itself the knowledge of millions. You are proposing a
Human Age." (298)
In thus proposing to tamper with the stability of angels, Sammael
is introducing into the supernatural realm a variation of the 'time-
philosophy1, the popularizing of which Lewis attacked in Time and
Western Man:
Dispersal and transformation of a space-phenomenon into a
time-phenomenon throughout everything - that is the trick
of this doctrine...A crowd of hurrying shapes, a temporal
collectivity, is to be put in the place of the single ob¬
ject of what it hostilely indicates as the 1 spatia 1izing1
mind. The new dimension introduced is the variable mental
dimension of time. (299)
Lewis' metaphysics is now, however, the subordinate of a moral intent:
if Sammael's adherence to the 'Time-Cult' is a sign of his wickedness,
there is an implicit approval of God's predilection (disparaged by
Sammael) for Iranian dualism, which, in its eternal and universal
consistency, is, as it were, 'spatially' defined.
His project, Sammael informs Pullman, '"is a most revolutionary
idea."' (300) It is so not least because it calls for the introduc¬
tion into Angeltown of large numbers of women, 'daughters of Eve',(301)
who previously were in Matapolis only to be punished (the spectacle of
Sammael's treatment of a woman guilty of sexual sin (302) was what
frightened Pullman into falling in with the Devil). Now, women will
be required for the perpetuating of the new race:
"...a permanent change to human stature might...modify many
things, such as the length of our lives. That would mean that
as a race we should gradually die out....Then you see to what
such a change might lead: namely, the introduction of the fe¬
male into the picture.... one would have to envisage a
situation - if most of our angels take wives- in which thirty
thousand patriarchs, who have lived for thousands of years,
will find themselves in the midst of swarms of people who
have just come into the world, and, my dear counsellor, the
question of Government will have to be decided." (303)
Comparing the polemics of the 19201s with The Human Age, Kenner
has remarked that an insight of Lewis' that remains consistent is
that, 'power is always wielded by vulgarians.' (30A) In the picture
of Sammael that emerges from the passages quoted above is perceptible
the exponent of 'destructive revolution', of the 'religion of im-
permanence", who had been the object of Lewis' animadversions in
The Art of Being Ruled. In section (iv) was presented Lewis' argument
that such figures flourish by flying 'a grey and neutral flag', when
they should be 'forced to declare themselves as Ozman or Ahriman, the
dark or the light' - then we could see the danger. Sammael, of course,
has already been declared to be Ahriman; but he has taken pains to
simulate a far more modest reputation, and, under the flag of a suf¬
ficiently sensational revolution, assumes that his true nature and
true purpose will be overlooked. This fools Pullman for a while, but
not God, who is both more penetrating and less avid of progress, or
change for change's sake, then the average citizen.
Beyond this, Sammael's scheme is, as revolutionary thinking,
quite unoriginal. It is based, once again, on the story from
Genesis 6 (which might be regarded as the scriptural key to the novel)
and itpartakesof the Gnostic interpretation of the Biblical account.
Sammael, like laldabaoth in The Apocryphon of John, is causing his
'black angels' (305) to mate with the daughters of men; and, like
the Gnostic demiurge, he is proposing a humanizing of the angelic
form in order to facilitate such intercourse.
To encourage the angels to take women, a carnival (the 'fiesta'
of the title) is organized by Pullman. Female sinners are to be
released from the Punishment Centre to provide a supply of sexual
partners, and 'on the backs of the invitation cards' is printed:
BRING YOUR WIVES
AND GIRLS (306)
A few angels demur:
The protests of the reactionary angels sounded antediluvian,
when they sometimes bobbed up, with armchair arguments, in
the midst of this irresistible flood of popular enthusiasm. (307)
The validity of the parallels suggested above (with respect to Sam-
mael's project, Genesis 6 and John's vision) is again substantiated
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by a particular detail (as was the case with 1 Zoe1). The conscious
use of scriptural knowledge or external sources is signalled by the
pairing of 'antediluvian' and 'flood'. 'Antediluvian' (literally,
'existing or happening before Noah's Flood1) surely alludes to Genesis
6, where God punishes the wickedness that results from the union of
the 'sons of God' with women by sending the Flood that destroys all
but Noah and his family. Furthermore, as was seen in Wilson's account
the theme of the Flood is also incorporated in The Apocryphon of John,
where, however, it is laldabaoth who, in a moment of repentance, sends
the Deluge, in order to destroy the corrupted creation. The dis¬
senting angels may be old-fashioned, their archaic opinions easily
overwhelmed ('bobbing up' in the midst of a figurative flood of vulgar
sex-crazed fanaticism); but their dissent is prophetic of the revisit¬
ing of God's punishment in Genesis 6 upon Matapolis, at the climax of
the nove1.
Then, 'antediluvian', as well as indicating outside sources, in¬
tensifies, with hindsight, Lewis' foreboding about the effects of
'destructive revolution' (also quoted in section (iv)):
...a very complete and profound inundation is at hand. After
us comes the De1uge...Meantime, we have a duty where the
officials of the Flood, as they might be called, are con-
ce rned. (3 0 8)
This is not to suggest that Sammael 'dramatizes' some of the apocalypt
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concerns of The Art of Being Ruled (or, elsewhere, of Time and Western
Man). Rather, Sammae1-Ahriman occupies Lewis' imagination as the
archetypal agent of covert practice and deception, whose short-term
purpose is control of the masses, and ultimate aim the bringing on of
chaos, destruction or darkness. That is to say, he pre-exists both
The Art of Being Ruled - where the Devil's work is sociologically and
philosophically identified - and The Human Age, where, an even more
'profound inundation' than Lewis had dreamt of having come down in the
two preceding decades, Sammae1, having accreted something of Hitler,
is produced in the flesh.
In the midst of the fiesta, Pullman finally is struck by the
enormity of Sammael's plans, and by terrible guilt at his part in
them:
In Sammael's heart there was no great purpose, but the old,
cold pride. He was resolved to explode the supernatural,
ultimately to make an end of God. He wished to bring
Heaven crashing down. He was now arranging for the con¬
tamination of the angel nature - for the destruction of
something which had endured since the beginning of time.
He was going to mix it up with the pettiness and corruption
of mankind....To save his skin, he (Pullman) had been
actively assisting at the annihilation of the Divine. (309)
Of this passage, Chapman writes: 'The master-plan to "humanize" the
angels is an attempt to terminate the servility of Hell to Heaven by
ending the supernatural role of the diabolic powers. Sammael conjec¬
tures that by abolishing one half of theManichean dualism, he would
ultimately bring about "the annihilation of the Divine." (310) It
is not Sammael, however, who 'conjectures' this, but Pullman; and to
base an analysis of the novel on Pullman's analysis of Sammael is un-
re1 i ab1e.
It must be so - unless it were a convention of infernal litera¬
ture that the Devil reveal all to a selected confidante. That is to
153.
say, Pullman's only source of information about Sammael and Sammael's
motives has been Sammael himself - the 'Father of Lies'. Thus,
Pullman's estimation of God's dependence on Sammael (the one cannot
exist without the other) is not necessarily either accurate or veri¬
dical, since it is based on what Sammael has told him (in passages
where, anyway, Sammael kept rhetorically playing with the idea of his
own status). Beyond this, it is theologically unsound to suppose
either that God needs Satan (who, in Reve1 ation Chapter 20, Verse 10,
is thrown into a pit of fire for eternity at the second resurrection),
or that 'abolishing one half of the Manichaean dualism' will 'bring
about the "annihilation of the Divine".' In Manichaeism, the principle
of light contends with that of darkness in order to recover fallen
light. If, therefore, the dark powers retire from the struggle, the
restitution of fallen light is merely made easier. Then, by what means
could Sammael 'contaminate' the heaven 1y angels, and thereby 'bring
Heaven crashing down'? What he does to his own angels, who are fallen
anyway, is of more questionable importance than Pullman (whose facul¬
ties are unbalanced by fear and guilt) allows: why should modification
of the nature of fallen angels constitute a threat to Heaven?
It is more reasonable, I think, to suggest that Sammael's designs
are upon man rather than Heaven, or at least that an offence against
Heaven is only indirectly meditated. That is to say, just as The
Apocryphon of John envisioned '(a) struggle for the soul of man be¬
tween the world of light and the world of darkness',(311) so here,
Sammael, like laldabaoth, by mixing human nature with that of the dark
angels, intends to erect a new barrier between man and salvation, to
isolate man further from Heaven. Indeed, Pullman and Sammael have at
one point (312) discussed the removal of the new race to another planet,
where, it is to be presumed, the 'children of darkness' would be con¬
clusively shut off from the divine light.
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Thus, Sammael's 'Human Age1 is merely a grand lie, manufactured
in the service of a new scheme to ensnare the human spirit in dark¬
ness. In the interests of this scheme, he is prepared to sacrifice
his angels; yet all his talk about transforming himse1f into a human
is, evidently, another deception. Though he is attended at the
fiesta by a beautiful 'octaroon1, he tells Pullman that, "'Naturally,
there will be no actua1 marriage;"' and the fabricated denunciation
of her as a 'triple-murderess', along with Sammael's decision to have
her shot as soon as the fiesta is over, is not a good start to the
'Human Age'. Sammael, it seems,is to remain supernatural, unsullied
by the complication with humanity to which he has condemned his
angeIs. (313)
Nevertheless, Pullman's fears about his part in the 'humanization
of the Divine1 (314) are as groundless as Sammael's assurance that God
will never mount a full-scale assault on Matapo1is.(315) Heaven can
as easily spare Pullman as it can overwhelm Sammael. The images of
the Flood which here recur are salvatory, as well as punitive. A
huge 'cataclysmic foot' crushes Satters1 cherished peony, while:
The light blazed outside. An ocean of light seemed to have
settled down around the lair of the lord Sammae1...(Pu11 man)
was now in the divine element. (316)
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CHAPTER 3
The Hangman in Lewis' Satire, with some
Observations upon the Presence of the
Rai1er and the Cyn i c
(i)
In the previous chapter, it was suggested that Lewis' theoretical
and imaginative work gave evidence of a cult of that religious body
of thought that may loosely be defined as 'Gnosticism1. Now, I want
to make some suggestions about Lewis' relation to a magical tradition,
in his capacity as a satirist and satiric theorist. My general
purpose in doing so is based on Lewis' statement in Time and Western Man:
For me art is the civilized substitute for magic; as philosophy
is what, on a higher or more complex plane, takes the place of
re 1igion. (1)
It is to complete this thesis by demonstrating that, to a considerable
degree, the Lewisian corpus can be accommodated within two traditions.
That is to say, Lewis' interest in, or affinities with, Gnosticism
provided him with a re 1igio-phi1osophica1 basis in his theory and
fiction (as well as working in the service of the imagination), while
a particular current of belief, of still older provenance than
Gnosticism, supplied his satire with a magic-aesthetic basis (the aesthet
ic component, arguably, never fully displacing the magical).
I will begin by citing, in this section, some observations made by
Lewis upon the relationship of art and magic. It will be necessary to
suggest a little of the general intellectual background of such
remarks, which are, in some degree, in character with my principal
authority in this chapter (whom I shall present in section (i i)) .
It is to be hoped that, from these remarks, will immediately emerge
one or two ideas which may be of significance in the consideration of
Lewis' sat i re itself.
Lewis asserts, prior to the statement quoted above:
If you say that creative art is a spell, a talisman, an incan¬
tation - that it is magic, in short, there, too, I believe you
would be correctly describing it. That the artist uses and
manipulates a supernatural power seems very likely... The poet
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or philosopher in the non-re 1igious greek states occupied, we
are told, much the same position as the priest or witch-doctor
or magician in a more religious or superstitious community,
it was for that reason that a poet or philosopher was held
responsible for his slightest or most casual utterance in the
way that he was. He was recognised as the custodian of the
spiritual consciousness of the race. The productions of art
assumed somewhat the role of sacred books.
It is the appreciation of this magica1 quality in artistic
expression - a recognition that the artist is tapping the
supernatural sources and potentialities of our existence -
that composes a good deal the attitude towards him and his
creation that so often comes to light, and at some periods in
a manner so unfavourable for his function. (2)
What is principally to be noted here, with regard to the general
direction of this chapter, is Lewis' comment about the supernatural
powers of articulation of the antique poet, and the import attached
by society to his utterance. Throughout history, as we shall see,
the practice, beliefs and reputation of the satirist are, to a varying
degree, implicated in such thinking. Aside from this, the passage
expresses a remarkable personal credo vis-a-vis the powers constrained
by, or inspiring, (Lewis) the artist, and the quasi-primitive condition
of artistic creation. Behind it, at some level, may possibly be
sensed the influence of the Cambridge school of anthropology. Their
work, initiated by Frazer's Golden Bough, Lewis discusses in the
second part of The Dithyrambic Spectator, acknowledging the importance
of Frazer's encyclopaedic researches in the field of magic and
primitive religion (3), and undertaking a critique of Jane Harrison's
Ancient Art and Ritual (1913) - not of her basic material, but of
her endeavour to dissolve the distance between art and spectator.
Certainly, when Lewis, following the passage cited above, states,
And though the artist is certainly not devoid of religious
emotion, it is exercised persona 1 1 y, as it were; and he is in
temper the opposite of the religionist. The man-of-science
is another sort of transformed magician. He, too, is opposite
in temper to the religionist. The truly scientific mind...
is as 'detached', as we say, as is the artist-mind. (4)
164.
one is reminded of Frazer's argument that science shares the same
assumptions as primitive magic - though its premises are different -,
that it evolves from magic, 'displacing' or sidestepping religion. (5)
Then, when Lewis describes the 'magica1 quality in artistic
expression', and states that,
The artist is definitely, for the fanatical religionist,
fabricating graven images, or tampering, in a secular manner,
with sacred powers. (6)
there is entailed, on one level, a connection between the Aristotelian
tenet, expressed in the Poetics (and to which Lewis refers in The
Dithyrambic Spectator), that the originating principle of art is that
of imitation, and Frazer's theory that the principle of magic is
imitation or mimesis (an effigy or picture is made of that over which
one wants to exert some influence). (7) Indeed, The Apes of God
might be viewed as providing a concrete demonstration of such a prin¬
ciple: the artist makes portraits of those whom he wishes to destroy.
Further, those images which the artist fabricates are for him,
Lewis asserts, as 'real' or as 'alive' as living people. His
consciousness is of the
sort that realizes that Don Quixote or the Widow Wadman is as
rea1, to put it no higher than that, as most people ostensibly
alive and walking the earth today. (8)
Consequently, it might be tentatively proposed, any harm the artist
qua satirist does those images is, in his imagination at least, in
the nature of 'real' damage. Certainly, the picture which emerges
from that statement of the artist's simultaneously occupying two
worlds, or a world where the imaginary or the supernatural is constantly
transcending the 'real', calls to mind passages from Nietzsche's
Birth of Tragedy (which, evidently, cast a considerable influence
over Jane Harrison's book). In Section 8, Nietzsche declares:
'At bottom, the aesthetic phenomenon is simple: let anyone have the
ability to behold continually a vivid play and to live constantly
surrounded by hosts of spirits, and he wi11 be a poet; let anyone
feel the urge to transform himself and to speak out of other bodies
and souls, and he wi11 be a dramatist.' And 'magic transformation,'
asserts Nietzsche, 'is the presupposition of all dramatic art.' (9)
The particular relationship of satire and magic, which Lewis'
comments in Time and Western Man point indirectly to - as I have
suggested above here and there -, has been studied at length by Robert
Elliott in The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual, Art (i960). This work,
whose contribution to the theory of satire is probably the most
important of any this century, I intend to make my main secondary
source of reference in the present chapter. I will begin by providing
a brief summary of Elliott's thesis.
(ii)
In order to account for the origins of satire, Elliott goes to
Aristotle's description of the Phallic Songs that were a feature of
the fertility rites practised in Ancient Greece, and elsewhere in
Europe and Asia Minor. To such rites, incidentally, Lewis alludes
when Horace Zagreus (describing his costume to Ratner) says:
"At my belt, upon this bootlace you see a phallus, such as
was worn by the phallophoroi at the Dionysia." (10)
During these rituals, an effigy of the god (Dionysus/Zagreus)
was borne upon a pole; and there was a general licence for the abuse
of parsimonious or tight members of the community, these being the
object of invective delivered in improvised iambs by the leaders of
the rite. The magic function of the phallic ritual was twofold:
'The ceremonial had two aspects, as it were: the invocation of good
influences through the magic potency of the phallus, the expulsion
of evil influences through the magical potency of abuse.' (11) It
was in such fertility ceremonies, concludes Elliott, that belief in
the supernatural power of violent language was first systematically
manifested; abuse was considered to be 'apotropaic'.
On this consideration, Elliott bases his analysis of the key
figure in his study, namely, Archilochus, 'the first individual
satirist of record,' who, evidently, marks something of a modification
of the apotropaic magic of invective: 'Archilochus' verses had
demonic power; his satire killed. Indeed, all satire "kills," sym¬
bolically at any rate, and Archilochus is the archetypal figure in
the tradition.' (12)
Briefly, the history of Archilochus is this. He was a poet and
priest of Demeter in the seventh century B.C., and was descended, on
the distaff side, from slaves. Having been betrothed by Lycambes to
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his daughter Neobule, Archilochus was enraged when the compact was
broken (putatively, on the grounds of the circumstances of his birth).
Subsequently, he 'composed iambics against the father and his house¬
hold,1 and, these verses having been sung or recited to Lycambes and
Neobule, they committed suicide by hanging themselves. (13)
Some preliminary speculations about the lethal efficacy of
Archilochus1 iambics, Elliott now offers: 'Whether the iambics of
Archilochus were believed to have magical potency because of his own
personal command over the Word, which was magical in and of itself,
or whether his power derived from his ability to bring about divine
intervention, it is difficult to say. But Hendrickson's thesis is
convincing: Lycambes and his daughter were driven - or were believed
to have been driven - to suicide by the preternatural power of
Archilochus' poetry.' (l4)
A third possibility might here be added to those advanced by
Elliott. This is suggested by G.L. Hendrickson in the essay
"Archilochus and the Victims of His Iambics" (1925), where he compares
the verses of Archilochus with the curses of classical tragedy: 'The
idea of the magical potency of a curse is one of the oldest possessions
of the human race, and it is manifested among nearly all peoples and
at all times...If we seek to discover the underlying element of truth
or efficacy - for there is some - beneath the hocus pocus of words,
rites and mechanism, we must attribute whatever power they seem to
possess to the exercise of one will upon the will or emotion of
another. Suggestion and suggestibility, active and passive, this is
the residuum of mystery, and it need not be denied that this residuum
is large enough and mysterious enough to embrace phenomena baffling
to the untrained and inexperienced mind, and therefore apparently
supernatural.' (15) From Elliott and from this passage, we have,
therefore, the possibilities that: (1) the power to cause death
resided magically in the character and ability of the poet - his
word was actually a weapon; (2) the poet achieved his effect by
afflatus or invocation; (3) he killed by the power of suggestion,
the will of the victim playing a part.
Lest we should assume that the third is in any way a modern or
'sophisticated' explanation, it will be as well to quote a further
passage from Hendrickson, in which he states that the ancient Greeks
rationa1ized this possibility from the first: 'The character of the
harm wrought by a curse or malediction was conceived of primitively
as direct - a physical emanation, the word itself, which carried the
force of a deadly weapon. But just as the Greeks had for the most
part rationalized, or "moralized," the curse into a means of re¬
dressing outraged right, so also in some degree they qualified its
direct efficacy. They thought of it as working rather on the mind,
disturbing its balance, and so producing a defect of reason, a madness,
in which the victim becomes the agent of his own destruction.' (16)
Based on the model of Archilochus, the idea of the mortal power of
the satirist grew, sometimes issuing in apocryphal stories. Thus,
Elliott refers to Pliny's account of the career of Hipponax, who, in
the sixth century B.C., invented the cho1iambic metre. Sensitive
about his dwarfish appearance, he composed invective rhymes against
two sculptors, Bupalus and Athenis, who had made a derisive statue of
him. According to some reports (disputed by Pliny), the sculptors,
shamed by these venomous verses, hanged themselves. (17) Hendrickson
cites the poet Simonides (of Amorgos), whose victim was 'a certain
Orodoecides.' (18)
With regard to such stores, Elliott implies, it matters not, in
essence, whether death in every case occurred (though the evidence
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suggests that the consequences of Archilochus' satire were real), or
what the cause of death (did it occur) may have been. Indeed, from
a distance of nearly 3,000 years, one can no more than speculate (in
the manner of Elliott and Hendrickson above), as Elliott concedes:
'It is most difficult, perhaps impossible, to be precise about the
nature of those powers.' (19) What is of importance to literary
history is, first, the be 1 ief that grew and held in the possibility
of a person's being satirized to death; and, then, the influence
these stories (with their problematic mixture of fact and legend)
have had, both over the satirist's conception of the power of his art,
and over the way the satirist is publicly regarded, up to the present
day: '...the iambic verses of a major poet, expressive of his hate,
his will to destroy, his mockery, were believed to exert some kind of
malefic power. The power seems to have resided, noh in secret,
esoteric spells or in the mechanics of sympathetic magic, but in the
character of the poet himself - in his command over the word. The
word could kill; and in popular belief it did kill. This is the
essence of Archilochus' story. It is crucial for an understanding
of the image of the satirist as it develops over the centuries, as
own
it exists in ourAday.' (20)
Thus, around 600 years after Archilochus, Horace (in the sixth
Epode) likens the virulence of his own satire to that of Archilochus
and Hipponax (21); and around two millennia after Archilochus, Ben
Jonson invokes the poet, in the Epilogue to Poetaster: 'I could do
worse,/ Arm'd with ARCHILOCHUS fury, write Iambicks,/ Should make
the desperate lashers hang themselves.' (22) Jonson's threat to his
enemies, writes Elliott, 'has two roots...one extending back over two
thousand years to Archilochus and the beginnings of Western Civilization,
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the other stretching back in cultural (as opposed to chronological)
time a distance beyond calculation. Both roots draw upon "primitive"
beliefs which have had remarkable vitality throughout the entire
history of satirical literature. The principal belief, of course,
is that satire kills (or at least causes death), that magical power
inheres in the denunciatory and derisive words of a poet whose function
is to blame as well as to praise.1 (23)
In illustration of the idea that the killing power of the satirist
is restricted to ne i thera certain place nor a certain time, Elliott
presents accounts of the cultures of pre-lslamic Arabia and ancient
Ireland. There, too, death was preferred to the shame that ensued
from being the victim of satire - or in some cases of spells or curses
which, in their animus and formal elaborateness, were scarcely dis¬
tinguished from satire. Indeed, in such awe were held the irish
poets (f i 1 i d) that some - Aithirne the Importunate provides a notorious
example of this - stooped to extortion, exacting largesse from kings
and princes who feared being satirized. (24) (It is not, perhaps,
flippant to suggest that there can be observed a much diluted trace
of this in the funding of Lewis by those who would forestall his
satire (the Wadsworths), or, even, by those who had been cruelly
satirized (the Schiffs). (25)) Much later comes the Welsh poet
Dafydd Ap Gwylim, 'almost a contemporary of Chaucer,1 writes
Hendrickson, 'of whom it is related that he killed a literary anta¬
gonist by the virulence of his verse;' (26) and nearer still to the
present day are two Irish poets of the early fifteenth and late
seventeenth -early eighteenth centuries, Hugh O'Higgins and Egan
01Rahilly respectively, who, reputedly, killed by lampooning. (27)
Nevertheless, the power of the satiric threat to kill wanes, on
the literal level, as belief in magic diminishes, 'the further in
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time we come from Archilochus and the beliefs of his age,1 writes
Elliott. Symbolically, however, the threat enjoys a sinister and
enduringly compulsive effect. Thus, though Jonson and, for example,
Roy Campbell, 'whose verse will drive hated rival poets to their
doom,1 expect to have no actual effect, though 'the satirist no longer
wields overt magical power, the old tradition remains vital, still
exerting a strenuous attraction on our imaginations.' (28)
Furthermore, suggests Elliott, there is a sense in which the
reputation of actual figures, such as Archilochus or Hipponax, has
worked a reciprocal enrichment of history and literature. Literature
returns repeatedly to the figure of the railer, the disreputable,
slanderous trouble-maker who, at the same time, is possessed of an
irresistible, almost fanatic, urge to deliver truths which those
around him are loath to hear. His archetype is Homer's Thersites;
thereafter he appears in the form of the Norse god Loki, as Bricriu
Poison-tongue in Irish saga, in Shakespeare's Thersites (in Troi1 us
and Cressida), and in the many malcontents of Elizabethan and Jacobean
drama - Jaques (in As You Like It), for example, or Marston's Malevole
(in The Ma 1 content). Such figures, Elliott interestingly proposes,
may recur, and enjoy licence to rail, or inveigh, because of a residue
of the belief - generally held in antiquity, as we have seen - in the
apotropaic magic of abuse. His central point, however, is that the
literary figure of the railer acquires dimension by absorbing charac¬
teristics of 'real' satirists, 'gains depth and resonance from its
assimilation of historical figures, particularly when to their poetry
has been attributed the malign efficacy of which we know.'
Concomitantly, the historical figure of the satirist is invested, by
legend, with something of the character of the railer, so that there
emerges, in time, a twofold picture of Archilochus, for example, as
both railer and magica11y-inspired poet-priest. (29)
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A 'comparable development1, states Elliott, involves the railer
and the Cynic philosopher Diogenes. The systematic rudeness of the
latter caused him to be viewed, with the passing of time, as a sort
of satiric railer with licence to abuse, John Lyly's Campaspe (1584)
casting him in this role. Reciprocally, the railer of low birth,
for example, Apemantus, the 'churlish philosopher' of Timon of Athens,
comes to be represented as a Cynic: the appellation 'dog' - for
example, 'Thou wast whelped a dog, and thou shalt famish a dog's
death.' (2/2) -, which is liberally applied to Apemantus, connotes
an association between the literary railer and the intemperate anger
and calculatedly rough manners of the school of Antisthenes, since
'cynic' means 'canine' or 'dog-like'. (30)
Timon of Athens, in fact (as Lewis, who was fascinated by the
play, seems to have realized - as I will show in section (iii)), is
a paradigm for the study of the various forms of the satiric voice.
In part it is so because its satiric figures, Timon and Apemantus,
represent the differing characteristics of the Archilochian legend.
For although, as Elliott points out, their tone and rhetoric now and
then converge, Timon, essentially, is a 'sat i rist-curser1, whi1e
Apemantus is a 'satirist-rai1er in the tradition of Thersites.' (31)
Towards the end of his book, Elliott devotes half a chapter each
to, respectively, Lewis as a theorist on satire, and Roy Campbell's
practice as a satiric poet. Where Lewis is concerned, Elliott's
approach does little (does not, in fact, seem interested) to contribute
to, or amplify, that tradition he has been following: namely, that
based in ancient belief in the magic of invective, all satire intends
to kill (symbolically or otherwise).
First, Elliott inspects Lewis' theories that satire is, or should
be, an art of externa 1 expression, and that satire partakes of the
objective truth of natural science. (32) But since Lewis' many
statements on these themes are of the nature of formal, stylistic or
rhetorical desiderata, they tell us nothing about the impulse to
satirize lethal 1y in Lewis (nor, apparently, does Elliott expect them
to, which would be understandable if he were trying to show that Lewis
represents a break with that tradition Elliott is interested in -
but he isn't).
Then, Elliott gets entoiled in Lewis' series of contradictory
statements about whether satire should operate according to ethical
sanction, or whether it should be 'non-moral'. This is a question, as
I showed in Chapter 1, that has exercised several of Lewis' critics,
and is too inclined to be answered on the strength of the dubious
assumption that, because all satire is morally motivated, Lewis' must
be also. Since I do not want to digress, I will merely state here
that such an assumption shows no regard for the psychology of satire,
and excessive regard for the excuses or reasons that satirists always
give for their art. Elliott, anyhow, evidently out of confusion,
resorts to this assumption: 'Manipulate these terms as he will,
however, Lewis is utterly incapable of disguising the intense moral
urgency underlying his whole literary enterprise.' (33) My personal
view, expressed in the last chapter, is that nothing that could be
described as 'intense moral urgency' is perceptible in Lewis' fiction
until the end of Monstre Gai. Had Elliott accepted Lewis at his word
on the subject of 'non-moral' satire, the effect must have been,
whether Elliott realized this or not, to have brought Lewis to the
heart of the tradition of magical satire. Fredric Jameson, in a fine
passage vis-a-vis Elliott and Lewis, intimates as much. (3^) These,
however, are complicated issues - for Lewis' practice as a satirist
(in which Elliott ought to have interested himself) is 'non-moral'
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in a way quite separate from that in which his theory of satire
propounds 'non-mora1ism1 - and I will postpone their further dis¬
cussion until I deal with The Apes of God in section (v).
At one point, Elliott considers certain remarks of Lewis' which
take up, with sinister joviality, the antique notion of the mortal
power of satire, and which, one assumes, would have been of great
interest to Elliott. Such remarks I must return to in later sections.
Elliott (I find this most surprising) consigns them to a lowly place
in his scheme. Here, he is discussing that passage in Rude Assignment
(35) where Lewis compares the duty of the satirist (in The Apes of
God) to that of the mediaeval apprehender of a horse-thief, namely,
to lynch the miscreant on the spot: 'In this image the satirist is
a hangman, as elsewhere in Lewis he is a dissector, a surgeon, an
executioner, a prophet - his function being in each case that which
from the beginning satirists have arrogated to themselves... Low
(Lewis remarks) is said to have killed a statesman by his satirical
portraits; but although he is in no way disposed to deny the power in
Low's extraordinary art, he dismisses the story as probably a "pleasant
exaggeration." Lewis himself claims to have "paralyzed" by the
violence of his pamphleteering the most troublesome "Apes" in his
neighbourhood....But these are only incidental remarks, linking him
with the tradition we are interested in, to be sure, but not consciously
at the heart of his enterprise.' (My italics) (36)
Later, Elliott states that, in The Apes of God, Lewis was not 'all
out for the kill,' that he had 'no intention of demonstrating' the
reputedly lethal powers ascribed to the cartoonist Low. (37) That no
such intention is manifested in The Apes of God, I would dispute
strongly, as, again, I will show when I discuss that novel.
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Indeed, I am of the opinion that Elliott is quite mistaken in
placing Lewis in only an 'incidental' relation to the tradition he
has been discussing. In my view, many of the characters and incidents
in Lewis' fiction, Lewis' personae and satiric voices, and the forms
his satire takes, reflect stongly Lewis' interest in that tradition,
and even, in some cases, can only fully be accounted for by reference
thereto. Certainly, over the 'heart of Lewis' enterprise' the inter¬
relationship of the figures of Archilochus (of the lethal satirist,
that is to say), of the railer and of the Cynic exercises a compulsive
attraction. Such a compulsion issues in Lewis' satiric fiction, in
his poetry and polemics, and in his criticism also. Sometimes, it
expresses itself sub 1imina11y, sometimes, self-consciously. it
manifests itself most notably in a recurring impulse - which Elliott
would deny - to bring about, or to see brought about, death (literally
or symbolically, within the frame of fiction) by satire, or by related
forces or forms of expression. Sometimes, even, we shall notice in
Lewis a fascination with the concept of putting to death, or execution,
which is possibly, in respect of its ritual element, or ceremonial
significance, obliquely associated with the idea of satire's ultimate
satisfaction being death.
In the next section, I will show how Lewis' verse attempts to
restore an archaic magic potency to satire, and, in doing so, reflects
the spirit of composition of BLAST. On the premise that BLAST was
motivated to destroy the objects of its contempt, I will make some
remarks about how such an urge is manifested, particularly by way of
the image of hanging, in Lewis' comments upon satire. From this,
I wi11 go to the theme of execution as it issues elsewhere in Lewis'
non-fictional work. Following this, I will examine the nature of
Lewis' satiric personae in relation to the figure of the railer and
that of the Cynic, the lengths to which he went, particularly in
The Lion and the Fox, to justify or exalt such personae, and a
particular problem that arises from se1f-i dent i f i cat ion with the
Cynics. Although this will necessitate a somewhat discursive treatment
it will at least have the virtue of compassing within a single space
the salient points of that tradition, described by Robert Elliott,
which has been reviewed in this section.
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(iii)
In One Way Song ("The song of the Militant Romance"), the Lewisian
persona announces his predilected metre:
I shall not take 'limping' iambics, not borrow from Archilochous
His 'light-horse gallop1,...
1 know with my bold Fourteener I have the measure that suits us
best. (Canto ii) (38)
But whether or not the Archilochian iamb is going to be employed, an
association with the first satirist has been suggested, and a
tradition called to mind. As in the ancient ritual displays of
invective, the satiric voice is to be improvisatory; and it will
work a spe11:
Let me abound in speeches - let me abound! - publicly polyglot.
Better a blind word to bluster with - better a bad word than none
1 ieber Gott!
Watch me push into my witch's vortex all the Englishman's got
To cackle and rattle with - you catch my intention? - to be
busily ba1king
The tongue-tied Briton - that is my outlandish plot! (Canto i)
(39)
Then, a conjuration is made. An archaic power is called upon. The
ancient magical energies of satire can only be recovered by an
invocation of disorder, of modes of expression which pre-date the
civilizing principles of grammar, prosody and calmly regulated sense
(such as the heroic couplet of Augustan satire), and flout the lexis
itself:
Set all our mother-tongue reeling, with the eruption of obsolete
vocab1es, . . .
Break out word-storms! - a proper tongue-burst! Split
Our palate down the middle - shatter it!
Give us hare-lip and cross us with a seal
That we may emit the most ear-splitting squeal!
Let words forsake their syntax and ambit -
The dam of all the lexicons gone west! -
Chaos restored, why then by such storms hit
The brain can mint its imagery best.
Whoever heard of perfect sense or perfect rhythm
Matching the magic of extreme verbal schism? (Cantos iii and vi)(40)
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Canto vi also looks outward from the poem, and defines, retro¬
spectively, the railing energy of BLAST ('a periodical consecrated to
blasting and blessing in a magica11y-charged prose worthy of an archaic
prophet,1 notes Elliott (41)). Here, the ordering principle of syntax
and punctuation, and the containment of the standard line of prose,
having been renounced, the collocation of hates - phrases and sentences
typographically engorged to form paragraphic storm-clouds of words -
gains in force from the uncivilized presentation. Modern notions
of decency or measure are violated. At the same time, however, the
curses are elaborate in their organization (as curses must be, in
order to be effective), artfully barbarous and overwhelming. The size
of the lettering (which I am unable properly to replicate here) is
frightening:
CURSE (3)
WITH EXPLETIVE OF WHIRLWIND
THE BRITANNIC AESTHETE
CREAM OF THE SNOBBISH EARTH
ROSE OF SHARON OF GOD-PRIG
OF SIMIAN VANITY
SNEAK AND SWOT OF THE SCHOOL -
ROOM




Hendrickson, we saw, associated Archilochus1 satiric verses with the
curses of classical tragedy; in a manner somewhat analogous thereto,
passages such as that quoted above are both curse and satiric poem, as
Geoffrey Grigson rightly stated: 'The Blasts and Blesses of that
magazine (all of them written by Lewis himself) would go, if there
were anthologists acute enough to recognize their nature, into any
survey of English poetry of the last fifty years. They were satirical
poems, though no one has ever remarked as much.1 (43)
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Furthermore, the proscriptions in BLAST - beginning 'BLAST' and
followed by a list of names, for example, 'Lionel Cust C.B. Fry Bergson
Abdul Bahai Hawtrey Edward Elgar', involve a retrieval of an ancient
concept of name-magic. We saw a religious form of this in the last
chapter (in the discussion of "Mr Zagreus and the Split-Man", in
section (viii)), where the Gnostic belief was adduced that to know the
name of the god was to have power over the god. By analogy, Elliott
informs us, to name a person, in archaic satire, in a curse or in an
incantation, gave power to entrap and harm that person. In Augustan
Rome, apparently, - during a period of relative sophistication, that
is to say - the belief in this power was sufficiently strongly held
for the naming of individuals in satire to be prohibited on pain of
death. (AA) The most rudimentary form such a belief took has been
demonstrated by the archaeological discovery of curse-tablets, on
which was merely inscribed the name of the victim whose death was
desired: 'Many of these small tab 1ets...contain only the name of the
enemy with a nail driven through it. The magical principle operative
here we have already considered: the name is no mere sign distinguishing
one person from another; by a magical process of identification, the
name _i_s the person, and he who controls the name controls the man.'
(A5) It is this most primitive form of name-magic that is recovered
in BLAST. All that is required, it is implied, is one word expressive
of hate ('BLAST', in huge majuscules), with the names of the victims
wr itten beneath.
Having noted so far in Lewis an association of magic with satiric,
destructive intent, I shall now proceed to the principal image in
Lewis' comments on satire of that intent, namely, the image of the
satirist as hangman or executioner. Such an image indicates an
assumption of the power of the satiric utterance to kill which
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consciously recalls the power that the first satirist (Archi1ochus)
exercised with his killing iambs. Although the power is no longer
considered to be real, the intent behind it may well be real enough;
it is, at least, simplistic to describe that intent as 'symbolic'
solely. This difficult question, anyhow, I will postpone until the
final section of this chapter.
In Rude Assignment, Lewis casts himself (in a passage referred
to in the last section) as a summary executioner:
As once upon a time, according to English law, it was the duty
of any man, observing another rustling a horse, to apprehend
him (if he could) and to hang him (if he had a rope) to the
nearest tree (if there were one thereabouts): so it was incumbent
upon all good citizens to turn satirists on the spot, at the
sight of such as those exhibited in 'The Apes of God' - if they
had any Satire in them, of which I happened to have an adequate
supply. (46)
The rhetorical purpose of this simile, with its echo of the 'hue and
cry' of mediaeval England (47), is to conceal the passions or rage of
the satirist by legalizing them, by pretending that the satirist is no
more than the servant of a penal code. Over the centuries, writes
Elliott, that is a typical and consistent feature of the satirist's
apo1ogia (and Grigson called Rude Assignment Lewis' apologia (48)):
'...the satirist is a public servant fighting the good fight against
vice and folly wherever he meets it; he is honest, brave, protected
by the rectitude of his motives.' (49) Thus, Lewis claims that the
violent exaction of a penalty is, in fact, a civic duty. Simultaneously,
however, such a claim is undermined (is, in a sense, intended to be)
by the very obsoleteness of the code Lewis chooses for illustration,
which serves to emphasize, rather than conceal, the barbarousness of
the impulse to punish, and constitutes a transparent excuse for the
expression of the satiric will to destroy.
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The image, or modifications thereof, recur sufficiently for one
to incline to the view that it expresses something essentia 1, rather
than 'incidental' (Elliott's word) about Lewis' conception of satire.
For example:
... in Swift, in Dryden, in Pope, it is not the 'natural^
'bubbling' laughter of Shakespearean Comedy that you would
expect to find, any more than you would look for jovial
heartiness in a surgeon at work, or, if you like (to take
a romantic illustration), in an executioner. (50)
There is Satire pretty comfortably fixed up, I think you
will concede - with all its passports in order, and with
a great big carte blanche to execute all and sundry at
sight1 (51)-
Moliere could kill with laughter as effectively as the
headsman with his axe. (52).
That such sentiments may be drolly couched should not necessarily
induce one to regard them as flippancies; indeed, there is something
impressive and disturbing about such smiling cruelty; and satire is
itself, of course, a mode of comedy. Then there is that comment
on the story that 'by his satirical portraits Low actually killed
a certain statesman,' of which Lewis (as one professional complimenting
another) suggests, 'this was no doubt a pleasant exaggeration.' (53)
'Pleasant'? Only to one given chronically to contemplating the
possibility (or, more likely, lamenting the impossibility) of shaming
someone else to death.
That manner of thinking outlined above either led to, or stood in
a dark parallel with, a tendency in Lewis to view putting to death as
art's purpose and consummation. In The Lion and the Fox, Lewis describes
the guise of detachment with which Shakespeare despatches the heroes of
the tragedies:
The innocent-looking, compassionate representation of an
agony and death, like that of Othello, with its catharsis
by means of tears and pity, is thus, as though in a dream,
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revealed as something else. It is a show of the same nature
as a public execution. . . . Shakespeare was in
this sense a public executioner, a quiet and highly respectable
man, as might be expected. His impassibi1ity was the professional
mask of the hangman. For dramatic effect the dramatist, like the
hangman, must be impassible. His attitude to the many kings and
heroes who were done to death by him was not conveyed by - that is
the idea of this contention - the impassible, impressive, dramatic,
"unmoved" mask of the executioner. But actually the mask was
incessantly convulsed with the most painful unprofessional emotions...
(54)
This startling analysis occurs in the context of a discussion of
Frazer's theory (in The Golden Bough) of the 'Scapegoat', that is,
the human or mock-god who, in the rites of many primitive or ancient
cultures (in the Roman Saturnalia, for example), reigned for a limited
term, then was put to death, to ensure fertility, a good harvest, and
so on, in the coming year. (55) Thus, the death of the hero is
viewed by Lewis as a magical requirement (or related to the magical
purpose of primitive sacrifice), and not a psychological necessity
(by means of which, in Aristotle's terms, the emotions of the audience
are vicariously purged). This, Lewis apprehends 'as though in a dream',
and what prevents us from following the 'connexion', he suggests, is
that 'every murderous instinct' of which the'"tragic" and dramatic
instinct is composed,' is, in us, 'translated into, and compressed in,
civilized reserve'. (56) The implication of this is that, had we
the visionary faculty of Lewis to revert to, or 'dream', primitive
modes of understanding, we would grasp, like he does, the imaginative
nexus of magic, art and death (which subsumes, it may be speculated,
the desire to see death result from satire). But is what is here
revealed to us really of the nature of a trans-cultural truth? The
anthropology is sound enough, yet is it not rather, at some level,
being adduced to give a technical coherence to a personal compulsion
to kill through art? - in the additional service of which, it might be
suggested, Shakespeare (as the highest propagandizing authority
possible) is cast as that (a hangman) which Lewis wishes to be.
(Elsewhere in The Lion and the Fox, as I shall show later in this
section, Shakespeare is adapted to the Lewisian satiric scheme.)
As Jameson has suggested, satire (satire in terms of the lethal
tradition described by Elliott, that is) was no option for Lewis,
but the essence of his art. (57) But if it was no option, then
the urge to kill associated therewith was equally compulsive (an
urge which issues in the obligatoriness of death in Lewis' fiction),
and ways of legitimizing it must constantly be sought. One way,
as we will have come to realize, is to give the killing a judicial
frame, or to figure the agent of death (whether it be Lewis or
Shakespeare) as an executioner. This achieved, gratuitous killings
can be made simultaneously to seem necessary (since the executioner
is not the law, merely its servant). Thus, the death of Arghol
(murdered by Hanp (58)) in Enemy of the Stars is at once meaningless
and entailed by the instructions with which the play commences:
THE RED WALLS OF THE UNIVERSE NOW SHUT THEM IN, WITH THIS
CONDEMNED PROTAGONIST.
THEY BREATH IN CLOSE ATMOSPHERE OF TERROR AND NECESSITY TILL
THE EXECUTION IS OVER, THE RED WALLS, RECEDE, THE UNIVERSE
SATISFIED. (59)
But if Lewis is going to represent himself/the satirist as an
executioner - in order to give legitimacy or licence to the impulse
to kill in art - he must, surely, at a level beyond this seem to
countenance capital punishment itself? (Did he not, then the animus
of his satire would seem to be unreal, its threats playful, merely,
or fantastic.) Here, we must follow Lewis into deep waters. He
can allow no ethical or practical justification for capital punishment,
and he abhors its cruelty, yet he strives to justify it anyhow
(in The Art of Being Ruled):
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To attach, as the humanitarian does, a mystical value to
1 i fe itself, for its own sake, is as much a treachery to
spiritual truth as it is a gesture of 'humanity.1 We
execute a criminal for a variety of frivolous reasons,
and often kill the wrong one. The manner of the administration
of our law is thoughtless and brutual usually. But the theory
of capital punishment (if the 'punishment' of the too-just god
of the law could be abstracted from it) is as humane as possible.
A higher value than all he can allege in his favour - namely,
the fact that he is a 1ive - we consider is threatened by the
most violent and extreme criminal. It is his 'violence' that
we are seeking to eliminate by destroying him. It is the
principle of non-violence that he menaces by his existence :
which is a superhuman one.... The assassin or poisoner cannot
plead that he should live because he is a 1ive, when it is
1ife, and in addition the only thing that gives life a super¬
natural value, that he is attacking. (60)
What sense we can disentangle from this is that capital punishment
is symbolica11y justified - though for no other reason -, and,
indeed, that Lewis would be better satisfied with it as a concept
if it could be symbo1ica11y effected - without physical cruelty,
that is. That, of course, is precisely the option available to the
satirist, but meaningless vis-a-vis the actual question of putting
to death. Probably apprehending as much, Lewis moves hastily on
from the issue:
The intricate problem of capital punishment cannot be dealt
with, of course, here, in a few passing observations. For
my purpose, however, it is enough to say that the rhetoric
of death and of the law, devised as a 'punishment' and a
deterrent, is one thing, and the question of regarding the
loss of life itself (apart from the needless tortures of
trial and execution) as inhuman or not, is another. (6l)
One Way Song, with its reference to Archilochus and summoning
of magical powers of expression, intimates the will to destroy in
Lewis' satire - and Lewis wrote of the poem:
In its essence the purpose of satire - whether verse or prose -
is aggression. ... Satire has a great big glaring target. If
successful, it blasts a great big hole in the centre. Directness
there must be and singleness of aim: it is all aim, all trajectory.
(62)
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But the poem also presents a Lewisian persona in which can be
observed elements of the railer, that figure who, in the tradition
of satire, as Elliott showed, overlaps with living satirists, such
as Archilochus or Hipponax, on account of a common reputation for
raging utterance.
This persona is called the "Enemy". Like Thersites in Troilus
and Cressida (whom Ajax beats, and whose tongue he threatens to
cut out, for Thersites is bent on revealing the stupidity of the
Greek heroes (63)), the "Enemy" is ostracized, his books boycotted,
because the truths he expresses are inconvenient to those in high
places. It is not 'safe', either for himself, for the literary
world, or for the world of politics, for the "Enemy" to go about
inveighing as he does. Thersites is called, in the dramatis
personae, 'a deformed and scurrilous Grecian', and 1 scurri1ousness'
is, more than once, the charge laid against the "Enemy":
What is it that men fear beyond everything?
Obviously an open person. Bring
One of us 'truthful ones'too near, their nests
Would be unfeathered. Experience invests
Us with such terrors, us whose tongues are clean,
It is rarely in the high-places we are seen....
The man I am to blow the bloody gaff
If I were given platforms? The riff-raff
May be handed all the trumpets that you will.
Not so the golden-tongued. The window-sill
Is all the pulpit they can hope to get,
Of a slum-garret, sung by Mistinguette,
Too high up to be heard, too poor to attract
Anyone to their so-called 'scurrilous' tract....
If I am armed with bright invective, rare
That is I agree - but mine is a dangerous affair. . . .
... "the rage" c'est moi! (Enemy Interlude", Cantos xiii,
xiv, xxvi and xxvii)(64)
A stichomythic 'flyting' (a satiric bout) takes place between
the "Enemy" and 'Jack Horner1 (a 'second shade/Dwarfish and fat'),
who, in the manner of the Greek heroes with Thersites, attempts
to return the railer's fire, and threatens him physically (with
hanging) - the only way, evidently, that he can be silenced:
The"Enemy": 'Mine is a dangerous errand, do you hear?'
Jack Horner: 'Enough of these insults, you intolerable seer!'
'I shoot from the hip, but can you really wonder?1
'You scurrilous pastmaster in blood and thunder!'
'Mine is a grim affair - I'm not a thug.'
'How dare you raise this most unseemly fug! . . .
'You'll swing for this - your wife's a merry widow!
'Maybe. But still I'll have with you a bet.'
'That I'll be even with your rude tongue yet!'
'Why no, but that you must, being but half-real,
'One fine day overreach your crazy zeal!'
("Enemy Interlude", Canto xxviii) (65)
Like Thersites, however, the "Enemy" has always the last word. As
his antagonist exits, 'boiling and freezing with indignation', the
"Enemy" derides him with the obscenity typical of the railer:
He had a waggle of his hinder parts
As if shaken by the combustion of dud farts. ("Enemy Interlude",
Canto xxix) (66)
And a striking image suggests that in Lewis' imagination, railing,
as a category of satire, is magically potent. The "Enemy" is
possessed of a burning power of utterance, literally:
(The Enemy spits,and a small green flame darts up from the
gothic parquet. He looks at the spot where the flame has emerged,
and then spits again. A second flamelet gushes from the floor.)
(67)
Rather as Lewis represented Shakespeare as a hangman in order,
it was proposed, obliquely to account for the necessity of killing in
his (Lewis') art, so also he goes to Shakespeare (again, in The Lion
and the Fox) to vindicate his own compulsive concern with the figure
of the railer - or, that, in my view, is at least one motive behind
the brilliant but tendentious Shakespeare criticism contained in the
passages in question.
The gist of Lewis' argument is this. When Shakespeare's
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tragic heroes - Hamlet, Lear, Timon, for example - suffer their
reversal, they begin to rail against life as Thersites does, and in
such a way as to seem indistinguishable from the railer in tone,
expression and sentiment. In illustration of this, Lewis quotes
two pairs of passages, in the first of which, Thersites and Lear inveigh
against lechery, in the second, against pride and authority:
The personalities are not the same, but the voice beats
out its repulsion in the same way. Thersites is the black
sheep of the a 1tofronto type: but when any Shakespearian figure
is approaching his pathos he drops into the a 1tofronto type
of gibing. Lear's is bellowed and Thersites' spat. (68)
Because Shakespearean critics have been perplexed or embarrassed
that the fallen heroes begin to sound like railers (who are
despicable, according to the general view), they have used dementia
(brought on by peripeteia) as an excuse: 'Their "madness" is for
an Englishman the necessary excuse. Such wildness would have seemed
unnatural if it had not been labelled pathologic.' (69) But, asserts
Lewis, it is rather the case that the railing protagonists have
not gone mad, but have gone out of character - their spirits have
departed the play, as it were - to become the messengers of a
universal, disillusioned, satiric truth, a truth which Thersites
has always, congenita11y, uttered:
Thersites, as a horrible clown, is allowed to express
without embarrassment a great and neglected vein of
truth, the nihilistic truth of what we see, looking
with our ears or otherwise. It is as outcasts, as
men already in a sense out of life, and divested
of the functional machinery of their roles (which
would necessitate their being ob j ects only - things looked at
and not 1ooking), that speak objective1y— an objective,
and not a functional, truth. Lear, Hamlet, Timon, Thersites,
and so forth, are in the position of disincarnate spirits,
but still involved with and buffeted by life. Their "truth"
is an angry one usually, but they have the advantage of
having no "axe to grind." (70)
From these comments, we may infer an interest in exalting the
railer from his reputation for scurrility to a position of
satiric-philosophic priority in Shakespeare's intellectual scheme,
and in doing so, to make of the Shakespearean railer an agent of
the sort of satiric, objective truth that Lewis esteemed in Men
Without Art. (71) (To such a position, the fallen protagonists
do not, in a sense, attain - where Lewis is concerned - as will
transpire when we come to his comments on Apemantus and Timon,
towards the end of this section.) Such an inference is confirmed
when, later, Lewis represents Thersites as the i nte11ectua1 centre
Troilus and Cressida:
The reigning attribute of Thersites is intellectual
pride: and it is from the point of view of this
intellectual pride that he views his heroic associates,
scorning their simple satisfactions, and the naive view
of themselves that pushes them to their martial antics.
(72)
It might also be noted in passing, bearing as it does upon the
premises of this chapter, that Thersites tries magic (con¬
juration) as a means of fortifying his scorn (a power given to
the "Enemy", with his green flames, and se 1 f-identification with
Faust (73)) :
How now, Thersites! what^in the labyrinth of thy fury!
Shall the elephant Ajax carry it thus? He beats me, and
I rail at him... 'Sfoot I'll learn to conjure and raise
devils, but I'll see some issue of my spiteful execrations
... 0 thou great thunder-darter of Olympus, forget that
thou art Jove, the king of Gods, and, Mercury, lose all
the serpentine craft of thy caduceus, if ye take not
that littleness than little wit from them that they
have! (2/3) (7*0
The attention Lewis gives to the railer in Shakespeare
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is, as was suggested, above, not disinterested..
First, it provides, in my view, a way of rationalizing
the abusive or scurrilous propensities (the issue, possibly,
of an intuitive or atavistic sense in Lewis of the magic of
invective) of a great many characters close to Lewis, in his
writing, or Lewisian personae, for whom, the "Enemy" was a sort
of collective mask. Two of these, Tarr and Horace Zagreus, I
shall discuss in the next section. Typical is the minor persona,
William Bland Burn, of the "Imaginary Letters" of 1917, here outlinin
to his wife a satiric view of human nature:
nevertheless
(At this point I interject: "It is/\more comfortab 1 e for me,
in the long run, to be rude than to be polite. It is a
physical discomfort not to show, after a time, my feelings.")
(75)
Then, if we recall Elliott's argument that the historical
satirist (the actual satirist, such as Archilochus, that is)
is augmented in reputation, or becomes legendary, by identification
(in terms of wrathfu1ness) with the literary railer who comes before
him in time, we will discern that Lewis, by giving attention to the
Shakespearean railer, is, as a satirist, building his own reputation.
He is advertising the tradition in which he wishes to be accommodated
Part of such a process - legend depending upon unquantifiab1e
mixtures of fact and fiction - was the bizarre article (in a solid
enough daily newspaper) titled "What it Feels Like to be an Enemy",
in which the habits of the modern railer were revealed to the public.
He breakfasts on vodka, blood oranges, raw meat and root ginger,
fol1owing wh i ch, he abuses at random unknown people over the telephone
Then, donning the Stetson 'at the angle that intimidates,' he boards
a bus in search of other 'enemies,' over whom he pours 'Broadsides
of "vitriol" or of "invective" (you have of course provided yourself
with bandoliers full of both).' (76) Then, there was a letter to the
editor of the "Evening Standard", in which Lewis deplores the fact
that, on the personal level, 'Contemporary man1 has no outlets
for 'his instincts of competitive violence.' As a remedy, Lewis
suggests a reintroduction of the word "enemy":
If you find a person distasteful to you, be rude to him
whenever you meet him as a matter of course; do not refer
to him as "my friend So-and-So"; other people would then
be compelled to refer to you both as "the enemies So-and-SO".
(77)
Such examples of self-advertisement, despite their levity, project
an image (part illusory, of course) of the satirist which may well
be intended to soften up, intimidate or, even, cast a spell over the
reader who goes to the satires with such public articles in mind.
Sooner or later - Lewis, it is to be presumed, must have hoped
the legend would begin to be established. And,indeed, it appears to
be in a passage in Augustus John's autobiography, which provides
a most interesting application of Elliott's thesis that, 'The
historical man... is mythologized into a type whose lineaments
pre-exist and, as it were, await his coming.' (78) Remembering the
Lewis of over AO years before (his knowledge of Lewis' subsequent
activities quite possibly confirming the impression), John casts
him as Loki, the Norse railer descended in type from the Homeric
Thersites (as we saw), and a god of slander: 'In the conspiratorial
world of the Montparnasse, P. Wyndham Lewis played the part of an
incarnate Loki, bearing the news and sowing discord with it. He
conceived the world as an arena, where various insurrectionary
forces struggled to outwit each other in the game of artistic
power politics.... our new Machiavelli sought toginger up his friends
by a whisper here, a dark suggestion there.' (79)
The "Enemy" characterization takes us, by way of the periodical
entitled The Enemy, to Lewis qua Cynic. From the front cover of No. 3
The "Enemy" is the notorious author, painter and publicist,
Mr. Wyndham Lewis. He is the Diogenes of the day: he sits
laughing in the mouth of his tub and pours forth his
invective upon all passers-by, irrespective of race, creed,
rank or profession, and sex. This paper, which appears
occasionally, is the principal vehicle of his criticism.
Two years before (1927), Lewis offered a fuller comparison of
himself to the Cynics. In the preamble to Time and Western Man, in
order to i11uminate,and show a precedent for, the necessary narrow¬
ness, sharpness and illiberality of his own criticism, Lewis quotes
Caird on the Cynic philosophy. Therein, writes Caird, progress took
the apperance of reaction, since the Cynics fanatically represented
and insisted upon certain 'aspects of thought or life' which formerly
had been neglected, in order to force them into prominence. Such a
method depended upon an imbalance of view, that it might convey
with maximum force the truths in which it was interested:
Such individuals produce their effect by the very disgust
they create among the ordinary respectable members of the
community... Their criticism of the society to which they
belong, and of all its institutions and modes of actions
and thought, attracts attention by the very violence
and extravagance of the form in which they present it.
And the neglected truth, or half-truth, which they thrust
into exclusive prominence, gradually begins by their means
to gain a hold of the minds of others, forces them to
reconsider their cherished prejudices, and so leads to a
real advance of thought. In this fashion the Cynic seems
to have acted upon the ancient... world, as a disturbing,
irritating challenge to it to vindicate itself.... (80)
The tendentiousness of his own criticism is analogous to that
of the practice of the Cynic philosophers, Lewis suggests. Yet
what strikes one with great force in these passages is that, in
making the association, Lewis seems anxious simultaneously to
dissolve it, or, at least, to hedge it about with so many qualific¬
ations as to make himself remote from it. From such an identification,
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Lewis keeps telling us, he may suffer (but he made it in the first
pI ace!):
I should be sorry to give you the idea that I regard
myself as a sort of Ant i sthenes . . . Still, in giving Caird's
account of the virtues and vices attendant upon the Cynic
revolution, I shall be furnishing you with a hint (against
myself, as I say) that may serve to enlighten you as to my
intentions, unless you proceed to apply it too literally.
(81).
There follows the quotation from Caird, given above.
Lewis continues:
Now I have supplied you with an analogy against myself for
practical reasons, although it has no literal application, as
I remarked above. I am doing a very different thing from what
the Cynic was doing, and I am very differently placed. But
certainly I am issuing a 'challenge' to the community in which
I live. I am 'criticizing all its institutions and modes of
action andofthought. ' I 'create disggst', that I have proved,
'among the ordinary respectable members of the community,' that
is to say among the established orthodoxy of the cults of
'primitivist' so-called 'revolution': what I say is 'violently
resented,' and I very sincerely hope will 'awaken thought'...
(82)
There is some affinity between this and the satirist's traditional
apo1ogia: principally, of course, it is a philosophical justification
of method; but the protestation that he creates 'disgust' (and,
unwillingly, assumes the ethos of a rebarbative sect of old) in
the interests of the cause of intellectual eng1ightenment might
fairly be applied to his satiric practice also. Indeed, some of the
literary criticism in Time and Western Man - the analysis of
Gertrude Stein's prose, for example (83) - is very close to satire.
But why the hesitance - over the adopting of a neo-Cynic position
- which reaches a pitch of nervousness that is really uncommon in
Lewis? Evidently, the identification with the Cynics was compulsive,
since Lewis sensed that it is ill-advised, and, after these passages,
makes no more of it.
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For, followed through, the identification may well be seen to
redound to the disadvantage of its maker. Though Lewis does not
proceed to Caird1s comments against the Cynic school, he surely had
them in mind: 'But in the Cynic expression of these truths there is
often a crudity and violence which seems to show that they were not
appreciated in their highest meaning, that they were grasped as weapons
to throw at the enemy rather than as expressions of positive truth.
"Follow philosophy until you regard the generals of armies as leaders
of asses."... "The most noble of all things is... the power to
speak out freely what we think." Are these sentences (Caird cites
more than those given here) expressions of righteous horror at war,
of genuine temperance and self-control, of a regard for humanity which
reaches beyond patriotism, of a simple resolve to speak the truth at
all hazards? Or are they the utterance of a bitter wrath against the
pleasures and ambitions of others, of a vulgar hatred and jealousy
of superiority either in birth or culture, and of a desire for the
utmost license of intemperate speech?' (My italics) (84)
Thus, the negative aspect of Cynic philosophy consisted in its
tendency to reject everything but the self-regard, pride and conviction
in his own righteousness of the Cynic himself; and to subject every¬
thing the Cynic envied to a systematic reductionism that must, in
the end, make it seem base. Even, to put the worst construction upon
that school of philosophy, Cynic teaching gave morally unbalanced
men a justification for railing, for systematized vituperation. (While
we are occupied with this point, it is worth noting, with regard to
the content of the last chapter, that negative criticism of Cynic
philosophy is comparable to negative criticism of Gnosticism, in
respect of the contempt for life shared by these systems. Gnosticism
took some of its thought from the Cynics (85))
The moral criticism of Cynic philosophy can also, it would seem,
without much modification, be adapted as an argument against satire.
Accordingly, Lewis ran a double risk (both as philosopher-critic and
as satirist) - and seemed to perceive as much - in employing the
analogy between himself and the Cynics.
The argument runs thus. Ostensibly, the Cynic or the satirist
rails at, or attacks furiously, other men, in the service of a
higher truth than that currently popular, or to castigate, or to
reform (any of these motives may be professed). In truth, he does so
because he is compelled to vent or rehearse gratuitously his own
pathological bitterness, psychic discontent or the obsessions of
a nasty mind.
This, in essence, in an old argument, and one that exercised Lewi
more, I think, than is generally appreciated. His defence of Thersites
is one attempt to answer it. And his nervous attitude to the Cynics
shows him obliquely aware of it, as does a certain passage in Tarr
(as 1 shall show in the next section). Very simply put, the question
amounts to this: is the satirist a wicked man, and to be disregarded,
or a righteous man, and to be attended to? (86) Such moral ambiguities
are not easily resolved, and, hence, another reason for Lewis'
attempts to get a 'non-moral' definition of satire becomes evident.
Still, we are, as has been suggested in this section, in the
presence of attitudes which exerted a compulsion over Lewis (a
compulsion which might be accounted for in terms of a residual belief,
or faith, in the magic of invective), and which must, by some means,
be defended. And the difficulty intimated in Time and Western Man
is resolved by recourse, once again, to The Lion and the Fox, where
Lewis contrives to secure Shakespeare's stamp of approval for the
Cynic.
The play over which Lewis here revises critical tradition is
Timon of Athens:
It is usually said that Apemantus is introduced by Shakespeare,
with his invariable resourcefulness and tact, to contrast Timon
with this cynic philosopher, to the disadvantage of the latter,
and to enable us to see how superior Timon was to such people,
and to relieve our minds on a point on which they might have
been uneasy. For otherwise we might have said to ourselves that
after all Timon is only a cynic philosopherl - and "cynic" is an
unpopular word. (87).
Lewis, however, takes the view, 'contrary to what it is usual to
affirm,1 that Apemantus 'has the best of the argument.' (88) It is
not at all the case, asserts Lewis, that the low, churlish cynicism
of Apemantus shows up, in magnificent relief, the passionate and
demented cursing of Timon. Rather, Apemantus reveals, by his presence,
the puppet-like quality of Timon, and of the other fallen protagonists
who curse and storm. Such characters (Timon, Lear, Hamlet) develop
their railing, disillusioned, misanthropic eloquence as a matter of
formality - it is a mechanical necessity of the drama. They are, or
become, phi1osophers, but of a perfunctory sort, while Apemantus
(or Thersites) is, because Shakespeare created him the way he is -
as a teller of bitter truths, independent of the machinery of the
tragedy - closer to Shakespeare's heart (89)
Lewis' conclusion is that, because Shakespeare made characters
such as Thersites or Apemantus the sources of the highest truth (for
Lewis, a satiric truth) - a truth which the heroes come to deliver
by accident, and not by nature - , there was a good deal of the railer
or Cynic in Shakespeare himself: the accents of the 'scurrilous'
Greek and the 'churlish' philosopher were those for which Shakespeare
had the greatest predilection:
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... it is easy for such a poet as Shakespeare to manoeuvre with
great freedom...to be both Apemantus and Timon. His attitude to
his characters was that of the actor: it is evident which
characters he enjoyed most playing: and as he was in a sense
playing to himself it is possible also to know which sort of
character he most professed to be - or was. Although wonderfully
supple and detached, there is a voice that is Shakespeare's and
there is a character that is his. His greatest heroes gibe like
Thersites (the a 1tofronto type), and his most embittered chorus-
work is grandly direct and stings like truth. It is the overdoing
of the impersona1 mirror notion, as we started by saying, that
has obscured this fact. (90).
Quite plainly, this is tendentious: at risk of repetition, let it
be stated once more that, in The Lion and the Fox, Lewis used
Shakespeare to authorize - or to make respectable - Lewis' own
interests, whether these relate to the hanging theme, to railing
or to the Cynic attitude. Whether it is wrong, whether, that is to
say, Lewis is foisting in Shakespeare certain casts of his own mind,
need hardly concern us. If, however, Shakespeare 'enjoyed' creating
the railing type, and furnishing him with a capacity to tell
uncomfortable truths, he also - it should be stated against Lewis -
harboured doubts about such characters. Such doubts echo the classic
argument against satire, sketched above, and are dramatized in As
You Like It (2/7 and 3/2), when Jaques, who wants 'leave/ To speak
my mind, and I will through and through/ Cleanse the foul body of
the infected world', and wants to 'rail against our mistress the
world', is severely rebuked by the Duke and by Orlando. (91) This,
however, is of the nature of a digression, and the reader interested
in this debate should look up those passages.
In the next section, 1 will examine Lewis' fiction in the light
of issues raised in this and preceding sections, with further
reference, where necessary, to Elliott's The Power of Satire.
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(iv)
Throughout the early stages of Tarr, the spirit that animates
Tarr himself is that of Thersites; but the characters at whom he is
going to rail are in no sense epical - this is intimated by Ta r r' s
abstruse first paragraph. The Thebaid (to which Lewis seems to be
alluding) is a Latin epic poem, based on Aeschylus' dramatic account
of the mission of the Seven Champions against Thebes:
PARIS hints of sacrifice. But here we deal with that large
dusty facet known to indulgent and congruous kind...It is
not across its ThebaYde that the unscrupulous heroes chase
each other's shadows: they are largely ignorant of all but
their restless personal lives. (92).
Rather, the camp through which Tarr moves, spitting his contempt,
is the art-world of Bohemian Paris.
He opens with a curse (against Hobson), sotto voce:
("I wish you'd go to hell from time to time instead of
Cambridge, as it always is, you grimlciog!" Tarr wished
behind the ve i 1.) (93)
What Hobson represents is an army of individuals who, affecting not
to be so, are in fact as regimented in their ethos as - to continue
my opening comparison of Tarr and Thersites - the Greek warriors:
"What is your position? (Tarr demands) you have bought have
you not for eight hundred pounds at an aristocractic educational
establishment a complete mental outfit, a programme of manners:
for four years you trained with other recruits: you are now a
perfectly disciplined social unit, with a profound esprit de
corps. The Cambridge set that you represent is, as observed in
an average specimen, a hybrid of the Quaker, the homosexual and
the Chelsea artist." (9*0
Hobson is determinedly anti-heroic. Although 'very athletic', he
'slouched and ambled along, neglecting his muscles.1 This arouses
Tarr's 'elaborate contempt' as much as the muscular stupidity of
the Greeks did that of Thersites. (95) Physically languid and
chronically inactive - like the indolent Greeks of Troi1 us and
Cressida, who won't leave their tents to fight - Hobson and his
kind (Lowndes is another (96)) loiter daylong in cafes, bars and
studios, being artists, painting nothing. Tarr:
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"You are not an individual: you have, I repeat, no right
to that hair and to that hat: you are trying to have the
apple and eat it too. You should be in uniform and at work,
not uniformly out of uniform and libelling the Artist by your
idleness. Are you idle?" (97)
Tarr, however, is no mere modern man in a fury. His anger, indeed,
his whole social being, is somehow, 'behind the vei1', archaic or
primitive:
...for Tarr had a gauche puritanical ritual of self, the
result of solitary habits. Certain observances were demanded
of those approaching him, and were quite gratuitously observed
in return. The fetish within - soul-dweller that is strikingly
like a wood-dweller, and who was not often enough disturbed to
have had the sylvan shyness mitigated - would still cling to
these forms. Sometimes Tarr's crafty daimon, aghast at its
nakedness, would manage to borrow or purloin some shape of
covering from elegantly draped visitor (98)
A 'fetish' is an 'object believed to procure for its owner the
services of a spirit lodged within it.' 'Wood-dweller' and 'sylvan
shyness' may remind us of Timon, and/or of the 'satyr' the shaggy,
half-human attendant of Pan, wherefrom came a false, but long
enduring etymology of the word 'satire1, which led to the belief that
satire ought to be rough (like the beast) in composition (99); or those
phrases may call to mind Faunus (from whom, fauni (fauns)), the Roman
pastoral god (identified with Pan) 'who revealed the future by dreams
or supernatural voices in sacred groves' and made 'spectral appearances
and terrifying sounds...in wooded places.' (100) 'Daimon' is divine
power, not attributable to a particular god, or it is personal fate;
or, 'an individual's character is his daimon' (Herac1eitus) (101); or, finally,
it is a being half-way between god and man (Plato). From this very difficult
image, we may perhaps extract (while hardly doing justice to the poetry
of expression) the idea that Tarr's character ('daimon' used in that sense -
evidently a famous one) is of a wild, satyric/satiric cast that, like a
fetish, can be used (as if by magic) to provide him with a protective
spirit of invective against those who intrude upon his solitariness, as
Hobson has.
199.
Certainly, Tarr is different from other men, his powers of
expression uncommon. Even, he is an awesome local spectacle when he
starts railing. People are actually attracted to him to hear themselves
abused (as they are to Thersites):
As Tarr's temperament spread its wings, whirling him with
menace and mockery above Hobson's head, the cantab philosopher
did not consider it necessary to reply. He was not winged
himself. Tarr looped the loop and he looked on. A droll bird!
He wondered, as he watched him, if he was a sound bird. People
believed in him: his exhibition flights attracted attention. (102)
He is also, like Thersites, a nuisance to those around him. The 'veil'
having dropped, he is an uncivilized, vituperative pest, whose truth
Hobson cannot escape. It is a comic picture:
"No I am responsible for you. - I am one of the only people who
see: that is a responsibility." Tarr walked down the boulevard
with him, speaking in his ear almost and treading on his toes (103)
Following this, Tarr threatens to throttle Hobson, an image which
foreshadows the fatal action and death by hanging of Part VI,
"Holocausts", then symbolically decapitates him. There is also
something of the motives of the Cynic in this: extreme methods are resorted
to, to bring Hobson to Tarr's way of thinking, to make him see, to elicit
some reaction from this sheep:
"I would seize you by the throat at once if I thought you would
black my eye. But I feel it my duty at least to do this for your
hat".... Tarr knocked his hat off into the road, and stepping after
it propelled it some yards farther with a running kick. (T04)
Not only as a model for Tarr's intellectual scorn, but also for
his voice (when railing), Lewis may have had Thersites in mind.
Patroculus' vain command, 'No more words, Thersites; peace!' (105),
describes quite as well the modus loguendi of the Lewisian railer
as it does that of the Shakespearean. The compositional principle in
either case is that of prolificacy or copiousness which, phrases feeding
off their antecedents, endlessly regenerates the venom of the orig i ninat i ng
observation. Variations on a theme are tirelessly sought, not so much for
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precision's sake - to discover the basest possibility but to enfilade
the target/victim/object of hate. The sheer quantity of words is as much
part of the attack as the disgust or contempt behind it. Whence all these
words? - Tarr is like a man possessed. One is reminded of the BLAST curses,
and of the conjuring voice of One Way Song - 'Break out word-storms!':
"Sex is a monstrosity. Sex is a monstrosity.•• But consider all
the col 1 ages marriages and affairs that you know, in which some
frowsy or foolish or some doll-like or log-like bitch accompanies
everywhere the form of an otherwise sensible man; a dumbfounding
disgusting and septic ghost! Oh sex! oh Montreal! How foul and
wrong this haunting of women is! - they are everywhere - confusing,
blurring, libelling, with their half-baked gushing tawdry presences!
(106)
Epithets, nouns and participles triple or even quadruple, less to
'suggest' or 'convey' an inexhaustible animus behind the invective than
because of it (the same applies to the rude punctuation - omitted commas,
spat exclamation marks). Briefly, we are out of the world of mimetic
fiction. This j_s railing, not a representation of it. Tarr has gone over
momentarily to a primitive form of utterance, by which he would drive the
evil of femininity away; in doing so, he becomes Lewis' oracle, as, Lewis
thought, Thersites and Apemantus were Shakespeare's. Together come to mind
Lewis' statement (in Time and Western Man) about the import attached to the
utterance of the antique poet or philosopher (thought to be magically
inspired) and Hobson's reflection that 'people believed in' Tarr.
Formally, the passage quoted does not suffer from comparison with
any of Thersites' great railing sequences(Troi1 us and Cressida(5/1 and
5/2), for example), and in subject may well remind us of:
Nothing but lechery; all incontinent varlets!... Patroclus will
give me anything for the intelligence of this whore: the parrot
will not do more for an almond than he for a commodious drab.
Lechery, lechery! still wars and lechery! nothing else holds
fashion. A burning devil take them! (107).
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It is also worth noting here, in passing, that narrative, just as
much as monologue, in Lewis is apt to develop the railing voice.
This is a favoured satiric method in The Apes of God; and the
following example, from that novel, is instructive and amusing,
since it shows Lewis' using the technique that Thersites employs
against Agamemnon and Menelaus, in which the subject is put through
a series of ridiculous transformations (with Menelaus, it is animals
(108)):
In this bath of unpleasant light Ratner lay blinking, rattish and
cross... This highbrow-sub-sheik of the slum had been the triste-est
Tristan... - the shoddiest Don Giovanni - the most ludicrous Young
Lochinvar - the most squalid Sorel, he had been the most unprepossess-
i ng^flatnerskol n i kof f . . . - he had been the Judas without the kiss... - he
was the Childe Harold without the Byron collar... - the Childe Roland
without the Dark Tower.... (109)
And so on.
When, however, a threat is presented _to Tarr - when Kreisler takes
a dog-whip to him - he retreats, 'with a feeling of primitive dissatisfaction':
There was something mean and improper in everything he had done,
which he could not define. Undoubtedly he had insulted this man by
his attitude, his manner often had been mocking; but when the other
had turned, whip in hand, he had - walked away? What really should
he have done? He should, no doubt... have humorously struggled with
him...But at that point his humour had stopped. Then his humour
had limitations? (110)
This and the two quoted below are the critical passages of the novel,
insofar as satire is concerned. Having gone to considerable length
to suggest uncommon powers in Tarr, Lewis seems suddenly to turn
against him, having him run away from a bully. And Tarr cannot
rationalize his way out of this. Persistently, for his own enjoyment,
he has treated Kreisler in a satiric spirit; but:
Once and for all no one had a right to treat a man as he had
Kreisler and yet claim, when turned upon, immunity from action
on the score of the other's imbecility. In allowing the physical
struggle any importance he allowed Kreisler an importance, too:
this made his former treatment of him unjustified. (111).
Kreisler, refusing to recognize Tarr's licence (observed by
Hobson and others), has broken the satirist's magic circle - that
is one way of interpreting these proceedings. Or, though Tarr is
fitted out with what seemed archaic powers of expression, they are
obsolete in this time (neither rea11y apotropaic, nor malefic). (The
magic power of satire disappears, as Elliott stated, lingers on with
vitality as an i dea, but not as a fact). Those people Tarr attracts
to his 'exhibition flights', it now seems, who 'believe in him',
are very impressed aesthetically by what they see as performances
- appreciation replacing the primitive's awe at the utterances of
his poet or philosopher. As far as injuring his enemies is concerned,
Tarr has been barking in a void - Hobson didn't look like being
shamed to death. Against an unrestrainedly primitive being like
Kreisler (Tarr's primitive impulses being, paradoxically, contained
by his painting and railing), Tarr is impotent. As, perhaps, the
satirist always is against the truly violent or the truly stupid.
(Thersites, too, has to flee in the end, when challenged to fight
- Troilus and Cressida (5/7)- Then there is the belief (described
by Elliott) that satire unjustly applied redounds to the embarrassment,
or worse, of its agent. That takes us beyond the present mixture of
considerations to the moral question.
What right had Tarr to go on treating Kreisler like that? In this
sense, these passages are, for Lewis, se1f-critica1, or, at least,
self-questioning. Tarr, the bubble of his humour having been burst,
cogitates over that which seemed to be worrying Lewis in the opening
pages of Time and Western Man:
His contempt for everybody else in the end must degrade him: for
if nothing in other men was worth honouring, finally his own
self-neglect must result, like the Cynic's dishonourable condition.
(my italics)... he - unlike Quixote - instead of having conceived
the world as more chivalrous and marvellous than it was, had
conceived it as emptied of all dignity, sense and generosity...
The curse of humour was in him, anchoring him at one end of the
see-saw whose movement and contradiction was life. (112)
For an instant, the satirist's attitude is seen to be, at root,
intolerable. But not acting upon this insight was to sustain Lewis'
thought and fiction for a long time to come.
Now, however, a way is found to circumvent Tarr's impotence in
the face of Kreisler's real threat, while keeping within the tradition
of satire's magical efficacy. Paradoxically, Kreisler's very
primitiveness (he is a mighty and indiscrimate progenitor, sexually
violent, a brawler and a homicide to-be (113)), the source of Tarr's
discomfiture, provides the means of his satirical despatch.
To illuminate my thinking here, I will again quote Robert Elliott
here on the mortal power of ridicule in primitive shame cultures. He
has been discussing the Ashanti culture of West Africa, where 'suicide,
was justified... to avoid the ridicule of one's companions. . . .
In the enormously complex relation of primitive man to his society,
ridicule functions primarily as a social weapon, as an omnipresent
threat against violation of social order and custom. Its power is
frightful, for it can sever the delicate life Iines which bind man
to the social body, outside of which he can conceive of no life for
himself. Under the rejection of ridicule he dies; and whi1e his death
may be by his own hand, the mechanism is actually one of public
execution. (my italics) Thus it seems likely to me that the magic
attributed to various archaic satirists may inhere in part in the
power of ridicule to effect psychic damage. Ancient Greeks were not
Ashanti; but we recall the tone of Archilochus' verses against Lycambes
.... The threat is essentially this: I will laugh at you, and because
I laugh, society will laugh. To be a laughing stock in Ancient
Greece was presumably intolerable; Lycambes, says the story, hanged
himse1f. ' (1 1 4)
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Clearly, in one such sense, it is ridicule that leads to Kreisler's
suicide by hanging. At the party at the Bonnington Club, he is transformed
into those be i ngsear1 i er associated with Tarr - a 'satyr', an 'uncouth faun',
a cynic, a railing Hamlet, a 'rough figure of comic mystery', (115) ~
archetypal e1ements,evident1y, in Lewis' conception of fictional character. But
whereas with Tarr - to return to that difficult image - these were internalized
spirits or fetishes, guardians of Tarr's solitariness and aroused only
when approached, Kreisler (whose 'veil' is perpetually down, as it were,
who knows no control) they possess in a frenzied and antic actuality.
Pursuing flappers in and out of the conservatory, he is an unaccustomed
physical danger to the 'bourgeois-bohemians'; and the request that
he leave (116) (in primitive terms, a tribal banishment) is, for
Kreisler, a hardly necessary formalization of the ridicule he has
a 1 ready i ncurred.
For when Soltyk and Anastasya (ardently sought after by Kreisler)
'look at him with embarrassment', Kreisler's shame is terrible in
its corrosiveness, and, for him, 1 think, ultimately lethal:
Inactive, he was ridiculous: he had not reckoned on being watched.
This was a fiasco: here he was posing nude for Anastasya and the
Russian... The sensation of standing neck-deep in horrid filth
beset him... He allowed her laughter to accumulate on his back,
like a coat of mud. In his illogical vision he felt her there
behind him laughing and laughing interminably. Soltyk was sharing
it of course. More and more his laughter became intolerable: the
traditional solution again presented itself. Laugh! Laughl He
would stand there letting the debt grow, they might gorge
themselves upon his back. (117)
That the ridicule is imaginary is not the point - Anastasya and
Soltyk having left while he had his back to them - or rather, it
is the point. For Kreisler knows that his behaviour, not just here,
but chronically, is shameworthy. Now, intensified by emotional confusion,
his shame reaches a peak. Eventually, he challenges Soltyk to duel, kills
him by accident, and hangs himself from the bars of his prison cell -
shame inducing him, finally, to resign to a fate which is also imaginary;
for he could, evidently, have fled France and evaded capture, but hangs
around on the borders for five days, physically and emotionally dead already:
... in the course of his spiritless and brooding tramp he
questioned if it were not he that had died, and not Soltyk at
all, and if it were not a ghost who was not wandering off nowhere
in part i cu 1 ar . (1 1 8)
Kreisler's death is not merely an endogenous necessity - in the
sense that he is affected by an atavistic notion that, because of his
disgraceful behaviour before Anastasya and Soltyk, he deserves to die
(a form of execution, wrote Elliott, resulting from the satiric power
of ridicule). Lewis' Archilochian impulse to kill his characters is
given a penal justification also: Kreisler must die in revenge for
the killing of Soltyk (a manslaughter which is, in essence, a
pre-meditated murder, since he has brooded upon the victim for so long).
He constitutes that threat to the principle of 'non-violence' which, Lewi
wrote in The Art of Being Ruled, merits capital punishment - and Kreisler
is the only form of suicide that mimics capital punishment.
Curiously, however, - the urge to do away with Kreisler becoming
acute - the justification is established in advance of its cause.
For Soltyk himself is commissioned to do the job (though pulled off
Kreisler when near completion). In this capacity, Soltyk is provided
with something like a preternatural power (induced by drugs - he is
normally timid), and the image is of death by hanging:
(Soltyk's) hands were electrified: will was at last dashed all
over him, an arctic douche and the hands become claws flew at
Kreisler's throat. His nails made six holes in the flesh and
cut into the tendons beneath... (Kreisler) collapsed upon his
back and the convulsive arms came with him. The strangling
sensation at his neck intensified. (119).
This may remind us of Tarr's threat to Hobson; Kreisler recalls it
as he strangles slowly in his cell:
A sort of heavy confusion burst up as he withdrew the restraint.
It reminded him of Soltyk's hands upon his throat. The same
throttling feeling returned: the blood bulged in his head: he
felt dizzy - it was the Soltyk struggle over again. (120)
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By this point - the reasons for the necessity of Kreisler's despatch
having been made clear - the satirist-hangman can devote himself to
the minutiae of death, describing Kreisler's preparations:
(Kreisler) tore several strips off his shirt and made a short
cord of them...He measured the drop from the bar of the ventilator
with puckered forehead calculating the necessary length of cord....
(121)
'The drop' is not just the distance between the bars of Kreisler's cell
and the floor. It is also hangman's jargon, denoting the length of rope
required to execute a criminal cleanly - by dislocation - (it is cal¬
culated by dividing a set figure in foot/pounds by the weight of the
criminal). The phrase percolated dreadfully and fascinatingly into the
lay mind, Lewis' included, it would seem (122).
Finally, certain passages in the novel imply that a second atavism
is leading Kreisler inexorably to the hangman (Lewis). We will recall,
from The Lion and the Fox, Lewis' characterization of Shakespeare as
a public hangman, presiding over the deaths of heroes which were, obscurely,
a magical requirement, the heroes themselves being, at some level, connected
with scapegoats of the type described by Frazer, mock-kings or mock-gods
who reigned for a short period, then were put to death to ensure fertility.
Withthis in mind, Kreisler's almost supernatural fertility, a marvel to
his associates, becomes particularly significant:
The picture of Otto as universal papa was the last straw, this
misdirected and disordered animal capacity made him into a vast
Magog of Carnival, an antediluvuan puppet of fecundity for his
compatriots. When he appeared that night everybody turned towards
his historic figure with cries of welcome... a small society had
been founded in Bavaria to care for Kreisler's offspring throughout
Germany. (123)
As does Lewis' comment in Rude Assignment that Kreisler, not Tarr,
was the protagonistof the novel, that Kreisler, in fact, was the
'condemned man hero'. (124) For Kreisler, like the mock-god of the
Roman Saturnalia, knows that his 'reign' is to be a brief one, and
subject to a cruel determinism. In a letter to his father, he writes that,
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in exactly a month, he will kill himself (if the paternal coffers
remain sealed). (125) The time he gives himself contains, I would suggest,
a rather decisive allusion. For Frazer writes of the term of the human
scapegoat of the Saturnalia: '...he went about in public with full license
to indulge his passions and to taste of every pleasure, however base and
shameful. But if his reign was merry, it was short and ended tragically;
for when the thirty days were up and the festival of Saturn had come, he cut his
own throat on the altar to the god whom he personated.' (126) Frazer also
points out that during the Saturnalia, there was a general licence for the
low to revile and rail against the high, slave against master. (127) With
these considerations in mind, is this why, in the novel's curious first
sentence, 'Paris hints of sacrifice,' the condemned hero, Kreisler,
proceeding to death, through the clatter of Tarr's railing?
Before proceeding to instances in Lewis' fiction where the magic-
satire relation is more self-consciously or more explicitly presented
than in Tarr, it will be necessary, in the light of the death of
Kreisler, to make a few comments upon the demise of Vincent Penhale,
in The Vulgar Steak.
Again, the fatal mechanism employed against Penhale depends upon
shame and ridicule (making of his suicide, in Elliott's terms, an
execution). His origins, imposture and shady activities having been
made pub 1ic ,
POOR BOY PASSES HIMSELF OFF AS BARONET...
"1 am pukka working-class. I was born, as they say, in the
gutter. I had intended to tell you. But not 1ike this." (128)
he is induced to hang himself:
There, hanging from the disued gas-suspension., .was Mr. Penhale,
his tongue protruding, and his face black. (129)
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His death, in fact, casts a double reflection of that of Kreisler.
The hanging of Kreisler, it was suggested, was socially justified
(as well as psychically a necessity) on account of his violence -
and Lewis later compared the career of Kreisler with those of Hitler
and Goebbels. (130) A similar justification, in the case of Penhale,
is advanced by Penhale himself:
"My main trouble," he told Martin with finality, "is that I am
all made up of action.... The arch-type of that sort of man who
is all act ion," Vincent continued,"is to be found in Berlin -
or that bloody little Jack-in-the-box up in his balcony, at the
Palazzo Venezia Ourepoch finds its highest express ionsin those
dynamical puppets - with little names full ofastupid percussion,
1 ike Hitler." (131)
This, really, however, is of the nature of an excuse for killing
Penhale, rather than a justification, since he has nowhere been
presented as violent, nor with the cold, satiric scrutiny that was
used in the portrayal of Kreisler. Throughout the novel, moreover,
Lewis seems to have been on the side of this man who defied the class-
system (which Lewis himself deplored (132)), making his shame an
equally transparent pretext for his death. Such considerations demonstrate
that the Archilochian impulse in Lewis could scarely be moderated - a sympathetic
protagonist, an essentially non-satiric novel, but the outcome inevitable.
In the Wild Body story "A Soldier of Humour" (a periphrasis for
'satirist'), a combat in words (or, to be more precise, tongues) is
described between two men, Ker-Orr, the soldier of the title and a
Lewisian figure, and a Frenchman, de Valmore. As the tale progresses,
the enmity of the two men acquires an intensity which can only be accounted
for by reference to the archaic conception of satire as an instrument of
death; their words and insults are weapons; and the power of ridicule and
the effects of shame are demonstrated no less impressively than they were
with Kreisler, though they issue only in psychic, and not physical,
destruction.
The feud is occasioned by two slights, trivial but of precisely
that order of insignificance that, in the neo-primitive atmosphere
of these stories, is apt to give rise to chronic, unappeasable and
irrational irritation.
Travelling through Spain with the purpose of learning Castilian,
Ker-Orr encounters, at a pension, de Valmore. The latter affects the
accent and mannerisms of an American with such conviction as to
have undergone (in his own mind) a racial transformation. His (New
York) English is, in fact, barbarous (133), but he derives a peculiar
power from exercising a Yankee brogue:
... the powerful consciousness of the authentic nature of
his accent made him still more insolently heedless of the
faults of his speech, it seemed, and rendered him immune
from all care as to the correctness ofMTiere english. (13^)
When, over dinner, he discovers that Ker-Orr is English (and not
American, as he had supposed) de Valmore assumes an equally peculiar
racial ascendancy over him. The first weapon is hurled:
"England! ha! England! England!" he repeated, as though
hypnotized by this word; as though pressing me harder
and harder, and finally 'chawing me up1 with the mere
utterance of it. (135)
Ker-Orr's riposte is merely to remind de Valmore of what he actually
i s :
"Why mon vieux!" I said suddenly, getting up, "how about the
South of France, for that matter - the south of France! the
South of France! The bloody Midi, your home-land, you poor
bum!" I gnashed my teeth as I said this. (136)
The particular power of this not very fierce piece of invective (its
triple insult mimicking that cast by de Valmore) resides in Ker-Orr's
use of the Americanism, 'bum'. Ker-Orr puts a 'spell' on de Valmore,
by assuming his cherished and illusory idiom:
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... the word 'bum' lay like a load of dough upon his spirit. My
last word had been american... his face passed through a few degrees
of the compass in an attempt to reach me in spite of the spell I had
laid upon him. (137)
The efficacy of Ker-Orr's word-magic is startling, de Valmore seemingly
becoming trapped between two selves (the affected and the real).
'Continuity, in the individual as in the race, is the diagnostic of a
civilized condition. If you can break this personal continuity in an
individual, you can break him,' wrote Lewis elsewhere. (138) In de Valmore,
incoherence ensues:
Sounds came from him, words too - hybrrd syllables lost on the
borderland between french and english, which appeared to signify
protest, pure astonishment,a 1 armed question. (139)
This flyting having passed off to Ker-Orr's satisfaction, he leaves
for another town, assuming the 'dream' of the encounter to be concluded.
The 'dream', however, is to become a 'nightmare' (140), two nouns which
convey very well the uncanny atmosphere of the story, its ominous triviality,
the appearances and accidents which are of the nature of supernatural
opportunities.
Having arrived in Leon, Ker-Orr begins making acquaintance with the
natives, in order to further his education in Castilian. After a few days,
however, having regrouped, de Valmore, to Ker-Orr's horror, appears,
newly malefic and formidable:
On the fifth evening, I entered the Cafe' as usual, making towards
my most useful and intelligent group. But then, with a sinking
of the heart, I saw the rectangular form of my ubiquitous enemy,
quartered with an air of demoniac permanence in their midst. (1^1)
What de Valmore now inflicts upon Ker-Orr is banishment - in primitive
terms, tantamount to death. The latter is expelled from the community
he has lately joined, which, prior to the arrival of de Valmore, had
been full of good will to him. The shame that has been cast upon Ker-Orr
is of preternatural virulence:
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The gradual cooling down of the whole room towards me, the dis¬
affection that swept over the chain of little drinking groups from
that centre of mystical hostility... all this, with great vexation,
1 recognized from the moment of the intrusion of his presence... I
expect that i t was a meaningless blast of disapprobation that he blew
upon me, an eerie and stinging wind of convincing hatred. (142)
Ostracized, Kerr-Orr determines to leave Leon and, much discouraged, to
try Coruna. Now, however, three American acquaintances of his - Blauenfeld,
Taffany and Morton - turn up in town. (143) This isn't quite the deus ex machina
it at first seems, being as much of a piece with the dream-logic of the tale as
the mysterious appearances of de Valmore (who, before the incident in the cafe,
was the object of another sighting by Ker-Orr, descending a flight of stairs,
the latter developing the sensation of having to deal with a 'phantom' or
'ghost' (144). To Ker-Orr, their arrival is a visitation, a 'miracle.' (145)
Now, Ker-Orr has secured the means of victory over de Valmore. This is
simply a matter of getting the three Americans to befriend the Frenchman, who
takes to these members of his adopted race with enthusiasm. Then, his defences
having been lowered, the Americans (feigning ignorance of their association)
introduce to de Valmore Ker-Orr as a friend of theirs - it being revealed
that his enemy is friends with the genuine article, as it were, de Valmore
is confounded.
Petty as this operation seems in the description, the psychic shock
administered to de Valmore by the ridicule of his ethnological illusion would
seem to be fata11y violent: the picture of death by e1ect rocution actually
occurs to one from the following:
My enemy pulled himself together as though the different parts
of his body all wanted to leap away in different directions, and
he found it all he could do to prevent such disintegration. An
attempt at a bow appeared as a chaotic movement, the various parts
of his body could not come together for it. It had met other
movements on the way, and never became a bow at all. An extraordinary
confusion beset his body. The beginning for a score of actions ran over
it blindly and disappeared. (146).
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Impaled on his own spear, as it were, it is now de Valmore's turn to be
expelled (or exorcized):
During the next two days I on several occasions visited the
battlefield, but Monsieur de Valmore had vanished. (147)•
Expulsion also features in Part IX of The Apes of God, "Chez Lionel
Ke i n Esq". Here, too, the outcome of the attempt to banish is that the agent
of the original expulsion falls victim (here, obscurely) to a higher power.
As might be expected from the attention given to his uncommon abilities
in the last chapter, Horace Zagreus is again at the centre of the stir. Here,
to the list of divine associations noted previously with regard to Zagreus,
might be added the Norse god Loki, feared for his propensity to cause discord
and contention (curiously, Zagreus is referred to as a 'viking' in this section,
his eye described as ' ba 11 i c-b 1 ue ' (1 48)). Elliott refers to the Lokasenna , a
poem of the tenth century, which tells how Loki (to whom John compared Lewis)
is ejected from a feast for his insulting behaviour - though this railing god
has always the last word. (149) We might also usefully call to mind - though
he makes the statement later in the novel - Zagreus' reference to the
'pha11ophoroi' and the 'Dionysia' (noted in section (ii) of the present chapter),
where, as we know, invective was directed at meanness.
Meanness, in fact, is a fault which Zagreus imputes to Kein at the
beginning of this episode, in a scene which gives some intimation of the
public slander of his hosts that is to follow.. '... the magical satires are
often occasioned by, and treat of, the same vices and follies which preoccupy
Horace and Wyndham Lewis, Rabelais and Pope: stinginess, i nhosp i ta 1 i ty, pride...',
writesE11iott. (150) Kein's fireplace is backed by an iron plate which, by
reflection, gives the appearance of a large blaze:
"You see, mean old devil! By reducing the rate of combustion he
reckons to save himself three bob a day - yet at a moment's notice
he can appear to have a cheerful and expensive fire." (151)-
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Then, over luncheon, Zagreus (in response to a steady commentary
against him from Isobel Kein at the head of the table: he is justified
to that extent) begins to talk loudly about the assembled party, even
endeavouring to turn Ke i n1 s protege", Keith, and other guests against
him.(152) The embarrassing cross-fire of chat reaches a fine climax
when Zagreus pays noisy flattery to his hostess vis-a-vis her plastic
surgery and the way she carries her embonpoint:
"It is on the same principle that persons wash their faceswith care
that she gets hers surgically refitted, it is hygiene
rather than vanity. Good-sense everywhere corrects and as it
were makes all right what in a less intelligent person wou1d
be repulsive and comic." (153)
Such colossally ironic commendations are the last straw:
"That's enough Zagreus! Take your latest boy somewhere else
if you wish to slander people!" Isabel exploded, her breast
heavfnj. (1 5^)
To this, Zagreus responds with a piece of cod anthropology:
"It has always been among the habits of the ingaevonic and
in a less degree of the celtic tribes, when at lunch, for
the hostess to discuss all her guests in a loud voice, with
some person selected for that purpose. But a 1 so and from
time immemorial it has been the inalienable right of every
tribesman (if he so wished) to discuss - with anyone he
might select for that purpose - his hostess or any guest or
guests he might choose - or indeed all together, one after
the other. I have merely availed myself of our ancient
british custom - obsolete, it is true, but recognized wher¬
ever men of our race foregather - as a precious and jealously-
guarded privilege..." (155)
In one sense, this reads like a clever parody of Frazer, and, indeed,
the sort of custom it describes is, as Elliott shows (156), observed
trans-cu1tura11y among primitive peoples. Yet since, beneath the
mimicking of anthropological conventions, there is a core of distant
truth, relating to the sacredness of the rite for low to abuse high,
the 'tribesman' his 'hostess', and since, also, strange powers have
been ascribed to Zagreus (to make people disappear, for example -
powers which are carefully kept at the level of report (157)), who,
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in name, is explicitly identified with the remote past, there is the
suggestion of an idea that the Keins are really in transgression. To
see this, it is, perhaps, necessary to hold in the mind simultaneously
the possibilities that Zagreus' diction is facetious and that it is
adjuratory - 'inalienable', 'discuss' (a choice euphemism!), 'availed',
'foregather', 'privilege, 'immemorial'. Certainly, the outcome of this
incident is sinister, Zagreus (having the last word) turning back the
expulsion upon Kein in the form of a curse, which transfixes his host.
Kein watches over the bannisters as Zagreus departs, and
- remained a moment as though commanded to stand still by some
supernatural agency (my italicsl - immobilized to gazein¬
scrutably down into the twilit well of the hall.
"Basilisk. Pecksniff!" Zagreus shouted with a gesture of
banishment and dismissal. "Acabada la comida! Finished!" (158)
If we wish, we can rationalize, or otherwise account for in terms
agreeable to our time, some of the aspects of Lewis' satiric fiction
reviewed above (as the ancient Greeks, in Hendrickson's essay, were
described as rationalizing the killing power of satire and the curse,
and psychologizing the magical force of those forms of expression).
Sometimes, the fiction allows us, without compelling us, to do so.
For if for Lewis (in Time and Western Man) there was a 'magica1
quality in artistic expression', and the 'artist (was) tapping the
supernatural sources and potentialities of our existence', art was also,
for him, the 'civilized substitute for magic'. That is to say, 'civili¬
zed' or 'up-to-date' interpretation of Lewis' satire is a possibility
that runs alongside interpretation in terms of a magical tradition -
without, in any sense, suppressing Lewis' place in that tradition, and,
indeed, providing sometimes a pale shadow of the opportunities for
interpretation provided by examination thereof. In another sense,
as Elliott wrote, the magical power of satire fades as civilization
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advances, but sustains the satirist as an idea: to such an idea, the
satirist must, perhaps, seek to-attach a non-magical layer of plausi¬
bility. Thus, the contempt of a Lewisian artist-figure such as Tarr
might be seen not as conveyed by a spirit voice (as Lewis referred to
the utterance of the railer in his Shakespeare criticism), nor yet as
'tapping supernatural sources' and so on, for its energy, but as art¬
ful, queer, brilliant exhibitionism; and the death of Kreisler might
be viewed not in terms of the.magica1 potency of ridicule to kill, but
as the action against himself of a manic-depressive at his nadir (his
mania occupying most of the novel).(159) I would be less happy still
about rationalizing the strange battle between Ker-Orr and de Valmore:
it might perhaps be viewed as disorganizing operations carried out
against a schizophrenic. With Zagreus, the narrative hovered between
suggestion and predication, and parody played a part; the incident
was a simile's distance from magic (Kein 'remained...as though com¬
manded...by some supernatural agency', and so on).
Things are different in The Human Age. In the midst of the supei—
natural, concessions to twentieth-century versions of reality are
unnecessary. Where the laws of physics and biology are no more obeyed
than they were understood by primitive man, magic becomes an unexcep¬
tional, or accepted, condition of existence.
Thus, in Honstre Gai, in the tumultuous scenes in Tenth Piazza
when the opposing forces clash, there is a reappearance of the little
flames which the "Enemy" caused to rise from the ground, in One Way
Song:
When they had walked for about a hundred yards, Pullman
noticed what he thought at first was something alive
jumping; he then saw that it was small flames, which were
springing about on the ground, a few feet ahead of him. (160)
On 'phoning the Phanuel Hotel to ask the Bailiff about the flames
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(such a combination of the quotidian and the outlandish is typical of
the novel), Pullman is informed that they are signs of a tutelary
spirit, sent by the Bailiff to attend Pu11 man.(161) If those flames
were, in "Enemy Interlude", magical symbols of the "Enemy's"
vituperation, and apotropaic, insofar as they saw off his assailant,
'Jack Horner', here too they are part of the supernatural weaponry of
a figure equipped with terrible powers of invective.
For in the next scene in Tenth Piazza, with Hyperides' forces
lined up against him, the Bailiff voices the most dreadful satire to be
found in the pages of Lewis' fiction:
"You have told more lies about me than you can remember...
Now, lam going to act - to act in so dreadful a way that,
could you live to see it, your eyes would drop out of your
head....
If I cannot whirl you from this world,
If I cannot crack your skull,
If I cannot wrench your entrails out and wind them on a stout pole,
If I cannot fill what is left over with benzine and put a match
to it, -
Then I 'm unstuck, throttled, and corked up for keeps. . . .
You have only a handful of countable seconds to live.
Ask for forgiveness of your stupendous Nothingness of a God,
you microscopic rat who learnt in Pontypridd how to blow
yourself up into a pestiferous obstruction. . . .
Ask for Heaven, and p'r'aps he'i1 give you an ice-cream.
Goooo-bye-bye-bye-bye-eeee. . . .
And for your scurvy slanders and your inventions about my
diabolical pacts with the ruffianly Satan.
May you burn to a cinder upon the grills of Dis." (162)
Here are conflated all the elements of the tradition of magical satire.
In form, this is at once an improvised poem, a curse, and a carefully
worded spell, at the opposite pole of elaboration to the name-magic
of BLAST. In the ancient curse (when it is stylized and complicated),
writes Elliott, 'the formal elements are the source of power; the
curse must be letter-perfect (as inmagical spells the world over) or it
will fail or perhaps, like some unjust magical satire in Ireland, re-
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dound upon the head of the curser1. Furthermore, 'the curser must
exhaust all possibilities as he searches for the essential agency of
power1, whether that be a god, or, for the semi-divine Bailiff, him¬
self. (163) Thus, the four savage protases, each beginning 'If I
cannot...', rehearse possibilities of destroying Hyperides, and are
concluded by the 1ine 'Then I 'm unstuck . . . ', which is of the nature
of what is technically known as an 'ovei—curse'. This, Elliott ex¬
plains, is a provision made in cursing for the contents of the curse,
or death at least, to recoil upon the curser, if he should in any way
fail in, or break, his oath.(l64) The satire's horrible, mocking
malevolence and burning desire for revenge reveal the Bailiff trans¬
formed into an Archilochian poet of hate. Indeed, the "Strassburg
Papyrus" of Archilochus' curses, from which both Elliott and Hendrickson
draw illustration (165) contains, on the evidence they give, nothing
that approaches in virulence or ferocity the Bailiff's lines, even
though Elliott writes of 'the total conviction of hate (carrying) down
undiminished through twenty-five centuries: we sense the force of the
implacable will behind the words.' That Lewis could conceive such
verbal hatred intimates something of the reserves of venom in the
satirist's imagination (as it did, in a milder degree - relatively -,
in the portrayal of Tarr's railing). The archaic depths of those re¬
serves might possibly be revealed by adduction of Hendrickson1s comment
on Fragment 75 of the Strassburg Papyrus, where Archilochus invokes
Hephaestus (the Greek god of fire) against an enemy: 'At the favor
which is prayed for we can only guess, but i t lies nearest at hand to
think of fire as a means of destroying his enemies, their homes and
lands.1 (166) That is the agent of death envisaged by the Bailiff
('benzine', 'burn to a cinder upon the grills of D i s') ; and when
Hyperides' end comes - caused for the only time in Lewis' fiction,
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directly by the power of the word itself, by the Bailiff's 'filthy
magic' (167) ~ black smoke engulfs him:
Practically unnoticed at first in the dazzling orange light,
a small black cloud began to grow in the air around the
figure of Hyperides... sudden 1y the black smoke parted,
exactly like two long black curtains being pulled aside.
Within, and now visible to all, was the figure of Hyperides,
his beard sheared off below the chin, an enormous nail
driven through his throat, behind entering the thick board
against which he had stood; on his head was stuck a white
pointed hat tied beneath his chin. FOOL was painted on it. (168)
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(v)
I want in this section to treat The Apes of God as the most sus¬
tained symbo1ic expression of the satiric impulse to kill in Lewis'
fiction, as, in fine, a 'revenge-satire1. The necessity of using that
term will, I hope, become clear in the comments appended to this
section. Here, I should say that I have employed it partly on the
strength of certain observations made by Robert Chapman in his study
of Lewis: Chapman points to the Omega affair of 1913, and the commis¬
sion withheld from Lewis by Roger Fry, as the seed of Lewis' vendetta
against Bloomsbury, the most prominent episode in which was the
publication of The Apes of God.(169) It will be necessary, first, to
offer some remarks about the concept of revenge.
In a discussion of 'vengeful destructiveness', Erich Fromm sug¬
gests: 'It differs from normal defensive aggression in two ways: (1)
it occurs after the damage has been done, and hence is not a defence
against a threatening danger; (2) it is of much greater intensity,
and is often cruel, lustful, and insatiab1e...'(170) If I am correct
in stressing the element of revenge in The Apes of God, then those
characteristics attributed by Fromm to the desire for vengeance ('in¬
tensity', 'cruelty', '1ustfu1ness', 'insatiability') dispose conclu¬
sively - to an extent that Lewis may well not have appreciated, or
at least did not reveal, when he theorized about the possibi1ity of
'non-moral' satire - of that notion, held by Wagner and Materer, and
put thus by Elliott, that Lewis' satire is marked by an 'intense moral
urgency'. It is not. Its principal characteristic, when we have The
Apes of God in mind, is an archaic, non-ethical, irrational passion
to destroy; and the foisting therein of modern conceptions of morality
is, in my view, as much an anachronism as it was in the time of
Archilochus, of which Hendrickson writes: 'In reality however the
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problem of justification intrudes an ethical point of view which need
not enter in. For in the age of violent passions and individual con¬
duct to which Archilochus belonged, together with reinforcement of
his own hot temperament, a man's enemies were per se in the wrong and
the just gods would punish them.' (171) (I would again, here, direct
the reader to Jameson's comments on Elliott and Lewis, since he seems
to know what Elliott makes some shift to obscure: '...Elliott's work
suggests that the archaic impulse of satire was rigorously nonmoral.'
Elliott, however, tries without very much conviction to affix the
idea of 'moral mission' to Archilochus' satire. (172)) Thus, the
emotions identified by Fromm with vengeance help to account for the
sheer length of the novel (insatiability) and for the extreme cruelty
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of many of the portraits (Dick Whittingdon, Matthew Plunkett, Ratner,
Richard and Jenny, the Finnian Shaws, the Keins, for example); and
on the strength of Fromm's analysis, there becomes available to us an
explanation for what baffled so many early reviewers of the novel,
namely, the colossal expenditure of hostility on (objectively viewed)
the little and unworthy. Thus, S.P.B. Mais: ' ... The Apes of God is
one long howl of derision at the asininity of certain unimportant
sectors of the modern pseudo-inte11igentsia. Why Mr Lewis...shou1d...
waste his giant strength and venom on such unworthy adversaries, is
one of those mysteries that are incapable of solution.' (173)
Next, Fromm distinguishes 'blood revenge1 from the simple instinct
to punish: 'Blood revenge is a sacred duty that falls upon the member
of a family, clan,or tribe who has to kill a member of the corres¬
ponding unit if one of his people has been killed. In contrast to
simple punishment, where the crime is expiated by the punishment of
the murderer or those to whom he belongs, in the case of blood revenge
the punishment of the aggressor does not end the sequence. The puni-
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t i ve killing represents a new killing which in turn obliges the
members of the punished group to punish the punisher and so on ad in-
finiturn. Theoretically, blood revenge is an endless chain.... Not
only blood revenge but all forms of punishment - from primitive to
modern - are expressions of vengeance... The classic example is the
1 ex ta1ionis of the Old Testament.1 (17*0 If we use such a theory
to account for the repeated pattern of attack and counter-attack in¬
volving Lewis (and associates) and the 'family' or 'tribe' that may,
in the first instance, loosely be labelled 'B1oomsbury', then we may
establish as the initial injury in the 'endless chain' Fry's treatment
of Lewis. Subsequently, Fry's 'clan' was punished in The Apes of God.
A further link in the chain was the refusal of the New Statesman to
publish Roy Campbell's favourable review of the novel, Bloomsbury
closing ranks against Lewis. Immediately, Lewis avenged this neglect
with the pamphlet Satire and Fiction, prefaced with the laudatory
essay of his supporter (Campbell) , and containing articles and reviews
favourable to Lewis. Nor does the force of the reciprocated impulse
to revenge abate with time. It was suggested in the first chapter of
this thesis that the often bitter tone of Geoffrey Wagner's study of
Lewis may at least in part be imputed to Lewis' behaviour, over 30
years before, towards members of Wagner's family, and to the cruel
portrayal of those people in The Apes of God. Yet, as Fromm's com¬
ments imply, the original injuries and their motives are apt to become
obscure with time, or, as here, to be 'forgotten'. Viewing the chain
of revenge - he was quite conscious of its existence - from a distance
of twenty years, Lewis, it seems, was satirizing a 'class' of 'pre¬
posterous parasites', his satire was 'political1:
The violent abuse of which I am the object still, even today,
must, I surmise, belong to the aftermath of this book (i.e.
The Apes); although it was first published a decade and a half
ago.
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I should be the last person to expect the satirist to be
allowed to pass his life in peace. If I aim a blow at a_
class (the 'upper class', in this instance...) I expect
retaliation. One must expect literally anything from the
outraged nobodies or their buddies, whose class is dying
and they with it. In their death-agony they are capable
of delivering some nasty kicks. (175)
To introduce politics into the picture, of course, is another way of
legitimizing the impulse to revenge, of rationalizing the non-
ethical.
Finally, Fromm accounts for the compu1siveness of the desire for
revenge by proposing that it may be of a magical nature: 'Why is
vengeance such a deep-seated and intense passion? I can only offer
some speculations. Let us consider first the idea that vengeance is
in some sense a magic act. By destroying the one who committed the
atrocity his deed is magically undone... Vengeance may be said to be a
magic reparation; but even assuming that this is so, why is the desire
for reparation so intense? Perhaps man is endowed with elementary
sense of justice...But there must be more to the cause of vengeance.
Man seems to take justice into his own hands when God or secular
authorities fail. It is as if in his passion for vengeance he elevates
himself to the role of God and of the angels of vengeance. The act of
vengeance may be his greatest hour just because of this self-
e1evation.' (176)
First (on the assumption that, at some level, the satirist wishes
to kill, whether symbolically or otherwise, as Elliott put it), we
might perhaps infer from this analysis that Lewis' satire resides in
a magical nexus of agency (Elliott's thesis) and intent (Fromm's -
the destruction of the Apes will have an erasing effect). Indeed,
reliance upon such an effect may well be what sustains the satirist,
ancient or modern, through his punitive career - and 'all forms of
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punishment - from primitive to modern - are expressions of vengeance,1
Fromm stated.
It may be what sustains him because always, it would seem, the
satirist, like Fromm's avenger (on the condition of the absence or
failure of divine or judicial authority), 'takes justice into his own
hands'. Thus, Hendrickson, vis-a-vis Archilochus' 'blood-feud'
against Lycambes and his daughter, and the vengeance exacted, writes:
'...he has not yet emerged from the crude passions of a social and
political middle age, an age of cruelty, hatred and self-help in lieu
of law.' (177) But, in a constitutionally more elaborate age, Donne,
in the obscene Satire 2, protests that he is compelled to satirize
outside the law: '...but my words none draws/ Within the vast reach
of the huge statute laws.' (11. 111-112) (178) While Lewis (still on
the 'aftermath' of The Apes of God) prefers a rougher justice to that
the law provides:
I have made it my habit never to go to law, but to shoot back
when shot at, and frighten them (i.e. 'the outraged nobodies
or their buddies') away, once in a while. (179)
From all these cases, however, we might extract the general point that
the satirist does not want the law - did it or did it not have the
power to implement his hatred or his complaint. Archilochus' satis¬
faction resides precisely in the 'magic' of personal vengeance. Not
only can the laws not press home the charges Donne makes against a
rotten poet who becomes a bent lawyer; more to the point, the laws of
the time are encroaching upon Donne's liberty to write satire. (180)
Even if Lewis could have gone to law (for what? - libel? - a law from
which, anyway, he suffered), we know that, figuratively at least, he
regards the satirist as the law - for on the page following the lines
quoted is that image (discussed in section (iii)) of the satirist
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as an extempore hangman, with the mediaeval dispensation to take
justice into his own hands. Consequently, we may propose that, in
general, the satirist's intent is (unconsciously or obscurely, per¬
haps) the 'magical' satisfaction afforded by personal vengeance - a
satisfaction that the law, had it power to grant him redress, could
not provide. This may be one reason why satire, typically, attacks
that which the law cannot prosecute - inanity, arrogance, meanness,
for example - things which cannot be arraigned.
Then, we may enquire in what ways, if any, the act of vengeance
'elevates' - as Fromm speculates - the satirist to the 'role of God'.
Here, we may resume the eschatologicaI interpretation of The Apes of
God offered in thelast chapter. Then, the preliminary act of ven¬
geance, it will be seen, is to kill off the Apes by presenting them
as dead, as the populace of an 'inferno', that is to say. Here,
Horace Zagreus, as the pre-Gnostic Orphic god Zagreus, as the Gnostic
deity Hermes, and as Thoth, is a guide and sometimes judge, a minor
agent of retribution. But beyond this, it will be seen that (l) to
present a set of people as dead, but (2) still to have power of deter¬
mination over their fate (like inhabitants of classical models of
afterlife, Lewis' Apes, though 'dead',still await judgement and
punishment), reflects a divine power onto the satirist, or onto some
persona or projection of the satirist.
Thus far, our position is that: (1) as an avenger, the satirist
(Lewis), through some residual belief in the magical power of satire,
is killing his enemies (symbolically); (2) such vengeance may offer him
magical satisfaction - it is a 'magic reparation'; (3) the issue of
the desire for vengeance is, reflexively, the apotheosis of the
satirist.
Condensing the propositions advanced above leads to the following
225.
question: can The Apes of God in any way be said to project, or to re¬
veal the presence of, what might be called a 'killing-god1?
It is my view that it can, in the complex relation of Lewis and
Pierpoint, whom Kenner calls a 'Lewis-avatar'. (181) Indeed, con¬
sideration of the figure referred to as Pierpoint in such terms is what
confirms, if I am right, The Apes of God as the most complete expres¬
sion of the punitive impulse in the Lewisian corpus, revealing the
novel to be the point of convergence of all Lewis' references else¬
where to satire, hanging and execution, and in itself a symbolic
scaffold and gallows.
Some ideas were advanced about Pierpoint in the last chapter,
where it was suggested that on one level, he figured the divine, the
infinitely remote Supreme Being of the Gnostic systems. That sort of
identification has been made also by many of Lewis' critics. Thus,
for Wagner, 'Pierpoint...must remain obscure.' Chapman states that,
'...above all, reigning supreme, invincible, untouchable, unseen, is
Pierpoint...Pierpoint functions as disembodied mind.' Jameson con¬
siders Pierpoint 'absent but all-powerful.' Paul Edwards writes that
Pierpoint 'like God (and also like Godot) (is) absent from the scene.'
(182)
Yet Pierpoint can only be viewed as the figuration of the apo¬
theosis of Lewis through revenge by recognizing that he oscillates
between a spiritual or supernatural significance and one that is con¬
crete. If he has godly traits (or non-traits), he also has a source
in the real world that is quite as historically solid as that of any
of the Apes. Indeed, in spite of dispute as to the importance of the
roman-a-c1ef status of the novel, the historical identity of Pierpoint
is a 'key' whose significance, in respect of the tradition of satire
that is here being discussed, cannot, in my view, be disputed.
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Yet Lewis' critics, when they have mentioned it at all, have con¬
sistently dealt with the historical import of the name Pierpoint
apropos, triflingly. Thus, Kenner, after the remark about Pierpoint's
being a 'Lewis avatar', continues: 'In prolongation of the analogy
between Lewis/Shakespeare and the provincial hangman, Pierpoint bears
the name of the British executioner.' (183) To this, Wagner responds:
'Hugh Kenner points out that Pierpoint was the name of the public hang¬
man in England at the time, so that Lewis presumably thought of him as
the executioner (and a Fascist one) behind the moribund society of the
work. However, the executioner who has recently received such publi¬
city in England was Pierrepoint (sic); Lewis spells his character
either Pierpoint or Pierpont....One could easily continue to involve
oneself in these amusing obscurities.' (18*0 The scant attention
Elliott pays to this point (he reduces it to a footnote), is particu¬
larly surprising, since it is in his field, as it were: 'According
to Kenner...the name of the public executioner in England was Pierpoint.
The literal signification of the name ("peer", "point"), together with
the association with the executioner's office, would clearly be
attractive to Lewis...Kenner identifies Lewis with him.' (185)
On account of the importance to my discussion of the points I am
presently to make, it will be necessary to get the history straight
here. It is this. Britain's Official Hangman was, at one time,
Albert Pierrepoint, who gained much attention at around the time
Kenner and Wagner were writing on Lewis, on account of the fact that,
between 19^9 and 1953, he testified to the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment, and resigned amid much fuss in 1956 (after the execution
of Ruth Ellis). It rather looks as if Kenner (published in 195*0 and
Wagner (1957) may have been influenced in their comments by these
facts (Wagner, incidentally, is captious about spelling, since con-
siderations of libel meant that the name of every character had to be
modified before it went into The Apes of God). Albert Pierrepoint,
however, did not begin his training as a hangman until 1931, which
made it impossible for Lewis to name a character after him. (186)
But Albert Pierrepoint was the last in a family line of execu¬
tioners Pierrepoint. Whether Kenner (an American yet unborn for much
of the period when they practised their craft) was cognizant of the
family connection is uncertain. Wagner is certainly wrong to regard
as the same 'the executioner who has recently received such publicity1
and 'the public hangman in England at the time' (of composition of The
Apes) .
Now, Albert Pierrepoint' s autobiography informs us that his
father, Henry Pierrepoint, began his career as executioner in 1900,
and was the Official Hangman, or 'Number One', from 1906 to his retire
ment in 1916. His brother (Albert's uncle), Thomas Pierrepoint, he
encouraged to take up the work around 190A; subsequently, Thomas be¬
came the Official Hangman on the lists of the Home Office in 192A,
retiring around 19^6.
Accordingly, the name 'Pierrepoint' may have impressed itself on
Lewis' imagination at any time before the composition of The Apes of
God, newspapers commonly naming the hangman in reports of executions.
Furthermore, in the summer of 1922, Henry Pierrepoint (a literate man)
published in the popular periodical "Reynolds Weekly Newspaper" a
serialized account of his work as an executioner. It might be con¬
jectured that Lewis either looked at, or subscribed to, this paper,
not least because that short section of The Apes of God (namely,"Mr
Zagreus and the Split-Man") that appeared in T.S. Eliot's Criterion
in February 192A contains, in the final version, nine references to
Pierpoint.
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The point of this digression is not only to show that there are
sufficient grounds (Lewis' critics fail to show this), historically,
for the proposition that Lewis took the name of his character from an
executioner of the time; it is also to show that Lewis is following
a precedent (Dryden's) for the satirist's identifying himself with a
specific executioner (as, I am suggesting, Lewis is doing - Pierpoint
being a projection of his own impulse to punish or revenge).
As basis for this second proposition, it should be stated that
Dryden is about the only satirist upon whose spirit, Lewis gives any
indication of modelling himself, notably by way of George Saintsbury's
eloquent praise of Dryden (in A Short History of English Literature).
Thus, both Men Without Art and Rude Assignment quote and allude to
Saintsbury's remarks; and, if it is not stretching a point, that image
of Tarr at the height of his satiric powers ('Tarr's temperament spread
its wings, whirling him with menace and mockery above Hobson's head')
may well have been inspired by Saintsbury's picture of Dryden aloft on
wings, punishing his adversaries beneath. (187) The "Envoi" to One
Way Song, furthermore, declares:
These times require a tongue that naked goes,
Without more fuss than Dryden's or Defoe's. (188)
The passage with which we are concerned occurs in Dryden's Dis-
course Concerninqthe Oriqina1 and Progress of Satire (an essay which
Lewis uses at the beginning of his attempt to define satire in Rude
Assignment). Dryden is referring to his Absalom and Achitophel:
A man may be capable, as Jack Ketch's Wife said of his
Servant, of a plain piece of Work, a bare Hanging; but
to make a Malefactor die sweetly, was only belonging to
her Husband. I wish I cou'd apply it to myself, if the
Reader would be kind enough to think it belongs to me. (189)
Jack Ketch was the public executioner in the second half of the
seventeenth century, and of this passage, Earl Miner (who duly
229.
acknowledges the researches of Robert Elliott) writes: 'As Dryden
well recognized, satire inflicts death in varying ways....In this
example, Dryden's image for satire is that of a minister of justice,
the public hangman. What is remarkable is that the poet would like
to apply the image of such a role and such a skill to himse1f1.(190)
As would Lewis (the role at least, if not the skill), though
obliquely, where Dryden is explicit - Lewis never states the self-
identification, but makes sufficient reference elsewhere to satire
and the hangman for us to posit it. It may also at this point be sug¬
gested that paraleipsis plays a part in Pierpoint's continuous
absence; by never presenting him, Lewis causes him to loom large and
ominous. It is almost too neat to add that the condemned never see
the hangman anyway, since they are hooded.
The psychological function of the association - whether explicit
or oblique - with a specific executioner may be accounted for by
reference to comments made in section (iii) of the present chapter:
it legitimizes the impulse to kill, gives a judicial frame to the
punitive urge - it 'civilizes' the desire for (symbolic) blood revenge.
In essence, however, and if he is candid, the satirist will acknow¬
ledge to himself that it is not Ketch, or Pierrepoint, with whom he
is identifying himself, but Archilochus (as Jonson, Horace and other
satirists have done). Rhetorically, the identification is a means of
striking fear into the satirist's enemies.
That the Apes are, thus, 'condemned', as it were, - in a sense,
Dan's tour is a series of visits to ce11s, almost the whole novel
being composed of interiors - entails their tota1 punishment; they
are satirized fatally (not correctively, sanatively, reformative1y,
and so on); they have no right of appeal. Ab initio, therefore, they
are presented in the worst light - Ratner, for example, as a revolting
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lachrymose failure, Kein, a blustering, bitter failure - there is no
satiric bathos: bubbles of good repute are not burst. (Wagner has
tried to show the contrary, suggesting that the portrayal of Dick
Whittingdon, a successful, wealthy young man who is revealed eventually
to be a pervert, achieves a 'genuine satiric effect.1 This, however,
overlooks the fact that Whittingdon is introduced as a farting, fidget-
ting, childish hearty, which is fairly satiric in itself. (191))
Such portraits, however, constitute an easily recognizable mode
of the satire, and are an integral part thereof. But as if Lewis
considered it too oblique to entrust to the mere repetition of the
name Pierpoint, throughout the text, the connotation of the hangman
behind the satire, or as if he was compelled to supercharge the text
withreference or allusion to the tradition of lethal satire, other
devices are employed.
One such is the extra-fictional 'broadcast' in which satire is
d i scussed; a notable example - all broadcasts issuing from Pierpoint
(they are his words supposedly) - is that in which Zagreus declares
that,
"True satire must be vicious...The venom of Pope is u;hat is
needed... Shakespeare employed simple laughter too much,
when he was not handling tears, to be a satirist...Or his
laughter had not the metallic bark that kills." (192)
Another is to impose on, or foist in, the thoughts or talk of
characters - in a manner that sits uneasily and threateningly with
surrounding dialogue, highly mannered though that is - a sort of
knowingness with regard to the tradition of satire in question, or
even an awareness that retribution is nigh.
A contrived passage of this sort is initiated by Ratner's question
(in the midst of the Lenten Party),
"All right Horace! - What has happened to Dan?" (193)
There follow 18 very humorous, paratactic lines (the effect lost if
not quoted in full) in which that hyper-energized, railing narrative
voice discussed in section (iv) projects revolutionary gestures onto
Ratner's direct question, then imposes on it an elaborate hypocrisy:
- Ratner frowned, as he asked where that poor young man
Absolom might have got to, and grinned at the same time
to make it worse - the grin struggling in vain with the
frown, the frown stronger -
The biblical allusion supplies us with the hanging motif: in 2 Samuel
(Ch.18, Verse 14), Absolom, the son of David, is found hanging by his
long hair from a tree after the Battle of Ephraim, and slaughtered by
the followers of Joab. Yet though the allusion was the result of the
narrative's forcing a certain construction upon the mind of Ratner,
it is, in the subsequent dialogue, made to seem to have originated
in him - a sleight which enables Ratner himself to be faced with the
prospect of death by hanging. Zagreus replies to his question:
"Yes where is Dan! How do I know Julius!"
"I think we ought to find out."
"Why Jul ius?"
"Oh I don 11 know!"
' Don 11 you Jul i us?"
"I think he's a very sensitive young man - he might hang him-
se1f from a tree!" . . .
grct-
"Your sympathy for others does youAcredit - why should Dan
hang himself from a tree?". . .
"Depression leads to suicide" Ratner muttered. "The awkward
age."
"Yours is a far awkwarder age Julius.... It is you Ratner who
may be found hanging from a tree!"
The implication of the last line may be that, since Ratner has been
satirized so unendurably since he made his appearance in the novel,
his suicide, through shame, must soon result; and since this passage
follows closely that broadcast, referred to above, where the killing
power of laughter was canvassed, such thinking is very much in the air
as it were. That a faint allusion is meant to the suicide, by hanging
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of Absalom's counsellor Achitophe1/Ahitophe1, there would not appear
to be sufficient grounds to maintain.
A somewhat stronger possibility, though one which I should be
less inclined to address had not Paul Edwards indicated the extent to
which Lewis deploys allusions to Dryden in the novel (19^), is that
the reference to Absalom is meant to call to mind, in a general
rather than a specific sense perhaps, and in order to underpin the
punitive theme of the novel, Dryden's Absalom and Achitophel - the
poem to which he was referring when he compared himself to the public
executioner.
In Dryden's satire, which recounts the Popish Plot of 1680-81,
and is represented biblically, David, Absalom and Achitophel figure
as, respectively, Charles II, the Duke of Monmouth (his son), and the
Earl of Shaftesbury. The poem itself occupies a point in a most
interesting sequence in which art/satire and history alternately
imitate each other: Dryden conceives the Plot as resembling Absalom's
revolt against his father in the Bible; he satirizes the Plot (and
Absa1om/Monmouth) in his poem of 1681; Jack Ketch actual 1y executes
Monmouth in 1685 (after the Protestant uprising against James II
(195)); Dryden, in the Discourse on Satire of 1693, identifies himself
with the executioner (Ketch) who put to death that man whom he had
previously satirized (though, in the passage where he makes the iden¬
tification, Dryden does not refer to Absalom).
If we can draw nothing specific from this, it at least gives a
precedent for the supposition that, in the satirist's imagination
(Lewis'), the association with an executioner (Pierrepoint) adds to
the symbolic urge to kill the notion of a real fulfilment. That an
earlier representation of Zagreus as the 'Merry Monarch' (i.e.
Charles II, the father of Absalom in Dryden's poem) is in any way
connected with the characterization of Dan as Absalom is too uncertain
to be worth more than a passing note (though the idea that, in a sense,
Zagreus has begotten Dan, his 'genius', was explored in the previous
chapter).
That image of Zagreus referred to above occurs in the midst of
more talk whose purpose is to show Ape society impelled towards the
ga11ows:
"What is the issue?- Pierpoint is convineed there is no issue!
We are all rats caught in a colossal mechanical trap."
"Ah" exclaimed Ratner . . "if we are a 11 rats!"
"That makes you less of a one!" Horace lightly called out
and with the manner of a Merry Monarch he struck Julius
gracefully upon the shoulder. "Do not crow over us all the
same, you old bottom-dog popped up from your gallows-pit." (196)
Since here, Zagreus is actually 'broadcasting' Pierpoint-Lewis (with
obligatory questioning from Ratner - he understands the form), the
monologue, on one level an analysis of a current trend, might also be
viewed as desiderative (vis-a-vis the novel's revenge-impu1se). For
what Zagreusand Ratner are discussing is what might be termed a
'Crime-Cult'. In reaction to over-restrictive laws, an artistic
criminal fraternity is emerging, which glamorizes and i nte11ectua1 i zes
1aw-breaking.(197) Local evidence of this is provided when Zagreus
and Ratner observe an aristocratic Ape stealing the Finnian Shaws'
silverware (198); and the phenomenon is epitomized by Jacques Coq d'Or
(Cocteau) and his associates, for whose club '"no one is eligible who
has not his thumbprints at the Surete Generale.1" (199) Not only
writing, asserts Zagreus, but life is coming to depend, among such
people, upon crime for its frisson - Coq d'Or stole 'pourboires' in
order to be thrown into jail, and
"... the Grain Qui Meurt leads to the Faux-Monnayeurs.
An outcast-status leads to a brotherhood - reaching from
the gallows to the rubber-shop. Laws against sex-
perversions like dry-laws make criminals of harmless sex-
oddities. But everybody is driven into the league against
Law." (200)
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The Apes' characteristically cultish behaviour is, thus, expediting
their inevitable retribution: if it is against the element of cult
itself that Lewis' satiric vendetta is directed, over the issue of that
craze (crime) impends the shadow of Pierpoint (the official hangman);
.and it would seem that, at some level, that 'colossal mechanical trap'
is of his own devising, with room enough for all the Apes - who are
going there anyway, but sooner than expected if (the satire again
legitimizing itself) their cult leads them to murder for art's sake.
Ratner asks Zagreus:
"Have any of the new French school of literary-pickpockets
yet dabbled in homicide? Are you i nformed cbo*,tthat?"
"Ah there is the difficulty!" Mr. Zagreus passed his
finger lightly across his neck, where the chicken got the
chopper.
"There was Loeb and Leopold in Chicago. But you have to
be under age, rich, and one thing and another, else you
swing, that is the difficulty." (201)
(Loeb and Leopold were the two students who, in 1924, intoxicated by
Nietzsche, murdered a boy. They escaped the death sentence, evidently
on account of their respectable backgrounds. (202))
The trap, however, is not ready merely for the Apes. Though the
primary stimulus to satirize (it has been proposed) issued from Lewis'
outrage at the B1oomsbury-type, the satire's demand for vengeance
destroys also characters peripheral to the Ape world. Such a develop¬
ment might be interpreted roughly in terms of Fromm's definition:
b1ood-revenge is a se1f-regenerating form of aggression which, as it
grows, adds fresh targets to the preliminary incitement to avenge.
This is certainly not to say that revenge upon the Apes ever becomes
less important for Lewis as the novel proceeds - it is his principal
motive; but it would seem to be the case that types whom, elsewhere,
Lewis has designated fit for destruction are here dragged to the
scaffold by the strength of the revenge-impu1se. Ultimately, therefore,
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cause is provided to condemn even those who have observed critically
the Apes (Zagreus, in my view, being excepted from this process - he
seems to know the secrets of satire; and he emerges from the inferno,
it was proposed in the previous chapter); and Jameson has referred,
aptly, to 'the execution of the satirists themselves1. (203)
As much is demonstrated in the case of the Blackshirt (Bertram
Starr-Smith), who is one of Pierpoint's agents and spokesmen. He
appears to have inherited some of the chromosones of Kreisler; and he
anticipates, though without the pathos, the self-analysis that made
Vincent Penhale's death, for Lewis, a necessity. Introducing himself
to Dan, he refers six times in two pages to his violent reputation,
then predicts:
"One day I shall be violent on purpose. I shall accept." (204)
From this point on, the Blackshirt's course is as fatally set as was
Kreisler's on the day when he set himself thirty days to live. Each
man has a bete noire (Soltyk for Kreisler, Ratner for Blackshirt), who
is the object of the current violent urge; and in each, violence is a
force that stiffens the body into a weapon which must snap, unless
the force is vented (an exteriorized image of the psychic crisis
within). There is a similar treatment of what Tarr witnesses,
At this moment Kreisler sprang up. His head was thrust for¬
ward, his hands were in rear, partly clenched and partly
facilitating his swift passage between the tables....Tarr
saw the party of young men he had been observing in a blur
of violent motion: Kreisler was in among them, working on
something in their midst. There were two blows - smack -
smack... (205)
and Dan, shrinking, beholds:
And it was all over with poor Blackshirt, for he leapt up
as he started to move forward - for he had not understood
how his body had acquired a peculiar rigor - the shock was
considerable.
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"I will show you what violence is, that I will quickly show
you too - you will tell me when you know - I wonder! Take
that for your violent now - take that too look you - when
next - and that now! Ah!" (206)
According to the terms of Lewis' supernatura11y legitimized re¬
venge system (sketched in the comments on capital punishment in The
Art of Beinq Ru1ed), the fascistic Starr-Smith should be put to death
(as Kreisler and Penhale were, in effect), since he threatens the
principle of 'non-violence' in life. Symbolically, such a demand
might be seen to be satisfied by Starr-Smith's sudden jump from the
stage (here figuring a scaffold) on which he has just assaulted Ratner,
and which was the scene of the "Vanish" performance. Before his jump/
drop, Starr-Smith makes a 'confession', this being his final appear¬
ance i n the nove1:
"Yes! Violent is just what I am!"...B1ackshirt was leaning out
of the stage...He looked up and as he saw the moving curtain
he jumped off the edge. The curtain came down to the floor. (207)
If Paul Edwards is correct in drawing a tentative parallel between the
"Vanish" episode and the 'concluding stage vanish of Flecknoe in Dry-
den's MacF1ecknoe (208), there may even be a very tenuous punitive
connection between this conclusive disappearance of Blackshirt and the
end of the poet Dryden ridiculed, who falls through a trap-door to hell.
(209)
To complement that symbolic reading of Bertram Starr-Smith's
despatch, it might be noted that the penal history of this century not
only provided Lewis with a real hangman to serve as the retributive
spirit of the novel, but offered also a real model (or two) for the
furious Blackshirt. The name Lewis gave to this violent character may,
of course, have nothing more than a coincidental relation to the
criminal(s) in question. But I would venture that, uncannily, Lewis
may have retrieved the information that on 29th December 1903, one
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Henry Bertram Starr was hanged at Walton Jail, Liverpool (for stabbing
to death his wife), and that on 9th March 1904, Sidney George Smith
was hanged at Cheltenham Jail, for the murder of his sweetheart.
These executions were reported in "The Times", on, respectively,
30th December 1903 and 10th March 1904; and the first name is suf¬
ficiently striking to have risen, perhaps, (and perhaps in combination
with the second) through Lewis' memory, to provide him with a source/
sources (at least in name and reputation) for his character. Such an
ability to filter from distant memory material required for imaginative
creation should not be doubted in Lewis: Augustus John's autobio¬
graphy remarks that Lewis could even recall with exactitude quite
trivial phrases from conversations that had occurred decades previously.
(210)
Finally, it may be observed that a literary convention outside the
Archilochian tradition casts the shadow of the hangman over The Apes of
God.
There is, as Edwards has noted (211), an intrigue involving Horace
Zagreus and the Follet family that constitutes the neglected story of
the novel, neglected, that is, for around 600 pages. In Part I,
Zagreus forestalls Dick Whittingdon by taking aside the Follets', and
Dick's family lawyer:
They went into the hall and found Horace Zagreus talking in a
low voice to the 1awyer..."That's how it stands. I will ring
you up tomorrow morning" Zagreus said to the lawyer, leaving
precipitately as he saw Dick approaching. (212)
In much fiction, the stealth conveyed by this tete-a-tete would be
the seed of a very furtive tale indeed. When it is considered in
relation to other statements in the opening pages, such as Lady Fredi-
gonde Follet's remark,
"Horace has the most charming eyes...Why has he not married?" (213)
and her husband's observation,
"I'm sure she'll outlive me" Sir James grinned in bland
repose, the death's head sweetened with the faintest
irony. (21A)
a plot is intimated, only to be suppressed.
Or, rather, held in abeyance until Part XIII, the last of the
novel. In between, we are spared a couple of hints that Zagreus is in
straits financially, his resources dwind1ing.(215) Then, during
Zagreus' interview with nonagenarian Lady Fredigonde, the material of
the suspended plot, at once conventional and wildly grotesque, is
rapidly disposed, as the novel draws to a close. (216) Zagreus, it
transpires, is an inheritance-hunter, and has written to Fredigonde
for ten thousand pounds. This she is now able to give him, since she
has just murdered her husband (also in his tenth decade). She con¬
fesses to Zagreus that by hiding from Sir James the bell he used to
summon his nurse (to remove him, when Fredigonde's tongue became too
much for him), she has brought about in him a fatal apoplexy - this
done, quite evidently, with malice aforethought (express).(217) But
the money is to be a dowry, to be Zagreus' on the condition that he
marry her!:
"I love you Horace! I desire to be your bride!"
... "Done!" he exclaimed. "There is no woman I would sooner
ma rry! "
Thus, by means of a fantastic distortion of the stock theme of
domestic murder, Lewis conceives a sort of gerontophi1ic menage a trois
which even evokes such causes celebres of the early ' 20' s as the crime
passione 1 involving Bywaters (the younger man) and the Thompson couple,
over whose conclusion Thomas Pierrepoint presided. And, as is proper,
the murderous couple are cheated of their desires (money/love), Fredi¬
gonde's death-rattle commencing as Zagreus takes her in his arms to
kiss her.
But we are entitled to wonder how real are those desires, and,
indeed, what may be the purpose of this preposterous denouement. Puni¬
tive satire requires deaths. The close of the novel provides deaths.
Yet it does so by a contrivance, by framing the revenge satire with
a conventional crime story (whose hideous and entertaining rendering
at once draws attention from and foregrounds the contrivance involved)
The killing urge of the satirist is fulfilled, but not by the agency o
the satire itself. If, therefore, these deaths may be considered to
occur outside the satire, at the edge of the novel proper, then Jame¬
son is probably correct when he writes (of The Apes of God): 'The
satiric impulse has found a purely symbolic vehicle in which to
inscribe its figures and invest its dynamism and does not require the
ultimately self-destructive symbolic representation of "real" death.'
(218)
Excursus: Men Without Art
To refer to The Apes of God as a 'revenge-satire' is to suppose
in Lewis a satiric attitude quite different to that he himself ex¬
pressed in Men Without Art, which was discussed in the previous
chapter (l have in mind principally p.226 and the Conclusion of that
volume, not the comments on the 'external method', and so on). There,
Lewis' theory of satire was regarded as founded on a premise of
Gnostic pessimism, and aimed at the biological original sin of the
human condition in its entirety. Above, however, The Apes of God has
been discussed in terms of a personal, 'magical' vendetta against
local, historical enemies. Necessarily so, I think; for I concur with
William Pritchard that it is hard to see how The Apes of God continu-
ally and concretely practises a theory that occurs in a work written
after the novel.(219) For although the satire in The Apes of God
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grows to exceed the terms of a local vendetta, vengeance being exacted
from other types, the Blackshirt for example, and although that
vendetta might, on one level, be eschato 1ogica11y represented, the
human condition per se is not what, principally, occupies it. Rather
is it the case, in my view, that the often painful physical satire of
The Apes of God was conceived by Lewis, by the time of Men Without Art,
as the grounds for a theory of universal application (the morning
routine of the unfortunate Ratner was cited, in such a context, in
the previous chapter). And when Lewis, having set out the terms of
reference (in Men Without Art) of the 'non-moralist' satirist, stated
that it would be his task to 'bring human life more into contempt each
day' (p.226), he was inducing from just one of the satiric tactics of
The Apes of God a world-view, or philosophy. But when, in the same
passage, Lewis announced that non-moral satire, its dispensation
established, now had 'carte blanche' to execute all and sundry at
sight', he was expressing a residue of the animus that dominates The
Apes of God in a place where it does not really fit - or, if meant as
anything more than a rather dubious Swiftian pleasantry, where it must
come close to being construed as evil (and that is a possibility which
ought to be kept in mind, in view of the nature of the discussion in
the next and final section). For, in Men Without Art, the ultimate
end of 'bringing human life more into contempt each day', and so on,
was to give rise to satiric laughter, which Lewis conceived as the
only means by which man could transcend the absurdity of his physical,
animal condition: the end was not punitive, that is to say. But in
The Apes of God, as we saw in one of Pierpoint's broadcasts, the pur¬
pose of satiric laughter was to kill. Thus, to conclude, the theory
of satire expressed in Men Without Art is a self-sufficient, meta¬
physical or existential statement of pessimism (of a Gnostic cast).
The Apes of God, however, is a revenge-satire,
fulfilling the time-honoured functions of the satirist -
consisting of the dropping of molten metal or administering
of punitive buffets to the fatuous, the overweening, or the
crooked. (220)
particularly where those 'fatuous, overweening or crooked1 people
behave in such a way as to cause offence (real or imagined) to Wyndham
Lewis, and over whom he erected himself as the law. And another com¬
ment, from the same volume of autobiography, could apply only to The
Apes of God:




Such a device as that last examined in The Apes of God (the
Zagreus-Fol1et intrigue, that is) may have served to satisfy vicari¬
ously, or by proxy, the desire for revenge, circumventing, in doing so,
the guilt that (it is to be supposed, or hoped) is entailed in the urge
to satirize people to death (vengeance, it was suggested, having no
moral sanction). But this raises the difficult question of how
genuine that urge may be in the modern satirist, and whether it is
troublesome to him. When Elliott wrote that the intent to kill one's
enemies through the power of the word had been sublimated (with the
disappearance of belief in magic) from something that actually could
be prosecuted to something that could only symbolically be expressed,
he was not implying that the intent itself was any less real now, or
in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, than in the seventh cen¬
tury B.C... But does this mean that the modern satirist (modern as
opposed to ancient, that is) apprehends, or responds to, that intent
he harbours in a manner distinct from that of his antique predecessor?
Does he, for example, indulge it the more lightly, because he knows it
cannot be effected? Such questions, perhaps, are best responded to by
the sort of paradox employed by Claude Rawson, when he discusses Jon-
son's boasting of 'Archilochan powers or the bardic gift of rhyming
to death', and Swift's statements that 'he would gladly exterminate
this or that person or group', namely: '...the satirist cannot in
such places be said to mean literally that he can kill, or would if
he could: but he does not not mean it either.' (222)
How troubled for most of his career as a satirist Lewis may have
been by that mortal intent referred to above, and how far he may have
suppressed such concern (did it exist) are uncertain issues. What is
clear is that in Ma 1 i gn Fiesta, there emerges a remarkable retro-
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spective guilt. It does so in such a way as to make Lewis' habits as
a satirist impossible any longer to sustain.
One cause of this guilt has been proposed thus by Jameson. He
sees the violent deaths that recur in Lewis' fiction, Lewis' 'aggres-
sivity' itself, as in some way deriving from the primitive aim of
satire as defined by Elliott, namely 'to blast its victim with the
magic of the curse'.(223) Throughout most of his fiction, suggests
Jameson, Lewis could put people to death without any qualms, because
he worked from the premise that themajority of his characters were, in
a sense, not real at all, or not 'personalities' in terms of the
estimation Lewis gave to personality. Accordingly, their deaths were
unreal also.(224) In The Human Age, however, and especially in Ma 1iqn
Fiesta, where Lewis conceived an afterlife where the already dead
could indeed die again (absolutely and for eternity), death suddenly
was revealed to him as a real state in his fiction, and not something
for the satirist to play symbolic, inconsequential variations upon (l
am placing the clearest construction I am capable of upon Jameson's
thesis). This, seemingly, was of the order of a tragic reversal and
recognition for Lewis qua satirist: 'For if the second death is an
imaginative possibility, and death can become real after all, then the
satirist bears final responsibility for what are now real victims, and
the guilt inherent in his aggressivity must at last be confronted un¬
disguised .' (225) Alan Munton has taken issue with this conclusion,
objecting that Jameson simply decides that, in The Human Age, Lewis'
concerns as a satirist are dislocated from symbolic modes of expres¬
sion 'into the real world'.(226) Yet whether or not one agrees with
Jameson's notion of the 'second death', his argument is worth citing:
it is aware of the important connection between Lewis and that tra¬
dition described by Robert Elliott; and it is correct in its impression
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(in spite, perhaps, of the assumptions it makes) that a radical recog¬
nition occurs in Ma 1ign Fiesta.
A second, and more concrete, reason for Lewis' guilt has been
propounded by Hugh Kenner. It is this. In writing Ma 1ign Fiesta,
in the portrayal of Dis (the Punishment Centre) and, most of all, in
the conception of Sammael, Lewis came to realize that satire was the
Devil's work. The blueprint for satire that Lewis produced in Men
Without Art was also a preliminary sketch of the mind of his Satan:
'...Lewis had much invested in Sammael; if the Bailiff is all that in
the old days Lewis had opposed, Sammael is very nearly the Lewis who
had opposed it, in satire which he described in Men Without Art (1934)
as a metaphysical, not a moral, criticism of man.' (227) Worse still,
if we recall, once again, that Lewis wrote, in Men Without Art, that
the task of the non-moralist satirist would be to 'bring human life
more into contempt each day', it seems that we are not far from the
rationale that made possible the horrors of Stalinism and Nazism:
'This strict being (i.e. Sammael), proud in his angelic estate, calmly
punishes man for being man. That, by implication, was what Lubianka
and Dachau were invented for; no crimes, nothing less than a state of
being, could inspire such horrors, or justify them in the minds of
those who administered them, doing, it would seem, Sammael's work on
earth... "On principle," says Sammael, "I approve of punishing Man
just for being Man".' (228)
Against this it might be pointed out that the definition Lewis
gave of satiric laughter in Men Without Art (as we saw in section (vi)
of the previous chapter) specified that it was 'not inhuman'. That
is to say, it was to provide a means of transcending man's animal con¬
dition (an absurd one), rather than of 'executing' anyone (as was
pointed out at the end of the previous section). But against this, in
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turn, it might be alleged that, first, bringing life into contempt,
and so on, is a dubious enterprise, even if 1otherwor1d1iness1 be its
goal, and that, furthermore, it is an evil project, if the contempt
become an end itself - otherwor1d1iness, existential, transcendent
laughter, and so on, gradually disappearing from the satirist's
scheme (and traditional doubts about the psychology of the satirist,
referred to earlier in this chapter, make that a possibility). Hence,
there is justice to Kenner's observations.
At the same time, however, I would suggest that there is as much
of Lewis the revenge-satirist in Sammael as there is of the pessimistic,
religious philosopher who emerged from the pages of Men Without Art.
The at once quasi-divine and historical agent of death projected by
the Lewis-Pierpoint/Pierrepoint relationship - who subsumed the hanging
and capital compulsions that occupy so much of Lewis' fiction and
theory, themselves the residue of archaic belief in the killing power
of the word - is also a foreshadowing (Lewis seems to be discovering)
of the Devil and his subordinates in Dis, in the conduct of their
daily business. Personally, as well as conceptually, the Devil is a
satirist.
He takes pleasure, for example, in reducing an unsavoury
acquaintance (the Bailiff) to a pile of shame and terror:
"And I am not very fond of a filthy little rat like your¬
self, sir, who combines the lowest vices, the blackest
crimes of the descendants of Adam and Eve, with the
longevity and some of the magical potentialities of our¬
selves...! would take over Third City, if that were
possib1e...You I should hang by the neck in the middle of
Tenth Piazza . .
The Bailiff stood there, like a schoolboy, weeping: he made
no noise, except for an occasional gulp. (229)
Merely exercising invective and observing its effect before an audience
(Pullman) is Sammael's source of satisfaction (he later reprieves and
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honours with a new job the Bailiff, having in this scene despatched him
to Dis). When killing comes too easily to the satirist (Sammael, of
course, may do whatever he will), then sadism finds its way into the
satiric impu1se.(230) The threat to hang the Bailiff in the middle
of Tenth Piazza is particularly poignant (for him), since hji has
lately killed an adversary (Hyperides) by satire in that place.
Then we might recall a certain tone Lewis adopted when discussing
his role as a satirist and The Apes of God: disavowing, grumbling
about the invidiousness of his task, protesting (too much, perhaps)
that the punishment of the 'fatuous, the overweening, or the crooked1
was a necessary but minor aspect of his work, and certainly not his
raison d'etre as an artist. That tone is repeated in Sammael, the
satirist's apo1ogia glibly taken up by the Devil. Thus, in Rude
Assignment:
...Satire must be received (by Lewis' 'tender-minded' contem¬
poraries ) as an instance of the intervention of the Fiend
in human affa i rs...(Yeats) seemed under the impression that
I was embarked upon a career as a satirist. But that was far
from my intention. Indeed I should be very sorry to have
nothing but that mode of expression to my credit, as it is
not my favourite one. (231)
Despite his having been 'plastered from head to foot with slander' as
a consequence, it was; his 'duty', 'incumbent' upon him, to hang the
Apes 'from the nearest tree'. Sammael, similarly, (as observed in
section (ix) of the previous chapter) has been slandered, his reputa¬
tion ruined for good, by taking on a task which, in truth, he would
much rather not be in charge of:
"I agreed, a long time ago, to administer tortures...to the
men and women who had failed to keep his (God's) command¬
ments...! resented being offered a job of that kind, but I
accepted nevertheless...! have never relished my job as
executioner...! do not enjoy playing the bourreau." (232)
If Sammael is what Lewis was, the Pullman of Ma 1ign Fiesta is
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what, in a sense, he is becoming. Whereas Pullman, in the other books
of The Human Age, has been referred to merely as an author in his
mortal career, here he is described as having been a satirist on
earth.(233) As a sounding-board for his dawning disaffection with
satire, Lewis presents the 'spirit' of a satirist in Hell.
Such an experiment in self-observation is concomitant with that
awakening of a vivid moral sense in Pullman that was commented upon in
the previous discussion of this novel.
Initially, Pullman is more ready to recognize evil than he is to
shed the satirist in him. To cling to being a satirist in the midst
of the horrors all about him is, in fact, a means of allaying his in¬
tense fear - he translates those horrors into the satirist's idiom.
Thus, when Madame Heracopoulos (who has sometimes been employed in
Dis, the Punishment Centre) expresses puzzlement over why, when she
was once removing the cuticle from the buttocks of a female sinner
(local anaesthetic having been administered), the woman died, Pullman
explains the victim's abrupt decease by recourse not to anatomy, but
psychology. Scarification is as much a principle of satire as it is
of surgery, and, accordingly, can kill through shame (Pullman seems to
be saying), as well as by physical trauma:
"It may not have been shock, but the will-to-live may
suddenly have ended; especially if she had been a woman
for whom having the skin peeled off her bottom maliciously
was so unlike anything in her experience that there was
nothing left to live for. - Not only is our nervous system
very dissimilar from yours, but also our psychology is
profoundly different." (234)
This is the satirist's expertise used defensively, desperately even,
rather than aggressively, used as a screen, that is to say. But it
invites us to recall, to his disadvantage, the Lewis who was once as
addicted to surfaces as that Swiftian persona who saw
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Last Week... a woman f1 ay'd, and you will hardly believe, how
much it altered her Person for the worse. Yesterday I
ordered the Carcass of a Beau to be stript in my presence;
when we were all amazed to find so many unsuspected Faults
under one Suit of Cloaths. (235)
Again, Pullman resorts to the satirist's training when, at the
Punishment Centre as a guest of Dr Hachilah, he observes a German
sinner burnt alive. The engine employed is an inverted sledge that
runs down aerial rails over a vast grill:
The Doctor's flask contained rum of a high alcoholic per¬
centage, but all that was not the only cause of his relative
detachment. In so large a place, curious mechanical acces¬
sories of this atrocious kind emasculated the horror; the
darkened atmosphere, the absence of sound (no cry came from
the victim) gave it much more the effect of an operation than
of an execution. A very odd, upside-down operation. (236)
Such a horrible spectacle can be withstood, it would seem, by observing
it coldly, technically, as the satirist has frequently affected to
regard his victims (the satirist having been for Lewis both surgeon
and executioner). But it can on 1y be withstood by attending critic¬
ally, objectively, to the victim and the means. When Pullman's atten¬
tion goes to Hachilah himself, this detachment - all that is left of
the satirist in Pullman - cracks. And, hence, one of the two cardinal
discoveries in Lewis' fiction:
"In ten minutes the Sinner will be totally destroyed?"
Pu11 man i nquired.
Hachilah did not answer, his eyes were greedily fixed
upon the slowly dissolving object...It was a spectacle
that affected him (Pullman) very deeply.
A new Hachilah was glaring at him in the foreground of
his consciousness. He imagined Dr Hachilah at a confer¬
ence where it was being decided whether to destroy a man
by fire or not. He could see him shifting excitedly about
on his chair, his fiery eyes feasting upon the living
flesh of the man for whom frying seemed practically certain.
He could imagine, too, how the victim felt sitting there,
and his eyes suddenly resting upon the man-eating eyes of
Hachilah. He felt, the length of his spine, and down to
the soles of his feet, what the man would feel for whom
life was in the balance. (My ita 1 i cs .)
He was electrified by this new disquiet. (237)
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For the first time, Lewis invites the reader to look into the eyes of
the avenger/executioner, rather than through those eyes. In an
astonishing access of sympathy, Pullman, and by implication Lewis,
suddenly feel what it is like to be the victim - of Archilochus, of
Dryden or Swift, of Wyndham Lewis, of any concentration camp guard or
doctor. Whether the satirist's desire to cause death is real or
imaginary, or whether it can be effected actually or only symbolically,
is not really the question; for what, it would seem, is being suggested,
or conceded, now is that the desire itself is infernal, and that the
cold, indifferent temper that has been the satirist's rhetorical boast
is, in truth, a consuming hatred.
In his final days, Kenner writes, 'Lewis's mind...was taken up
with Pullman, with whom his imagination had now identified itself.
Sammael interested him little, as did satire.' (238) Such a transition
of interests, Kenner suggests, had its source in Lewis' suspicion
(aroused by what he himself had discovered in the writing of Ma 1ign
Fiesta) that 'the whole Lewisian system of values is wrong. And Lewis
actually braced himself to consider the latter possibility. It is the
most extraordinary deed in his long career. At the age of 73 he
commenced to re-examine, at long last, the premises on which he had
conducted all his writing.'(239) And at the root of this renuncia¬
tion is that insight of Pullman's which, Kenner thinks, 'challenges
the whole of the preceding work' (everything, that is, that Lewis had
ever written):
God va1ues man: that is the important thing to remember.
It is this valuing that is so extraordinary...The only
value for Sammael is solipsistic. I, Pullman, am acting
in a valueless vacuum called Sammael. (240)
Such a revelation was to have been the subject of The Trial of
Man, the fourth book of The Human Age, of which Lewis completed only a
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synopsis, which, evidently, he later rejected. But on the strength of
the conversion apparent in Ma 1ign Fiesta, of Pullman's radical en¬
lightenment, and of the synopsis itself, it is possible to state that,
at the end of his career, a twin departure was being made by Lewis.
He was casting off not only the malignantly destructive system of
desires of the satirist, but also those philosophic and imaginative
frames of mind that had predisposed him to criticize, and to envision
nature, as the Gnostic did.
The two aspects of such a departure from the traditions in whose
terms this thesis has regarded Lewis are concomitant. For if God
values Man, then to satirize Man, or to satirize particular men, is,
obliquely, an insult to God. While in his credence in this valuing,
in God's interest in Man, in going from satire and Satan to God, Pull¬
man is acting on the strength of that faith that the Gnostic lacked,
sufficient in itself to bring salvation. Thus, whereas in Time and
Western Man (as was observed in Chapter 2, section (iv)) Lewis had
insisted that God could only be apprehended through a sort of aesthetic
gnosis, which must make Him unattainable to all but a few, towards the
end of Ma 1ign Fiesta, Lewis is no longer concerned with such esoteric
notions of communion with the Divine. No special intellection \0
required in Pullman, at the end of that novel, for him to be lifted up
into the divine light, simply faith (and heartfelt prayers).
In the last book of all the hero, Pullman, is at last in
Divine Society. He favours the Divine. 1 favour the
Divine.
Thus, Lewis in a letter to Kenner.(241) It is, in a sense, in
answer to this statement that God (for the Gnostic, infinitely remote)
reveals Himself in the synopsis of The Trial of Man, gently catechis¬
ing Sammael's nurse, 'delighting' her for reasons she cannot discover:
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The Sister had by now become familiar with the magnificent
geography of this superb face: the broad forehead, sur¬
mounted by heavy blue-grey hair, the light lines not
seemingly drawn there by nature, but by the man himself -
they had so voluntary an appearance...(242)
Yet the quality approaching awe that, for the first time, Lewis here
displays in physical characterization:
This old magician of the cloudy wastes of Heaven! How
fresh he 1ooked .. .(243)
is also, perhaps, a self-delivered riposte to his long, troubled de¬
bate with material being, nature and life. Likewise, God's refusal
to be aroused by the foul-mouthed railing of another 'magician1, the
now mutilated Sammael, and His 'consideration' for His enemy in his
suffering, (244) reveal vengeance to have become a defunct imperative
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